POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

Your editor argues that the Constitution needs to be amended to give Americans the constitutional right they believed they had but the Supreme Court in *Bush v. Gore* denied—the right to vote for and select the president.

GARY C. JACOBSON asserts the 2000 election and its bizarre aftermath in Florida accurately reflected the configuration of partisan politics that crystalized during the Clinton administration: close partisan balance in Congress and in the electorate; distinct regional, cultural, and ideological divisions between the parties' respective electoral coalitions; and a sharp partisan polarization among political elites, echoed, though more faintly, in the broader public. The trends that produced this political configuration predated the 1990s, but they accelerated during the Clinton years, and Clinton himself was a catalyst in their development.

ROBERT S. ERIKSON presents a look back on the 2000 presidential campaign and election, using data from campaign polls and the VNS exit polls. He examines the forecasters' error in predicting a Gore victory and follows the campaign horse race in national and state polls.

OMAR G. ENCARNACIÓN challenges the widespread conventional wisdom that holds a vibrant and robust civil society to be a crucial precondition for the successful consolidation of democracy. He explores the politics of democratization of post-Franco Spain, a case that possesses the curious distinction of being an historical paradigm of civil society underdevelopment, and also the most striking example of democratic consolidation among so-called Third Wave democracies.

RICHARD M. PIOUS challenges the belief that President John Kennedy was able to manage the Cuban Missile Crisis and end it on favorable terms. He examines the records of the deliberations of the ExComm and Politburo in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis and concludes that only when Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev abandoned gamesmanship and turned to secret negotiations and bargaining were the two leaders able to defuse the crisis.

HOWARD L. REITER examines the development of the north-south split within the Democratic party in the United States and dates it from the era of the New Deal. He emphasizes the interplay of economics and race as causal factors, concluding that cohort replacement was the means by which the congressional party changed.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Editor's Opinion: Why Americans Deserve a Constitutional Right to Vote for Presidential Electors

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

Americans deserve the constitutional right to vote for president. We do not have it now. Last year's presidential election showed that our Constitution should be amended to declare explicitly that every citizen of requisite age has a constitutional right to vote for presidential electors and that the popular vote in each state determines the allocation of electoral votes. This kind of amendment would retain the electoral vote system of choosing the president and not alter the balance of power between large and small states, among regions, or between parties.

Political scientists, constitutional law experts, and other careful readers were stunned to read in the U.S. Supreme Court's *Bush v. Gore* majority opinion the declaration that "the individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for President unless and until the state legislature chooses statewide election."[1] All of us knew that was literally true in the original 1787 constitutional language. But the actuality since Andrew Jackson's day was that state legislatures had enfranchised essentially all white, adult, male citizens to vote for presidential electors.[2] Then various constitutional amendments prohibited discrimination in voting on the basis of race, gender, or age above eighteen. Most Americans who even thought about it thus assumed that the long-term de facto right to vote for presidential electors had become through custom and tradition a de jure right and was sufficient to make our

[1] George W. Bush and Richard Cheney, *Petitioners v. Albert Gore, Jr. et al.*, 12 December 2000.

[2] The exceptions were South Carolina, which held out until 1852, and Florida, which in 1868 briefly went back to having the legislature appoint electors.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY, the editor of *Political Science Quarterly*, is professor of political science and the Janet Robb Professor of Social Sciences at Barnard College and the Graduate Faculty of Columbia University.

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system a secure presidential democracy.[3] Probably most voters did not even know they were casting votes only for electors, since the names of electors in almost all states are not on the ballot—only the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

The original and never amended language of the Constitution left to the states the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," a number of electors equal to the number of senators (two for each state) and representatives to which the state was entitled in Congress.[4] A reading of the diary that James Madison kept during the 1787 constitutional convention shows why this indirect and decentralized way of choosing the president was adopted. The most important reasons were: first, the delegates had wide differences of opinion on what the role of ordinary citizens should be in the election of the president, so they agreed to disagree and leave that issue to each state; and second, the states with small populations that were very insistent on states' rights were given another important constitutional power in the interest of their being able to persuade their states to adopt a predominantly nationalizing constitutional document.

In this past year's presidential election, the Florida legislature showed itself prepared to ignore the popular voting tallies if Al Gore had come out ahead in a recount and simply to select George W. Bush electors on its own authority. By taking that course the Florida legislature would have demonstrated for the future: first, that a state legislature could choose popular vote as the "manner" of selecting electors; and second, that if a plurality of the popular vote in the state went to a candidate of a party other than the one controlling the legislature, the legislature could then change the manner and choose electors pledged to a candidate preferred by the legislative majority rather than by popular vote.

The freewheeling majority of the U.S. Supreme Court gave constitutional cover to such a strategy not only when it made the explicit declaration that no federal constitutional right to vote for president existed but also when it failed to caution the Florida legislature about the harm it would cause by following through with its intention, regardless of all the other advice it gave as dicta. To the contrary, the decision cited an obscure nineteenth-century Senate report, a document that has no status as supreme law of the land, to support the majority's claim that, "The State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors."[5]

There is one other provision needed to fully protect the democratic selection of the president: to do away with having actual people as electors even while keeping the electoral vote system for choosing the president. Whatever the case in 1789, there is no merit in the twenty-first century to have real, live electors. When those electors perform the job we have wanted for over 150

[3] See, for example, Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of American Democratic Governance," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989): 21.

[4] *Constitution of the United States of America*, Article II, section 1.

[5] S. Rep. No. 395, 43d Cong., 1st sess., 1873–74.

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years—to elect the president democratically by ratifying the plurality of the popular vote—they become needless rubber stamps. If, on the other hand, electors start deciding to exercise independent judgment as the Framers intended and not just to rubber stamp popular vote pluralities, a small number of strategically placed "faithless" electors could in a close election defeat the intended presidential outcome and provoke a truly dangerous political crisis. Even in the year 2000, one District of Columbia elector pledged to Gore nevertheless cast a blank ballot despite Gore's winning 85 percent of the District's popular vote. Moreover, with the genie of the exact language of the Constitution having been taken out of the bottle by the Florida legislature and with the mass media continuously making plain that electors could not be forced to follow the popular will, the danger of some electors becoming faithless in the future is much more likely. This would be especially true if, unlike the 2000 election, such a future presidential election were to be fought over intensely divisive foreign or domestic proposals.

Even newly emerging democracies in the Third World and former Soviet satellites guarantee every ordinary citizen the right to vote for their country's highest officials. The world's longest-standing democracy and leader of a worldwide crusade for democracy must at least give its own citizens the constitutional right to vote for presidential electors and thus the right to have that vote accurately counted, regardless of the state in which the voter casts it. We have seen it is no longer sufficient to rely on custom and tradition. It has become necessary to insert firm constitutional language by amendment if we are to be protected against antidemocratic state electors, antidemocratic state legislatures, and antidemocratic Supreme Court justices.[6]*

[6] There are also some good reasons for strengthening the democratic nature of presidential elections through doing away with the state-by-state practice of winner-take-all in appointing electors. Moreover that rule is not required by the Constitution and could be changed without an amendment. Maine and Nebraska have alternative apportionment systems even now. Supporters of Thomas Jefferson and of John Adams created the winner-take-all rule in 1800 so that Adams would get no electoral votes from Virginia, and Jefferson would get none from Massachusetts. Its original purpose was thus to disenfranchise statewide popular or legislative minorities from getting any electoral votes at all for their preferred candidate. It is still the case that voters who do not constitute a plurality of the statewide popular vote are disenfranchised, since whether they deliver to their candidate one percent or 49 percent of the popular vote, that candidate gets not a single electoral vote.

*Political Science Quarterly welcomes communications in support or opposition to this opinion.

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

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A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000

GARY C. JACOBSON

Bill Clinton entered the White House in January 1993 with his fellow Democrats solidly in control of the House and Senate. When he moved out in January 2001, Republicans were in full control of the federal government for the first time since 1954. Yet the Republican majorities were, to say the least, exceedingly tenuous. Al Gore had actually won the popular plurality by a margin of nearly 540,000 votes, but George W. Bush eked out a 271-267 electoral college victory when, after more than five weeks of legal maneuvering, the U.S. Supreme Court settled the dispute over the Florida vote count in his favor.[1] The election left the Senate split precisely in half, Republicans and Democrats each holding fifty seats; the Republicans retained control because the vice president, Republican Dick Cheney, casts tie-breaking votes. The Republicans held on to their slim majority in the House of Representatives, a net loss of two seats leaving them with a 221-212 margin.[2] Table 1 summarizes the congressional results.

The 2000 elections were as close to a dead heat across the board as we are ever likely to see. Yet they were not the least anomalous. They accurately represent the close partisan balance now prevailing in the United States. Because no discernable partisan tide was running in 2000 and the rate of party line voting was, according to the exit polls, the highest in decades, the outcomes reflect the underlying partisan balance in the electorate with unusual clarity. They re-

[1] "Final Vote Tally Shows 105 Million Voted," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 December 2000.

[2] The two remaining members are independents who split on which party they routinely support.

GARY C. JACOBSON is professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. His most recent books are *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (5th ed.) and *The Logic of American Politics* (coauthored with Samuel Kernell).

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TABLE 1

Membership Changes in the House and Senate in the 2000 Elections

	Republicans	*Democrats*	*Independents*	*Vacant*
House of Representatives				
Elected in 1998	223	211	1	
At the time of the 2000 election	222	209	2	2
Elected in 2000	221	212	2	
Incumbents reelected	193	199	2	
Incumbents defeated	4	2		
Open seats retained	20	4		
Open seats lost	5	6		
Senate				
After the 1998 election	55	45		
At the time of the 2000 election	54	46		
After the 2000 election	50	50		
Incumbents reelected	13	10		
Incombents defeated	5	1		
Open seats retained	0	3		
Open seats lost	1	1		

Source: Compiled by author.

veal two national parties more evenly matched in terms of popular support than at any time since the nineteenth century, but with a distinct regional and cultural divide between their electoral coalitions.

The campaigns of 2000 did not, however, reflect the intense partisan polarization that has characterized U.S. national politics during the past decade, because the battles for control of the White House and Congress were fought in swing states and districts and for the support of independent-minded swing voters, circumstances that discouraged partisan appeals or even mention of party. Only after the election, in the dispute over how Florida's ballots would be counted, did the full fury of partisan conflict emerge. Members of Congress and other activists on both sides saw the struggle as another round in the fierce partisan warfare that was a defining feature of national politics during the Clinton years. Although ordinary Americans watched the legal and rhetorical squabbling with considerable detachment (neither Bush nor Gore excited widespread popular passions), they, too, divided sharply along partisan lines in their reactions to the events in Florida, just has they had over Clinton's impeachment in 1998–1999.

The close partisan balance in Congress and in the electorate, the regional and cultural divisions between the parties' respective electoral coalitions, and the stark partisan polarization among the parties' politicians and activists, which are are echoed, though more faintly, in the broader public, represent significant long-term trends in U.S. politics. These trends clearly predate the 1990s, but each accelerated during the Clinton years, and Clinton himself played a catalytic role in shaping the political alignments exposed by the 2000 elections. The configuration of partisan forces revealed and installed in Wash-

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ington by the election poses an enormous challenge to the incoming Bush administration and to members of Congress on both sides hoping to avoid unproductive legislative stalemate.

My purpose in this article is to examine the elections of 2000 in their immediate context, as the product of long-term trends in American electoral politics, and as a legacy of the Clinton years. I focus on the House and Senate elections—the presidential election requires a separate analysis to do it justice—except as the presidential contest impinged on the congressional races. I also consider the implications of the elections, the partisan forces they expressed, and their aftermath for the first administration and Congress of the new millennium.

Neutral Partisan Forces

The root source of the congressional and presidential standoff produced by the 2000 election lies in the electorate itself. The substantial popular majority among party identifiers that Democrats had enjoyed since the New Deal was largely gone by the mid-1980s, a change traceable largely to realignment of southerners and social conservatives into the Republican camp.[3] Democrats have since retained a small advantage among party identifiers in most polls,[4] but because self-identified Republicans are more likely to vote and are slightly more loyal to their party when they do, the normal electoral balance is now nearly even.

The congressional election results mirrored this close partisan balance because national forces were essentially neutral in 2000. The razor-thin margin separating Bush and Gore meant that neither party benefited nationally from presidential coattails. Nor did any other national conditions clearly favor one party over the other. Unlike 1994, but like 1996 and 1998,[5] the electoral environment in 2000 broadly favored the congressional status quo. The economy continued to look strong through election day. Modest inflation, low unemployment, rising family incomes, a growing federal budget surplus, and declining rates of crime and welfare dependency had left the public largely satisfied with the direction of the country and approving of its elected leaders.

Clinton obviously benefited from these positive trends, enjoying high levels of public approval; but so did members of Congress. As Figure 1 shows, even though Clinton and the Republicans were often at bitter odds with one another,

[3] Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 5th ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), 106–107; Alan I. Abramowitz, "The End of the Democratic Era? 1994 and the Future of Congressional Election Research," *Political Research Quarterly* 48 (December 1995): 873–889; Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), chap. 7.

[4] In twenty Gallup Polls taken between January and September 2000, the Democrats averaged 51.5 percent of the major-party identifiers (with leaners included among the partisans).

[5] Jacobson, *Politics of Congressional Elections*, 178–194.

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FIGURE 1
Approval of Congress and Bill Clinton, 1993–2000
(Quarterly Averages)



Source: See text.

public approval of the president and Congress showed a remarkable tendency to move in parallel during the Clinton years regardless of which party controlled the Congress.[6] During the eight quarters of unified government in 1993–1994,[7] the quarterly averages of congressional and presidential approval ratings were correlated at .73; during the twenty-four quarters of divided government, they were correlated at .77. The average gap between presidential and congressional approval ratings was actually higher during Clinton's first two years as president (21 points) than during his final six (17 points). At the time of the 2000 elections, both Clinton and the Republican Congress were enjoying unusually high levels of approval by historical standards. The most plausible reason why public approval of the president and a Congress dominated by his enemies moved in rough parallel is that many Americans evaluate both branches by the same criteria, namely the economy and the general state of the nation.

The House Elections

The high level of public satisfaction with Congress and the absence of a discernible partisan tide had a predictably dampening effect on House competition in

[6] The data on presidential approval are from CBS News/*New York Times* and Gallup polls; the data on congressional approval are from CBS News/*New York Times*, Gallup, NBC/*Washington Post*, ABC/*Wall Street Journal*, CNN/*Time*, and *Los Angeles Times* polls, all at http://www.pollingreport.com.

[7] The congressional approval question was not asked during the second quarter of 1994, so I interpolated the data point for that quarter.

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2000.[8] Only the most vulnerable incumbents attracted formidable, well-funded opponents; and in the end, only six incumbents—four Republicans and two Democrats—were defeated in the general election.[9] Many of the thirty-five open seats were not hotly contested, because the district's partisan makeup so clearly favored one of the parties. Most of these noncompetitive open seats were held by Republicans, so that although the Republicans had to defend twenty-five open seats to the Democrats' ten, they actually enjoyed a net gain of one open seat on election day.

The battle for control of the House was thus highly concentrated in a small number of seats, where unprecedented sums were spent by both the candidates and various independent and "voter education" campaigns operating outside the regular campaigns' purview.[10] Most prominent among the handful of incumbents who did attract vigorous opposition were Republicans from Democratic-leaning districts who had defied the manifest wishes of a majority of their constituents by voting to impeach Clinton. Three of the four Republican incumbents who lost fell into this category: California's Brian Bilbray and James Rogan, both representing districts where Clinton had won 55 percent of the major-party vote in 1996, and Jay Dickey of Arkansas, representing a district where Clinton had won 66 percent. But Republicans as a group escaped punishment for their widely unpopular move to oust the president by the simple fact that it failed. Most voters got what they wanted—continuation of the Clinton presidency—and saw no reason to punish Republicans wholesale for the attempt. Just as good times helped Clinton to survive the impeachment process,[11] the strong economy probably helped protect the Republicans in Congress from any impeachment backlash by encouraging public contentment with the status quo.

Also contributing to an uneventful election was the House Republicans' shrewd defensive campaign strategy that was, ironically, almost the exact inverse of the one that had given them their majorities in 1994. Rather than campaign as a team pledged to a common program as they had with the "Contract with America" in 1994, Republican campaigns in 2000 centered on individual candidates and locally important issues.[12] Instead of boldly challenging Clinton, congressional Republicans sought after impeachment to avoid confrontations with the president at all costs. Democrats had hoped to make the Republican Congress an issue, but congressional Republicans carefully avoided battles that

[8] Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), chap. 3.

[9] Three other incumbents, two Democrats and a Republican, lost primary elections.

[10] Gary C. Jacobson, "Congress: Elections and Stalemate" in Michael Nelson, *The Election of 2000* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001), forthcoming.

[11] Gary C. Jacobson, "Public Opinion and the Impeachment of Bill Clinton," *British Elections and Parties Review* 10 (2000), forthcoming.

[12] Bob Benenson, "Proudly Worn Party Label Missing in Key Contests," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 September 2000, 2182–2185.

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TABLE 2

At-Risk and Safe House Seats, 1992–2000, by Party

Electoral risk as determined by presidential vote	*1992*	*1994*	*1996*	*1998*	*2000*	*Change 1992–2000*
At Risk						
Democrats	67	36	40	36	33	−34
Republicans	14	20	22	18	16	+2
Total	81	56	62	54	49	−32
Competitive						
Democrats	49	32	27	31	33	−14
Republicans	23	40	29	27	25	+2
Total	72	72	56	58	58	−12
Safe						
Democrats	142	136	140	144	146	+4
Republicans	139	170	176	178	180	+41
Total	281	306	316	322	326	+45

Note: "At Risk" seats are those in which the winning party's presidential candidate received at least 2 percent less than his average across all districts; "Safe" seats are those in which the winning party's presidential candidate got at least 2 percent more than his average across all districts; "Competitive" seats fall in between these ranges. The 1992 major-party presidential vote is used for 1992 and 1994, the 1996 major-party presidential vote is used for 1996, 1998, and 2000. The district presidential vote has been adjusted where necessary for changes in district boundaries required by court decisions after the initial post-1990 redistricting.

would remind voters either of the 1995 government shutdown or impeachment, instead curbing their ideological rhetoric and rolling out the pork barrel.[13]

In the end, relatively few seats changed party control (seventeen, tied for third lowest among the twenty-seven post-World War II congressional elections). But on balance, the changes that occurred increased the partisan match between districts and members, extending one of the most important developments of the Clinton era. Table 2 displays some illustrative data. It divides districts according to whether the district-level presidential vote for the winning House candidate's party (measured as the percentage of major party vote) was above, below, or near the national average.[14] Representatives whose party's presidential candidate ran two or more percentage points below his national average in the district are considered at risk. Those whose party's presidential candidate ran two or more points ahead of his national average are considered comparatively safe. The rest are deemed competitive.

[13] Andrew Taylor, "Sound Like a Moderate, Vote Like a Conservative," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 5 August 2000, 1930–1934; Mike Christensen, "Congress' Cornucopia: A Sampler of Spending Add-Ons," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 October 2000, 2322–2323.

[14] This procedure is, of course, premised on my argument that the parties enjoy rough parity in the electorate; but any reasonable procedure for making these comparisons across time would show a comparable pattern.

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The data in Table 2 reveal what happened in 1994. Although Clinton entered the White House as a centrist New Democrat, his most conspicuous actions during his first two years—support for gays in the military, pushing through gun control legislation, the failed attempt at comprehensive health care reform, a tax increase as part of his deficit reduction package—branded him a liberal and generated a conservative backlash that helped Republicans take control of the House.[15] The administration's actions in the context of unified Democratic control of the federal government inspired Republicans and conservatives who had been voting for House Democrats to switch to Republican candidates. Consequently, a large majority of the seats Republicans picked up in 1994 were in districts that, according to their presidential voting habits, should have been Republican all along. Clinton was thus an unwitting catalyst in a process that enabled the Republicans' congressional wing finally to reap the benefits of the rise in Republican party identification of a decade earlier.[16]

Because most of the districts Republicans took over in 1994 already leaned Republican, the party had little trouble holding onto most of them through the rest of the decade. More generally, the data in Table 2 show that districts held by the "wrong" party and districts with a competitive party balance both became rarer during the decade, while the number of districts where presidential and House voting were aligned grew substantially, mainly to the benefit of Republicans. This development raised the odds against either party taking seats from the other in the absence of a strong national tide in its favor and thus contributed to the narrow range of competition for House seats in 2000.

The House balance has been very stable and unusual since 1994. Republicans have held onto the House for four consecutive elections for the first time since the 1920s, but with majorities much smaller than those typically enjoyed by the Democrats during the era of Democratic dominance initiated by the New Deal. Indeed, they form the narrowest House majorities elected in any four consecutive elections in U.S. history. As long as the closely divided House reflects a closely divided electorate, control of the House will remain too close to call, as it was in 2000, in any election without a strong partisan tide. It is virtually certain to be up for grabs again in 2002, and awareness of that reality is bound to pervade legislative politics during the 107th Congress.

The Senate Elections

In contrast to the House elections, the Senate elections did alter the status quo in 2000. Republicans lost five seats, leaving the Senate evenly divided between the parties for only the second time in U.S. history. Democrats picked up one seat in July, when Republican Paul Coverdell of Georgia died and Georgia's

[15] Gary C. Jacobson, "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Summer 1996): 203–223.

[16] Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate," *Journal of Politics* 60 (August 1998): 639–642.

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Democratic governor appointed Democrat Zell Miller to take his place; Miller easily won a special election on 7 November to fill out the remaining four years of Coverdell's term. The Democrats gained four additional seats on election day, defeating five incumbent senators to the Republicans' one, with each party losing a single open seat.

The Democrats' gains in the Senate did not, however, reflect any national partisan trend, but rather the absence of one. Turnover is typically higher in Senate elections. On average, Senate incumbents are about three times as likely to lose as House incumbents.[17] Senators are much more likely than representatives to face stiff competition and to lose elections, because a much larger proportion of states than districts have a sufficiently close partisan balance to make them winnable by either party. During the past two decades, no fewer than forty of the fifty states have been served by senators from both parties. Of the remaining ten states, only one (Hawaii) did not elect at least one governor of the party opposite of their senators. Brighter electoral prospects attract a larger number of the talented, well-funded challengers who are essential for competitive contests. As a result, in the average election year about half the Senate races are hotly contested compared with less than 15 percent of the House races.[18] The 2000 election was fairly typical in this regard, with ten seats won with less than 55 percent of the major party vote and sixteen seats won with less than 60 percent.

Senators run on a six-year rather than a two-year cycle, which can also lead to different patterns of competition in House and Senate races. When a strong partisan tide produces large House and Senate gains for a party, the representatives who ride in on the surge are in danger two years later. The senators serve six years before they face the prospect of reelection under less favorable circumstances than when they were first elected. For example, Republicans had an excellent year in 1980, picking up thirty-four House seats and twelve Senate seats, and winning a majority in the upper chamber for the first time since 1952. They quickly gave up most of their House gains, losing twenty-six seats after only two years; but they did not suffer significant losses in the Senate until 1986, when the class of 1980 faced its first test and the Democrats picked up eight seats to regain majority status.

The 2000 Senate elections were the first test for several of the staunchly conservative Republicans who were first elected on the strong Republican tide of 1994. Three of the five Republican losers in 2000 were members of this class—John Ashcroft of Missouri, Rod Grams of Minnesota, and Spencer Abraham of Michigan. All three were burdened with images that put them well to the right of their constituents. Thus part of the reason Democrats pulled even in the Senate is that the strong Republican tide that had prevailed in 1994 was no longer running.

[17] But only on average; reelection rates of senators vary widely from year to year, ranging in post-World War II elections from a high of 97 percent in 1990 to a low of 55 percent in 1980.

[18] Mark C. Westlye, *Senate Elections and Campaign Intensity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 25.

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With the presidential election essentially tied, it would seem that neither party's Senate candidates could derive much of a boost from the top of the ticket. Although no national trend favored either party, some distinctive state currents generated by the presidential campaign probably affected several Senate races.[19] Overall, there was a modest but detectable relationship between statewide presidential and Senate results. The incumbent party lost six of fourteen Senate seats in states won by the other party's presidential candidate, but only two of nineteen seats in states won by its own party's presidential candidate. One of the two was in Florida, where Gore may actually have received the most votes (we'll probably never know). The other was Missouri, which Bush won by a narrow margin. With the exception of Missouri's John Ashcroft, every losing incumbent was from a state won by the other party's presidential candidate.

Overall, twenty-four of thirty-four states cast a plurality of their votes for Senate and presidential candidates of the same party, precisely the same as in 1992 and 1996. Consistency in Senate and presidential voting has returned to the levels that prevailed in the 1950s and early 1960s, in contrast to the 1968–1988 period, when typically only about half the states were won by the same party's Senate and presidential candidates.

Regional Alignments

Like the close national vote for president, the close partisan balance in the House and Senate masks distinct regional differences in party strength. Reflecting the growing linkage between presidential and congressional election results, the regional divisions in the presidential vote reappear in House and Senate election results. Bush won twenty-five of the twenty-six states in the South, Plains, and Mountain West, losing only New Mexico.[20] After the 2000 elections, Republicans held 63 percent of the House seats and 67 percent of the Senate seats in these regions. Gore won nineteen of the twenty-four states in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast.[21] The congressional elections left

[19] In at least one instance, a presidential campaign gave decisive help to a Senate candidate: the huge effort to get out the union and minority vote that swung Michigan into the Gore column was essential to Debbie Stabenow's victory over Spencer Abraham. See "Michigan," *New York Times*, 9 November 2000.

[20] The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia; the Plains include Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota; the Mountain West includes Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.

[21] The Northeast includes Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; the Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin, and West Virginia; the West Coast includes California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. I have placed Alaska in the Mountain West because it has far more in common—geographically, culturally, and politically—with the Mountain states than with the West Coast states.

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FIGURE 2
Republicans' Share of House Seats, by Region, 1946–2000



Source: Compiled by author.

Democrats holding 57 percent of the House seats and 69 percent of the Senate seats in these regions.

The alignments exposed by the 2000 elections represent the latest extension of a long-term trend in regional voting patterns in which the two parties have gradually exchanged areas of dominance. These changes are displayed in Figures 2 and 3, which show the regional distribution of House and Senate since 1946. Republican gains in the South, Plains, and Mountain West put the party in control of Congress in 1994 and have kept it in Republican hands since then. Insofar as Democrats have been able to undo any of the damage suffered in 1994, it has been in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast.

The regional divisions between the parties' electoral coalitions and the demographic and opinion differences that underlie them are readily apparent in the exit poll taken on election day. Recapitulating now familiar patterns, the poll showed that Republican House candidates were favored by men, whites, and married people; Democrats were favored by women, African Americans (overwhelmingly), Hispanics, and singles (Figure 4).[22] Regionally, voters in the Northeast favored Democrats, while southern voters favored Republicans. Midwesterners divided almost evenly, giving Republicans a very slight edge;

[22] Figures 4 and 5 show how much the share of votes cast for Republican House candidates deviated from 50 percent for each category of respondents.

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FIGURE 3
Republicans' Share of Senate Seats, by Region, 1946–2000



Source: Compiled by author.

westerners were split 50-50, but only because Democratic majorities in the coastal states were offset by the solidly Republican mountain states. Democrats prevailed among urban voters, Republicans among rural voters, with the suburbs divided almost evenly.

Conforming to traditional party class differences, the higher a voter's income, the more likely a vote for the Republican candidate. But notice that differences generated by two noneconomic factors—gun ownership and religiosity—are even larger than the differences associated with income. The difference in the House vote between the highest and lowest income categories is 16 percentage points, while the difference between people in households with and without guns is 20 percentage points, and between the most and least religiously active, 23 percentage points.

Analysis of voters' responses to issue questions, a selection of which are shown in Figure 5, reinforces the idea that the vote choice was strongly influenced by noneconomic considerations. The vote is most strongly related to responses to the abortion question, with people who think it should always be illegal voting 42 percentage points more Republican than people who think it should always be legal. The second largest difference is associated with support or opposition to school vouchers (36 points), the third largest, with opinions on gun control (34 points). On other issues that divided the presidential candi-

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FIGURE 4
Demographic Characteristics and the Republican House Vote



Note: Population percentages for demographic categories are in parentheses.
Source: Voter News Service Exit Poll at http://www.cnn.com 12 November 2000.

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FIGURE 5
Issue Positions and the Republican House Vote



Note: Population percentages for opinion categories are in parentheses.
Source: Voter News Service Exit Poll at http://www.cnn.com 12 November 2000.

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dates—whether to invest a share of social security money in the stock market, how to cut taxes, how to make drugs more affordable for seniors—the gap is 31 to 33 percentage points. The House vote also divided over the trade-off between protecting the environment and encouraging economic growth.

In every case, the same demographic and issue-based divisions between the party coalitions reappear, usually magnified, in the presidential vote reported in the exit poll.[23] The Republican coalition in 2000 was disproportionately white, male, resident of states in the South, Plains, and Mountain West, fond of guns, religiously conservative, rural, married, and affluent. The Democratic coalition in the 2000 election was disproportionately female, minority, resident in the Northeast or West Coast, secular, unmarried, unarmed, and of modest means.

The stark regional and cultural division between the two parties is another legacy of the Clinton years. Although the shift in regional alignments continued a long-term trend, Figures 2 and 3 show that the most rapid shifts occurred during the Clinton administration, underlining his catalytic role in shaping the current party alignments. Ironically, Clinton had originally positioned himself as a centrist New Democrat, a moderate on social and economic issues; and both he and his vice president, Al Gore, were from the culturally conservative South. Yet Clinton's personal behavior and, in many cases, policy positions alienated cultural conservatives, strengthening the Republican party in regions where cultural conservatism predominates. The power of this dimension was exemplified by Al Gore's failure to win either his home state of Tennessee or Clinton's, Arkansas, both of which fall on the Republican side of the widening regional and cultural divide.

Partisan Polarization

The close partisan balance in the electorate left both parties competing for moderate and independent voters in states and districts where the partisan balance was equal enough to foster genuine competition. As a consequence, the campaigns that would decide which party would control the House and Senate tended to downplay party, because moderate swing voters are thought to detest partisan squabbling. The same was true of the presidential campaigns. Thus it was not until after the election that the intense partisan polarization that characterized national politics during the Clinton years came into sharp relief once again. When it did, reactions to the postelection action in Florida confirmed that not only politicians and activists, but also ordinary Americans have become sharply divided along party lines.

Members of Congress and partisan activists immediately rallied to their party's presidential candidate. Both the heated rhetoric and clean partisan split

[23] Gary C. Jacobson, "The Elections of 2000 and Beyond," A Supplement to Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *The Logic of American Politics* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000), 23–25.

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were reminiscent of the struggle over Clinton's impeachment, which had divided members of Congress almost perfectly along party lines.[24] "They're stealing it, they're stealing it, they're stealing it" is how Republican Representative Charles W. Pickering, Jr. of Mississippi put it, unprompted, to a reporter.[25] Like impeachment politics, the instinctive partisan reactions to postelection events in Florida showed just how polarized national politics has become.

The split was not confined to politicians and activists; although ordinary voters were more bemused by than passionately involved in the postelection events in Florida, they, too, divided strongly along party lines in responding to questions. Polls assessing public opinion on the election's aftermath found immediate, sustained, and huge differences between Bush and Gore supporters (that is also to say, between Republicans and Democrats[26]) on relevant questions. Some examples appear in Table 3. Among Bush voters, 93 percent were satisfied with the election outcome, 92 percent thought Bush had won the election legitimately, and 95 percent approved of the Supreme Court's decision stopping the manual recount of ballots in Florida. Among Gore voters, 89 percent were dissatisfied with the outcome, 81 percent thought Bush was not the legitimate victor, and 80 percent disapproved of the Supreme Court's decision. Most Gore supporters (65 percent) thought the Court's decision was partisan, while most Bush supporters (84 percent) thought it was impartial. Gore voters were convinced that more Florida voters intended to vote for Gore than for Bush (83 percent), while most Bush voters believed the opposite (59 percent, with another 28 percent uncertain). The two sides were also sharply divided on whether the Court's decision to stop the vote count was fair. Partisan differences of this magnitude are unusual in public opinion data, but they are fully consistent with evidence of increasing partisan polarization among voters both before and during the Clinton administration. They echo the split between self-identified Democrats and Republicans over Clinton's impeachment, when polls consistently found about 85 percent of Democrats opposed to impeaching and convicting the president, and about 65 percent of Republicans in favor.[27]

Partisan divisions among both members of Congress and ordinary citizens have been growing for several decades. The widening partisan and ideological

[24] In the House, 98 percent of the Republicans had voted for at least one of the four articles of impeachment, and 98 percent of the Democrats had voted against every one of them. In the Senate, 91 percent of the Republicans voted to convict Clinton on at least one article, while not a single Democrat voted for conviction on any article.

[25] Andrew Taylor, "First Test of Promised Comity is Late Lame-Duck Session," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 November 2000, 2723.

[26] Polls that report responses broken down by party identification rather than presidential preference replicate the results reported in Table 3. For example, a Gallup Poll taken 15–17 December found 85 percent of Republicans saying that Bush won "fair and square," while 49 percent of Democrats thought he had won on a technicality, and 37 percent said he stole the election. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/release/pr001220.asp. [28 December 2000.]

[27] Jacobson, "Public Opinion and Impeachment."

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TABLE 3

Public Opinion on the Presidential Election Outcome (Percent)

	All	*Gore Voters*	*Bush Voters*
1. "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the outcome of the elections?"			
Satisfied	50	9	93
Dissatisfied	45	89	6
Don't know	5	2	1
2. "Would you say George W. Bush legitimately won the election, or not?"			
Legitimately won	53	11	92
Did not	40	81	3
Don't know	7	8	5
3. "As you may know, on Tuesday the United States Supreme Court ruled in George W. Bush's favor, and stopped the manual recounting of votes in Florida that had been ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that stopped the manual recount?"			
Approve	54	16	95
Disapprove	42	80	4
Don't know	2	4	1
4. "Do you think the Supreme Court's decision was based more on partisan politics, or more on an objective interpretation of the law?"			
Partisan politics	37	65	10
Objective interpretation	54	29	84
Both (vol.)	1	1	2
Neither (vol.)	1	0	1
Don't know	7	5	3
5. "Regardless of what the current vote total is, who do you think more Florida voters intended to vote for: Al Gore or George W. Bush?			
Gore	46	83	13
Bush	34	7	59
Don't know	20	10	28
6. "This week, by margin of 5 to 4, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida courts' decision and stopped hand recounts of presidential ballots in Florida. All in all, do you think the Supreme Court's decision to stop hand recounts in Florida was fair or unfair?"			
Fair	51	19	88
Unfair	44	78	9
Don't know	5	3	3

Sources: Questions 1–5, CBS News Poll, 14–16 December 2000; question 6, *Newsweek* Poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates, 14–15 December 2000, both reported at *http://www.pollingreport.com.* [3 January 2000.]

divide in Congress has been thoroughly documented.[28] It is summarized in Figure 6, which displays changes over time in House members' average Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate scores. DW-Nominate scores are calculated from all nonunanimous roll call votes cast during the 80th through 105th Congresses and

[28] John Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), chap. 7; David W. Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chaps. 3 and 5; Barbara Sinclair, "Hostile Partners: The President, Congress, and Lawmaking in the Partisan 1990s" in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era* (Washington, DC: Congres-

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FIGURE 6
Ideological Positions of House Party Coalitions, 80th to 105th Congresses



locate each member for each Congress on a liberal-conservative scale that ranges from −1.0 to 1.0; the higher the score, the more conservative the member.[29]

The mean ideological locations of House Republicans and Democrats converged from the 80th through 90th Congresses, then began to diverge steadily. By the 105th Congress, the gap between the parties' mean locations exceeded 0.71 on this 2-point scale, about twice what it was in the early 1970s. Figure 6 provides more detail on the etiology of the trend: the Republican mean moved to the right, while the Democrat mean moved to the left, a consequence, plainly, of the gradual atrophy of the party's conservative southern wing. As the parties pulled apart ideologically, they also became more homogenous internally; by the 105th Congress, the House contained the most distinctive and

sional Quarterly Press, 2000), 137–140; Gary C. Jacobson, "Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection" in Bond and Fleisher, *Polarized Politics*, 9–15; Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, *Income Redistribution and the Realignment of American Politics* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1997), chaps. 2 and 3; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, "The President in a More Partisan Arena," *Political Research Quarterly* 49 (December 1996): 729–48.

[29] For an explanation of the methodology for computing these scores and justification for their interpretation as measure of liberal-conservative ideology, see Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chaps. 3 and 10; DW-Nominate Scores are updated versions of their D-Nominate measure.

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polarized party coalitions in more than fifty years.[30] The same trends appear among senators as well.[31]

These trends are familiar to observers of Congress. Less widely known is that voters also became increasingly polarized along ideological and partisan lines during the same period. The proportion of voters placing themselves to the right or left of center on the National Election Studies 7-point ideological scale has grown since the 1970s, and the relationships between party identification, ideology, and voting behavior have all become stronger.[32] In particular, the connection between ideology and House voting has strengthened in the 1990s. As Figure 6 shows, the main reason is that self-identified conservatives have become much more likely to vote for Republican House candidates in the 1990s.

The growing partisan and ideological coherence, consistency, and loyalty among voters reinforce partisan polarization in Congress, for they make House Republican and Democratic electoral constituencies—defined as the voters who support each party's successful congressional candidates—more homogeneous and more dissimilar. Between 1972 and 1998, for example, the gap between the average ideological self-placement of the respective House parties' electoral constituents doubled. Republicans' supporters were responsible for the lion's share of the change; even as the Republicans' electoral constituency was expanding at the expense of the Democrats, it was becoming more uniformly conservative.[33]

The widening gap between the congressional parties' respective electoral coalitions also shows up in aggregate electoral data. In 1972, the average Democratic member's House district was less than eight percentage points more Democratic in its presidential vote than the average Republican's district; by 1996, the gap had grown to more than sixteen percentage points. District-level presidential vote data are not yet available for 2000, but substituting Clinton's 1996 vote suggests that the gap between the House parties' respective electoral coalitions is at least as large for the 107th Congress as it was for the 105th. The congressional parties have moved apart as their electoral constituencies have moved apart.

It is no coincidence that partisan and ideological polarization reached postwar highs during the Clinton administration. Clinton has been a polarizing figure in American politics since his first appearance on the national scene during his campaign for the nomination in 1992. Socially conservative Republicans associated with the religious Right took a deep dislike to him from day one, viewing him as a pot-smoking, draft-dodging, womanizing liberal, who was funda-

[30] Gary C. Jacobson, "The Electoral Basis of Partisan Polarization in Congress" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 31 August–3 September 2000), 1–2.

[31] McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, *Income Distribution and Realignment*, 16.

[32] Jacobson, "Electoral Basis of Partisan Polarization," 6–7.

[33] Ibid., 7–9.

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FIGURE 7
Ideology and the House Vote, 1978–2000



mentally mendacious, conniving, and morally unfit to be president. They never saw fit to reconsider.[34] Other Republicans have also generally taken a dim view of his morals, even while approving of his administration's performance on the economy, budget deficit, and other aspects of policy. Some Democratic constituencies, particularly African Americans, have been enthusiastic supporters; other Democrats have rallied to him because, whatever they think of Clinton, they loathe his many enemies on the Right even more. The signal events of his presidency—the fights over gays in the military, the national health system in 1993–1994, the showdown with the Republican Congress over the budget in 1995, and, above all, the impeachment struggle in 1998–1999—uniformly served to reinforce partisan and ideological divisions.

Clinton's capacity to divide both the Congress and the electorate along party lines was on fullest display during his impeachment and Senate trial, but it was also evident throughout his presidency. Congressional party differences in level of support for presidential initiatives were greater during his administration than in any since *Congressional Quarterly* first began publishing this in-

[34] Conservative political columnist George Will, for example, ended his wrap-up on the Clinton administration with this sentiment: "Clinton is not the worse president the republic has had, but he is the worst person ever to have been president"; see "Clinton's Mark," *Washington Post*, 11 January 2001.

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FIGURE 8
Partisan Differences in Presidential Approval, Eisenhower through Clinton
(Quarterly Averages)



formation.[35] The average party difference during the Clinton years of 45 percentage points was more than 10 points larger than that in any administration from Eisenhower through the first Bush presidency. Still, this fissure began to widen well before Clinton. Party differences in presidential support have generally been growing wider since the Nixon administration. Once again, the Clinton years witnessed not the initiation but rather extension of a preexisting trend. The opposition party is responsible for nearly all of the change, as its level of support for the president has declined while support from members of the president's party has remained stable.

The public displays a complementary trend in its responses to the Gallup Poll's presidential approval question during the same period. Differences in level of approval between respondents identifying with the president's and those identifying with the other party from Eisenhower through Clinton are displayed in Figure 8. Again, the gap is widest during the Clinton administration (averaging 56 percentage points). The Reagan administration is not far behind (53 points), however, indicating that wide partisan divisions in evaluations of presidents predate Clinton. By this evidence, Reagan too was a polarizing figure, most likely because of the intense partisan conflicts over the federal budget during his administration. As with presidential support in Congress, the

[35] The same trend appears in both the House and Senate.

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widening partisan gap in presidential approval is largely a consequence of declining levels of approval by people who identify with the opposition party.

Outlook for the 107th Congress

It is not surprising that both members of Congress and ordinary voters divided reflexively into separate partisan camps in response to the postelection dispute over Florida's votes. In the context of the political trends reviewed in this article, it would have been remarkable only if they had not done so. The way in which George W. Bush won the White House certainly makes it harder for him to deliver on his campaign promise to "be a uniter, not a divider." But even without that burden, any president would face a formidable challenge in trying to govern in harness with a Congress so evenly and sharply divided by party as the one elected in 2000, especially when the partisan divisions are so firmly rooted in the parties' respective electoral constituencies.

Bush might take some hope from the example of his father. Observe in Figure 8 that party differences in presidential approval were relatively small during the first three years of the senior Bush's presidency, mainly because his approval rating among Democrats remained relatively high. During the same period, party divisions in Congress over Bush's legislative agenda were smaller than was typical for Reagan or Clinton. Not until 1992, do the data show partisan differences matching those of the Reagan and Clinton years.

Unfortunately for George W. Bush, political conditions make it much more difficult for him to attract moderate Democrats with his "compassionate conservatism" than it was for his father with talk of a "kinder, gentler nation." The father dealt with Democratic congressional majorities that were responsible for governing and were confident they would retain power for the foreseeable future; the son must deal with a closely divided Congress, where every action will be taken with an eye to maintaining or gaining control in the next election. Bush has to bridge a much wider ideological divide than did his father, and not only between the parties. Not the least of his challenges will come from the staunch conservatives who dominate his party's congressional wing; after six years of being stymied and out-maneuvered by Clinton, they are scarcely in the mood for bipartisan compromises. But to the extent that Bush sides with his party's conservatives in Congress, Democrats will be attracted to the strategy of take-no-prisoners opposition pursued so successfully by congressional Republicans in 1993–1994.

Finally, unless he is extraordinarily lucky, Bush cannot expect help from the kinds of global events that buoyed his father for the first three years of his administration. The senior Bush got to preside over the demise of the Berlin Wall, the end of the cold war, and victory in the Gulf War, successes that drove his approval ratings to record highs.[36] Such opportunities are unusual, and none

[36] George C. Edwards III, "George Bush and the Public Presidency: The Politics of Inclusion" in Colin Campbell, S.J. and Bert A. Rockman, *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), 136–138.

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appear at present on the horizon. Moreover, the economy, which was his father's downfall, is showing ominous signs that the longest expansion in U.S. history may be ending just as Bush takes office.

Under these conditions, the political configuration left in place by the 2000 elections is likely to continue the pattern of contentious partisan conflict in which gridlock and stalemate prevail most of the time. If that happens, politicians' energies will turn to persuading voters to break the deadlock by settling matters in their favor in 2002 and 2004.

Looking Forward to 2002

Both houses of Congress will be up for grabs once again in 2002. The Democrats' quest for the Senate might appear to be favored by the subset of seats that are up for election; Democrats currently hold only fourteen of them, while the Republicans must defend twenty-one. However, only five of the current Republican seats are in states won by Gore, and Democrats have to defend three seats in states won by Bush. Democrats may actually have a better chance to take over the Senate before the 2002 elections. Republican control rests on the continued health of the 98-year-old Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and the 79-year-old Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Each represents a state with a Democratic governor who will appoint his successor if he cannot serve out his term.

Even if no change in voters' sentiments occurs, the partisan balance in the House may be altered by the reapportionment and redistricting that must take place before the 2002 midterm in accordance with the 2000 census. Redistricting after the 1990 census clearly benefited the Republicans, because the states that gained seats in the House were significantly more Republican than the states that lost them. In addition, the federal Voting Rights Act's charge to the states to design districts that are winnable by minority candidates worked as a pro-Republican gerrymander.[37] The post-1990 reapportionment and redistricting were a major reason why Republicans finally gained control of the House in 1994.[38]

Republicans should also benefit from the post-2000 reapportionment and redistricting. As in the 1990s, the states scheduled to gain seats are more Republican (as measured by the presidential vote) than the states that will lose seats. Gore won six of the ten states losing seats, while Bush won seven of the

[37] Minority voters are primarily Democrats; packing them into minority-majority districts thus makes neighboring districts more Republican. See Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), 10.

[38] Gary C. Jacobson, "Reversal of Fortune: The Transformation of U.S. House Elections in the 1990s" in David Brady, John Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina, *Continuity and Change in Congressional Elections* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 11–12.

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eight states gaining seats.[39] Moreover, Republican governors and legislatures will control the redistricting process in a slightly larger number of the states where extensive changes in district lines are likely to be required. Republicans also will benefit from Democratic retirements if those members who were persuaded by Minority Leader Richard Gephardt to run one more time in order to help their party retake the House in 2000 now decide to step down.[40]

House Democrats' main hopes for 2002 lie in Bush's victory in 2000. With the exceptions of 1934 and 1998, the president's party has lost House seats in every midterm election since the Civil War. During the past half-century, the Republicans have lost an average of twenty-four House seats in each of the seven midterm elections held during Republican administrations. The main reason that the Republicans did poorly in these elections was the economy. Four of them were held in recession years, two others in years of feeble economic growth, and only one in a year when the growth rate was even average (1986). Republicans lost an average of thirty-five seats in the recession years, compared with eight in the others.

The battle for control of the House in 2002 is likely to be determined mainly by the Bush administration's performance in managing the economy. If the economy continues to grow or bounces back quickly from any slowdown and Bush maintains decent public approval ratings, redistricting may offset the usual midterm decline sustained by the president's party and the Republicans may hold on. But if history is any guide, the 2002 elections offer Democrats their best chance of retaking the Congress since they lost it in 1994.

[39] Arizona, Texas, Florida, and Georgia gain two seats each; California, Colorado, Nevada, and North Carolina gain one each; New York and Pennsylvania lose two each; Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin lose one each.

[40] Karen Foerstel, "Gephardt's Charge," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 November 2000, 2578.

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The 2000 Presidential Election in Historical Perspective

ROBERT S. ERIKSON

The year 2000 presidential election was a unique historical event. With a very close popular vote, the outcome depended on Florida, where, whichever way the votes were counted, the outcome was the closest state election in memory, closer than if Florida voters were deciding by flipping fair coins.[1] Although Al Gore won the national popular vote, George W. Bush eventually won the contested Electoral College verdict with help from the U.S. Supreme Court.

Continuing the *Political Science Quarterly* tradition of following each presidential election with an early analysis in the spring issue after the election,[2] this article attempts to put the 2000 election in perspective—to understand the electorate's 2000 verdict within the context of what we know about elections past. Fortunately, several resources are available to help with this task. For a start, there are the Voter News Service (VNS) exit polls of voters as they left their polling places on election day. Both national and state exit polls, with their breakdowns of the vote by attitudes and social characteristics, became available to all on the web immediately after the election. Another data source available from the web is the trial-heat poll results reported throughout the cam-

[1] To understand how close the election in Florida was, consider the likely outcome if the approximately six million voters all were flipping coins. Over multiple trials of six-million coin flips, the median lead for heads or tails would be about 600 votes.

[2] For 1989, 1993, and 1997, the late Everett Carll Ladd wrote these election postmortems. I am grateful for being asked to try to follow in his footsteps. See Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1988 Election: Continuity of the Post-New Deal System," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989); 1–18; Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1992 Vote for President Clinton: Another Brittle Mandate?" 108 (Spring 1993): 1–28; Everett Carll Ladd, "1996 Vote: The 'No Majority' Realignment Continues," *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (Spring 1997): 1–28.

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paign. From election to election, the density of trial-heat polling has grown to the point that during the heat of the 2000 campaign, multiple surveys were reported every day. Still another resource is the rich pool of surveys conducted at the state level. During the fall 2000 campaign, there were more daily state surveys reported than national surveys. When the results of state surveys are adjusted for state effects, they can be used to assess national trends.[3]

Drawing on History: Past Elections as Models for 2000

One way to understand an election is to frame it in terms of its historical analogies. For example, the story-line of 1996 ("popular incumbent wins reelection easily in a wave of national prosperity") followed the familiar script from 1956 (Eisenhower reelected) and 1984 (Reagan reelected) among others.[4] For 2000, there was no shortage of scripts from elections past. At various times during the campaign and the extended post-election period, events appeared to follow one story-line from the past, only to veer off and follow another. The surprise ending was a variant of Hays-Tilden in 1876—the disputed election decided by the vote along partisan lines of a special congressional commission. At the start of the campaign, the obvious model from the past was 1988, with Gore playing the role of George Bush senior from twelve years before. But as the campaign progressed, other models followed.

1988–Bush Defeats Dukakis

For several months, the 2000 campaign was following the script of 1988 to the letter. In both 1988 and 2000:

- The vice president of a popular term-limited president was the obvious early front-runner for his party's nomination.
- The vice president had difficulty shaking hints of personal involvement in scandals from the previous administration (Iran-contra for Reagan-Bush, fundraising problems for Clinton-Gore).

[3] This article goes to press in March 2001, only four months after the election and three months after the final determination of its outcome. Thus it runs the risk of being premature. Future analysts will have information about the election and its voters not yet available in the election's immediate aftermath. This will include the rich survey data of the 2000 National Election Study, which is normally disseminated about six months after the election. And the exit polls will reveal more of their riches after their individual-level data are released a year after the election. The exit poll information available on the web immediately after the election consists of reported bivariate relationships between certain predictors (social characteristics, attitudes, policy preferences) and the vote. Valuable though this information is, it allows for no multivariate analysis. At their most rigorous, voting studies examine the effects of several predictors on the vote while controlling for each other. This is possible only with individual-level data.

[4] We could add 1964 and 1972 to this list of landslide reelections under economic prosperity. Those elections are more remembered for the ideological "extremism" of losers Barry Goldwater (1964) and George McGovern (1972) than for being conducted under the aura of prosperity.

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- The vice president showed surprising weakness in the early primary phase, even appearing to be beatable by his persistent rival (Robert Dole in 1988, Bill Bradley in 2000). However, aided by the stronger political machine, the vice president emerged victorious in the New Hampshire primary and glided to the nomination.
- Still politically weakened and and overshadowed by the president, the vice president found himself behind in the preconvention polls against an out-party governor.
- At the out-party national convention, the delegates muffled their ideological leanings, and the candidate gave a good speech. The polls showed the out-party candidate zooming to a lead as large as 17 points. The thought was in the air that the out-party had a good shot at returning to power.
- At the in-party national convention, the smell of defeat was in the air. Now as the party's nominee, the vice president needed to give the speech of his life. He did and then some. Almost immediately, the polls showed the vice president surging to the lead.
- The election seemed on course to be a triumph of economic determinism where despite some apprehensions the nation was not about to reject the party in power during a time of prosperity.
- Consistent with economic prosperity and contrary to many predictions, the vice president's lead did not dissipate as a temporary convention bounce. The lead, albeit a small one, persisted to Labor Day and then held through most of September.

As of late September, the analogy with 1988 ended, as Gore lost his lead. It was replaced by a different script that had been competing for attention: 1960, John F. Kennedy beats Richard Nixon.

1960–Kennedy Beats Nixon

As a close election according to the polls, the 2000 election was repeatedly called the closest since 1960 (Kennedy-Nixon) by campaign commentators. But this was not the only analogy between 1960 and 2000. In each instance

- The vice president, though very knowledgeable politically, was an awkward or stiff campaigner.
- The vice president was surprisingly reluctant to enlist the help of his popular president, preferring to campaign on his own merits rather than his administration's past accomplishments.
- The public credited the vice president with an edge in experience and competence.
- The opposition candidate was personable, but was held suspect for his lack of experience and being an unknown quantity.
- In the debates, the opposition candidate held his own with the vice president, an experienced debater, thereby gaining stature with the voters.

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- Throughout the campaign, the opinion polls were so close that no observer could honestly forecast how the election was going to turn out.

Following the 1960 model, the 2000 contest was so close at the end as to be in dispute. In both elections, the vice president lost to the less experienced opponent, at least in the final electoral vote tally. Not to be forgotten though, is that Bush led almost all trial-heat polls during the month leading up to the election. This suggests another model from history.

1948–Truman Beats Dewey

The 1948 model has a prominent place in twentieth-century electoral history. Against all odds, with the final polls showing a decisive Thomas Dewey lead, Harry Truman was reelected in the upset of the century. How close did 2000 come to be a replay?

- As the election approached, one candidate (Dewey, Bush) led in all or virtually all the polls.
- Fighting for his political survival, the underdog (Truman, Gore) ran a populist campaign, appealing to his Democratic base to get out the vote.
- The underdog's prospects were exacerbated by a pesky leftist third-party candidate (Henry Wallace, Ralph Nader) who threatened to drain votes away in key states.
- The favored out-party candidate posed not as a representative of his party's ideological wing but as a pragmatic large-state governor who gets results.
- As Election Day approached, the favorite candidate operated on the illusion of easy victory, saying little of substance. Bush continued to take most Sundays off, and by the Thursday before the election, he stopped all internal polling.
- A late campaign event (Dewey's impromptu complaint about his train engineer, revelations about Bush's earlier drunk driving arrest) may have caused some voters to shift, although it is hard to say.
- In the crucial analogy, undecided voters surged to the underdog, handing him the popular vote by a whisker. Although there were no last minute polls to record 1948's event, the 2000 surge is amply documented.

If it were not for the ballot difficulties in Florida, the repeat of 1948 might have been the final story of 2000. The difference was that in 1948 the pollsters were not in the field to record Truman's late advance, which generated a true upset. In 2000, one could not blame the pollsters, whose tallies converged toward a prediction of a dead heat. Still, since the popular vote "tie" did not arise until election eve, the magnitude of Gore's surge was not heavily publicized. Since most voters were aware only of Bush's narrow lead over the final month, the final Gore popular vote victory presented a surprise. In an ironic twist, a popular vote/electoral vote disparity was widely anticipated, but with the wrong electoral model.

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1888–Harrison Beats Cleveland

The 1888 contest served as a model because it was the last time the popular vote winner lost in the Electoral College. As the 2000 contest approached, many observers (myself included) forecast that although Bush was ahead in the polls, Gore had a good chance to win the Electoral College. The reasoning was that in the supposed battleground states where the election was to be decided, Gore was running about even with Bush and maybe a bit ahead. It seemed quite possible that Gore could lose the popular vote and still win narrowly in the battleground states, doing to Bush what Harrison did to Cleveland.

Apart from Florida, Gore won most of the battleground states. Had the votes in Florida been counted to Gore's liking, Gore would have won the Electoral College and with a higher percent of the electoral votes than of the popular votes. Still, the fact that Bush, not Gore, benefited from the electoral vote, popular vote disparity deserves discussion.

1876–Hays Beats Tilden

The story ends with the replay of the now familiar Hays-Tilden postelection dispute. Neither the original 1876 outcome nor the 2000 replay require additional attention here.

The 2000 Election and Past Scripts: A Summary

To recapitulate the chapters of the 2000 story, we start with Bush ahead throughout the conventions, followed by a reversal with Gore holding a narrow lead (a la 1988). By late September the race tightened further but with Bush regaining the lead after the first presidential debate (echoes of 1960). Meanwhile, Gore was holding his own in the battleground states, suggesting a possible Electoral College upset (as in 1888). Finally, Gore surged at the last minute for an upset popular vote win (harking back to 1948) but of course only to lose in the all important Electoral College (see 1876).

Forecasting the 2000 Election: What Went Wrong?

Similar to the easily accessible scripts from past elections, political scientists have developed their own models as prisms for interpreting elections. By the 2000 election, political science forecasting models earned attention both within the profession and in the mass media. The forecasting models base their predictions from a statistical analysis of past election results, where the input for the predictions are various measures of economic prosperity plus aspects of political satisfaction, best summarized by the president's approval rating.[5] For 2000,

[5] See, for instance, the consensus of very accurate forecasts of the 1996 presidential election in James Campbell and James Garand, eds., *Before the Vote: Forecasting American National Elections* (Thousand Hills, CA: Sage, 2000).

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the augers pointed clearly in one direction. With twelve years of prosperity and a president with a record level of popularity for his eighth year in office, all signs pointed to a Gore victory by a comfortable margin.

If elections can be predicted from the economy and other variables, what is the role of the campaign? While many studies focus on the influence of campaign events and strategies on voter decision making,[6] an increasingly dominant school of thought sees elections largely shaped by forces beyond the control of the candidates and their campaign managers. According to this view, campaigns matter, but only to steer the vote toward the proper equilibrium, which can be foreseen in advance.[7]

Simplified to the point of caricature, current theorizing about campaigns goes something like this: Elections are easily predictable from variables such as economic conditions and the popularity of the president (whether or not he can succeed himself). Therefore, what candidates do during the course of the campaign is largely irrelevant to their fate. Candidates try their best and do run the best campaigns they can. But this only cancels out their equal and opposite effects. It is not that election outcomes are automatic, but that the long campaign moves voters only by providing the information so that they become aware of their interests.

The argument behind this new conventional wisdom is a thoughtful one and based on certain truths. On the eve of the formal election campaign—around Labor Day—elections are as predictable from economic and political variables as they are from available polls. And polls typically show only mild movement over the fall campaign period from Labor Day to election day, when the campaign is full-blown. It is at least arguable that when the polls show change over the campaign, it is in the direction predicted by the forecasting models.

Throughout the 2000 campaign, the polls cooperated only part of the time to confirm the political science wisdom of a probable Gore victory. To a political scientist with faith in forecasting models, it would matter little in the days before the Democratic convention that Bush actually led in the polls. This faith was soon vindicated with force when Gore surged ahead after the conventions. The template of 1988 (when Bush Sr. similarly surged ahead) seemed so right. However, this faith was then put to the test when Bush Junior regained the lead, and it had to be seriously questioned after the election, even as the late surge to Gore and his narrow popular vote victory provided some reason to

[6] Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89 (May 1995): 309–26; Daron R. Shaw, "A Study of Campaign Even Effects from 1952 to 1992," *Journal of Politics* 61 (May 1999): 387–422.

[7] Andrew Gelman and Gary King, "Why Are American Presidential Election Polls so Variable When Votes Are so Predictable?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (October 1993): 409–519; Thomas Holbrook, *Do Campaigns Matter?* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); James E. Campbell, *The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2000).

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FIGURE 1
Incumbent Party Vote, Actual and Predicted, 1952–2000



sustain belief. How could the model be wrong? What about the role of the campaign in deciding the outcome?

Let us see how badly the forecasting models got it wrong and then figure out why. At the American Political Science Association convention in early September 2000, a panel of nine political scientist forecasters made their predictions. They agreed in the expectation that Gore should win decisively if not in a landslide. Their only debates seemed minor, like exactly which way the economy should be gauged and whether other variables should be included in the equation.

Typical for these forecasting models is one presented by Christopher Wlezien and me. For 2000, the Wlezien-Erikson model predicted a Gore victory with about 55 percent of the two-party vote.[8] Since it explained 82 percent of the variance in the vote over the twelve elections 1952–1996, the prediction of a Gore victory might have seemed bankable. What went wrong?

[8] This forecasting equations is

$$IPV = 33.49 + 7.56PCIG + 0.30PA$$
$$(3.05)\ (2.71)\qquad ((0.07)$$

where IPV = the incumbent presidential party's percent of the two-party vote, $PCIG$ = quarterly per capita income growth through quarter 15 of the administration, weighted so each quarter counts 1.25 times the previous one, and PA = the president's Gallup approval rating in quarter 15. Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R squared =.82; N = 12.

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FIGURE 2
Democratic Presidential Vote, Actual and Predicted, 1952–2000



To put the forecast in perspective, it is helpful to present the information graphically. Figure 1 displays the incumbent-party vote (as percent of the two-party vote) on the Y axis and the model's predictions on the X-axis, using 1952–1996 data. The 2000 forecast is shown in bold. To aid understanding, it is also helpful to display the information after converting the incumbent-party vote and the prediction to the vote share of the two-party vote going to the Democratic party. This is done in Figure 2.

Figures 1 and 2 show that the vote prediction was off in 2000 by five percentage points. Interestingly, this is not even a record-setting amount of error, as the 1972 out-of-sample forecast was slightly larger. The difference was that nobody noticed much, if the usual predictors underestimated the size of Nixon's landslide win over McGovern in 1972 by six points. The five-point overestimate of Gore's showing in 2000 stood out, because even though the forecast got the popular vote winner correctly, it missed who would enter the White House.

The forecasters' excuse is that their predictions were not intended as precision estimates. With 82 percent of the variance explained by the model, obviously 18 percent is unexplained in the error term. With this degree of prediction and only twelve cases (past elections) to work with, the degree of precision is far from perfect. If one treats the statistical model presented in equation 1 seriously and applies it to the facts of 2000, Gore wins but only with odds of about 4 to 1. So we can assume that the models are correct up to a point, but that the things they do not measure contribute as well. What would they be? In other

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words, what other factors contributed to throw the 2000 prediction off course? There are at least four possible explanations.

Explanation 1: Presidential Popularity Does Not Travel

One possible explanation is that when the president does not run again, perhaps neither the presidential approval rating nor economic record carry over fully to influence the reputation of the party's chosen successor. This idea is difficult to test empirically, not just because there are so few cases to work with statistically. Usually when the president does not run, the economy is in a middling position and the president's approval rating is mediocre. With no sitting president on the ballot, the result is usually a close election, which may or may not be due to the ambiguous forecasting cues from the past administration. Here, one historical example stands out. The 1952 election was conducted in an atmosphere of conflicting signals. Although outgoing President Truman was unpopular and the Korean War was continuing with no end in sight, the 1952 economy was surging. The electoral verdict was a landslide victory for the outparty's popular candidate, Dwight Eisenhower, former five-star general, the conqueror of Europe, who had promised "I will go to Korea." The voters saw the need for a change of parties after twenty years of Democratic rule. Thus, 1952 was one prior instance where a positive economy was no guide to the electoral verdict.

Explanation 2: Ralph Nader

A second explanation for model failure in 2000 is the Nader campaign. One aspect of this explanation is that while he won only 3 percent of the total vote, most of Nader's votes would have gone to Gore. Without Nader, one could image that 2000 would have provided Gore with at least a 51 percent vs. 49 percent win and a decisive Electoral College edge.

There is a second way that Nader may have helped Bush. This argument is more speculative. Possibly, fear of losing votes to Nader on the Left propelled Gore to campaign farther to the Left than he would have if Nader were not on the ballot. Had Gore campaigned explicitly as a centrist manager of economic prosperity (more or less Clinton's stance of 1996), he could have gained votes in the center of the spectrum but lost votes on the Left. Of course, it can only be an educated guess whether the left-leaning or the centrist strategy would have worked best for Gore once Nader was in the picture. But it easy to imagine that whichever strategy could have garnered more votes, there would have been more votes for Gore without the Nader candidacy creating the dilemma.

Explanation 3: Bad (Good) Campaigning

A third way of accounting for the mistaken forecasting models in 2000 is simply to refer to the forecast error as the residue of the campaign's effect on the out-

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FIGURE 3
Daily Polls, July–November, 2000



come. Although it can be debated whether campaigns generally move voters toward or away from the equilibrium outcome where voters "should" produce, campaigns do affect election outcomes. In 2000, it would appear that the campaign moved voters away from the equilibrium outcome. Put more colloquially, perhaps Gore did not get the votes he deserved because he ran a bad campaign. The reader can fill in the blanks to complete this argument. Gore failed because he would not enlist Clinton and could not effectively claim credit for the accomplishments of the Clinton administration. (See explanation 1 above.) Gore failed because he ran too far to the left. (See explanation 2 above.) Or Gore failed because he simply was a bad candidate who could not connect with voters. Importantly, we should keep in mind that to the extent candidates affect the outcome, both candidates are potentially responsible. One should be as willing to credit the quality of the Bush campaign as to blame Gore's mistakes and inadequacies as a campaigner.

The Polls and the 2000 Campaign

The wealth of poll data for 2000 makes it possible to trace the progress of the campaign on a virtually daily basis. Figure 3 presents a wide-angle view over a lengthy time span, revealing the progress of the trial-heat polls from July 2000

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to election day. Each point represents the two-party vote estimated from the one or more polls with the particular date as the center of its polling period.[9]

Because the polls fluctuate more because of random sampling error than real trends, it is necessary to summarize the trajectory of the polls by some sort of moving average. This is done by using the well-established LOWESS procedure (locally-weighted scatterplot smoothing) as devised by W. S. Cleveland.[10] The LOWESS line reveals clearly the presence of the major trends—Bush's early lead, Gore's postcampaign resurgence, the restoration of a slight Bush lead, and Gore's final comeback. This considerable movement contrasts with Clinton's stable lead in the 1996 race.[11]

Figure 4 zooms in for a close up picture of the fall horse-race, from 1 September to election day. We see the same features in close-up. With about 200 separate polls over the final campaign period of slightly more than two months, we have an average of over three fresh polls each day, representing multiple thousands of respondents.[12] But even with this density of polling, the moving picture of the horse race suffers from a certain degree of disappointing fuzziness. We see the major trends, but further details are elusive.

Ideally, the density of polling should be sufficiently thick—that is, with a large enough number of daily respondents—to allow short-term trends to become observable through the distortions caused by random sampling error. We would like, for example, to observe the effects of the series of presidential debates in October. But where can we find the data?

Starting with early September, it is possible to more than double the number of daily samples to an average of more than seven samples per day. This is accomplished by mingling state-level polls of the presidential race with national polls. Of course, to use the state polls for purposes of detecting national trends it is important to control for which state is being polled. Similarly, to compare state polls from different states, it is crucial to control for the dates the polls

[9] This graph is created from the polls reported at the website pollingreport.com. Each national presidential poll was coded by the middle date of its reported polling period. Where a poll was reported as conducted over an even number of dates, the later of the two middle dates was used. When, as often was the case, multiple polls were centered on a particular date, the date's observation represents the average—a poll of the polls. Where a particular poll series represented a daily tracking poll as a moving average over two, three, or four days, the daily samples were discounted by the number of polling dates. For example, the three-day Gallup tracking polls would each be counted, but each weighted by one-third.

[10] See W. S. Cleveland, "Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots," *Journal of American Statistical Association* 74 (December 1979): 829–36. For political science discussions, see William G. Jacoby, *Statistical Graphics for Univariate and Bivariate Data* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997); and Nathaniel Beck and Simon Jackman, "Beyond Linearity by Default: Generalized Additive Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (April 1998): 596–627. For an application of LOWESS to the 1996 campaign, see Robert S. Erikson and Christopher Wlezien, "Presidential Polls as a Time Series: The Case of 1996," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (Summer 1999): 163–178.

[11] Erikson and Wlezien, "Temporal Horizons."

[12] The number 200 is approximate, with tracking polls weighted downward to reflect their rolling averages.

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FIGURE 4
Daily Polls, September–November 2000



are conducted. To solve this problem, state and date effects were statistically estimated with each set of effects estimated while controlling for the other. This way, the date effects were estimated for each poll as if the poll were for the nation as a whole rather than the specific state.[13]

The result of this exercise is Figure 5 which pools the estimates from national and state polls for September and October.[14] Like the two previous graphs, Figure 5 shows the daily observations of the poll of polls—this time including state-adjusted state polls—plus the LOWESS moving average. With the doubling of the number of daily samples, Figure 5 appears to show a series of real peaks and valleys over the fall campaign. We see Gore's rise through

[13] The statistical technique employed is pooled cross-section time-series analysis using Least Squares Dummy Variable analysis (LSDV), pooling all surveys—national or state—conducted in September and October. Each date is a dummy variable. Similarly, each state is a dummy variable, with the base category being national polls. With the final date in October serving as the base category, the date coefficients represent differences from the horse-race on 31 October. Each state coefficient represents the difference between the particular state and the national polls. The key assumption underlying this use of state data to analyze national trends is that the movement of electoral preferences is uniform across states. For instance, if a candidate gains two points nationally, the assumption is that he gains the same two points in every state, or at least that national gains on average are reflected uniformly across states.

[14] November data is not included for this figure.

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FIGURE 5
Daily National Preferences, Estimated from State and National Polls



mid-September, the period when the Bush campaign had difficulty finding its bearings. We then see Gore's decline and Bush's gain in late September coinciding with Bush's appearance on the Oprah show and as Bush's attacks on Gore's "character" begin to take hold. We then see Gore rise again in early October (origin uncertain) only to plunge following the first of three presidential debates on 4 October. Just as the Bush momentum ceased, the second presidential debate on 13 October appeared to precipitate a further Gore plunge. The third, however on 24 October was followed by a Gore rally.

Attributing causes for small changes in the polls may be problematic. But whether we know the actual reasons, we can at least observe—or think we observe—periodic small changes in the nation's vote preferences over the campaign. Assuming these changes were real, whether they were only short-term blips or whether they represented a series of permanent shifts in the campaign landscape is a matter for further analysis.

The Final Days: The Gore Surge and the Electoral College Muddle

Around the end of October 2000, observers began to question whether the popular vote winner would win in the Electoral College. Based on the polls, one could foresee a narrow Bush win in the popular vote with a less certain outcome

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in the Electoral College. Thus, observers saw that conceivably Gore would win the Electoral College but without a popular vote mandate. This expectation turned out to be quite incorrect, as Gore won the popular vote while losing the Electoral College. How did this unexpected result come about?

Here I refer again to the multitude of state polls to draw a new lesson. Especially in the final weeks of a very close national election, state-level polling was particularly intense in the so-called battleground states where the presidential vote was expected to be the closest. Certainly with the Electoral College outcome being the election determiner, it made at least as much sense to follow the presidential trial heats in large battleground states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Florida as it did to follow the national vote.

The late polls in the large battleground states told what appeared to be an amazing but largely hidden story. Even though Bush had the national lead, Gore led in most (but certainly not all) of the polls in the key battleground states. Given the wealth of information from state polls, especially in battleground states, it was possible to project expectations of the Electoral College outcome as a function of any possible movement of the popular vote. The one crucial assumption was that any swing of the national vote would be uniform across states. Given the polls through the end of October, although Bush led in the national popular vote by about four points, the projected Electoral College outcome was much closer. From the perspective of about 1 November, if Gore were to gain only a point or two in the popular vote, the projected Electoral College result would be a dead heat. (For further details, see the Appendix.) It follows that if Gore actually caught up to Bush in the popular vote, Gore would have been heavily favored to become the next president by virtue of a slight Electoral College advantage.

As it turned out, Gore surged to the popular vote lead but still lost the Electoral College. The question then shifts to why Bush had the Electoral College edge? The reason turned out to be that the surge to Gore was distributed unevenly across the states and in such a way that Gore gained the most in states where it did him the least good. Gore gained about 3 points in both safe-Gore states and safe-Bush states but only 1.3 points in the fifteen battleground states where the election was contested—only enough to set him roughly even in the Electoral College tally.

Figure 6 compares the states' actual vote outcomes with the projections from September and October state polls, assuming a uniform swing to a national tie in the popular vote, that is assuming all states move exactly the amount necessary to create a popular vote tie. The figure shows that predictions are good. Although not obvious to the naked eye, the safe states at the extremes were slightly more pro-Gore than predicted, while the battleground states in the middle were slightly less pro-Gore than predicted. The predicted and actual vote outcomes in the battleground states are shown in close-up in Figure 7. While the close fit overall is evidence that state polls are useful, the assumption of a uniform swing was wrong at the end of the campaign. Why?

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FIGURE 6
State's Gore Vote vs. Dead-Heat Predictions from State Polls



We offer a speculative explanation for the concentration of Gore's gain in nonbattleground states, which is interesting in its potential implications. Both campaigns focused their attention solely on the battleground states, leaving much of the nation with virtually no campaign ads or candidate appearances. By the final week, voters in the battleground states had enough information to figure out whom to vote for. Meanwhile, in the uncontested nonbattleground states, voters had little information. Many made up their minds at the last minute, generating late decisions for Gore.

For the electoral vote winner to be the popular vote loser is certainly a blemish on the Electoral College as an institution. The reason, however, is not that the Electoral College system was biased in favor of Bush or systematically biased in favor of Republicans generally.[15] The defect of the Electoral College is that as the popular vote becomes extremely close, converging on a tie, the Electoral College outcome becomes increasingly arbitrary. But as the Florida

[15] The Electoral College has two sources of bias that cancel out. Small states gain extra representation from the fact that each state starts with two votes for each senator, and small states tend to vote Republican. Large states gain from their winner-take-all feature, and large states tend to vote Democratic. If the two votes per senator were taken away, the partisan advantage would go to the Democrats. If electoral votes were assigned proportionately rather than at-large, the advantage would go to the Republicans.

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FIGURE 7
State's Gore Vote vs. Dead-Heat Predictions from State Polls, Battleground States Only



story tells us, it is also true that as the vote gets close, the final count of the popular vote in the pivotal states becomes arbitrary as well. If a few hundred votes more were counted for Gore in Florida, the Electoral College and the popular vote would have been in their proper balance.

A Polarized Electorate

Ever since the concept was first refined by the authors of *The American Voter*,[16] election watchers have searched for signs of a new partisan realignment. The classic realignment occurred in the early 1930s, when the electorate changed from the decidedly Republican electorate of the 1920s to the Democratic electorate of the 1930s and thereafter. The Democratic majority stemming from the New Deal realignment was a coalition loosely comprised of the poor, Catholics and Jews, blacks, plus the Democrats' traditional base in the South. White southerners have since departed the coalition, but the other partisan divisions of rich vs. poor, Protestant vs. non-Protestant, and white vs. black have persisted in varying degrees up to the present.

[16] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

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Some degree of realignment has occurred, starting as early as the 1960s, as old economic issues of the New Deal were supplemented by partisan differences on civil rights and on social and cultural issues such as the emerging partisan divide on abortion. As new issues divided the parties, it became fashionable to claim that the old partisan cleavages from the New Deal era were eroding. A more accurate description of the change, however, was not that the old cleavages were disappearing but that they were supplemented by new sources of cleavage. Differences along lines of income, religion, and race persisted or even grew, while new partisan divisions sprouted, such as the famous "gender gap" between men and women. Party identification has become a stronger electoral force among the American electorate after a short period of seeming dealignment in the 1960s and 1970s. Ideological preferences have clearly become stronger determinants of peoples' partisan choices.[17]

These statements about stability and change are not new. They would have been valid if written a decade earlier. What is not so clear is whether the bases of peoples' presidential choices have shifted during the decade of the 1990s and into the beginning of the new millennium.

2000 Exit Polls

For a temporal perspective, let us examine the changes in the voting patterns over the twelve years from 1988, the year of George Bush's presidential victory, to 2000, the year of his son George W. Bush's presidential win. For a guide we have the exit polls conducted on the day of the election, in this case by ABC in 1988 and VNS in 2000. Table 1 shows some comparisons between these two election years. If we make allowances for the fact that Bush Sr. won by a 54-46 margin, while Bush Jr. actually lost the popular vote, the exit poll division shown for the two elections is remarkably similar. The forces that divided people into Bush and Michael Dukakis supporters were remarkably like those that divided people into Bush and Gore voters.

Consider party identification. In each election, Democrats had a slight 4 percentage point lead over Republicans in identification. In each contest, slightly over 90 percent of Republicans voted Republican, offsetting the more numerous Democrats with their slightly lower voter loyalty in the 80 percent + range. A similar stability is found for ideological identification. In 1988, about four in five liberals voted Democratic, while similarly about four in five conservatives voted Republican. We see these same ratios persisting in 2000. The one change in ideological preference was a slight decline in the conservatives' numerical advantage over liberals.

[17] For two recent accounts, see Larry Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (January 2000): 35–50; and John H. Aldrich and Richard G. Niemi, "The Sixth Party System: Electoral Change 1952–1992" in Stephen C. Craig, ed., *Broken Contract? Changing Relationships between Americans and their Government* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

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TABLE 1

Stability and Change in the Attitudinal and Demographic Breakdown of the Presidential Vote, 1988 to 2000.

	1988			2000		
	%	Dukakis	Bush I	%	Gore	Bush II
Party Identification						
Democrats	42	82	15	39	86	11
Independents	18	42	45	27	45	47
Republicans	38	8	92	35	8	91
Ideological identification						
Liberal	25	85	16	20	80	13
Moderate	52	54	45	50	52	44
Conservative	43	16	83	29	17	81
Race						
White	87	41	58	82	42	54
Black	8	88	10	10	90	8
Religion						
White Protestant	48	31	68	47	34	63
Catholic	28	51	49	26	49	47
Jewish	4	69	30	4	79	19
Income						
Top Third (88,>40K,00,>75K)	35	38	61	28	44	53
Middle Third	37	45	53	49	48	50
Bot. Third (88,<$20K,00<29K)	29	56	42	23	55	39
Gender						
Men	48	42	57	48	42	53
Women	52	49	50	52	54	43

Source: Compiled and extrapolated from 1988 ABC Exit Poll and 2000 VNS Exit Poll.

We also see from Table 1 that key demographic differences between the parties persisted with little change from 1988 to 2000. The income differential seemed to decline slightly, as high income voters were more attracted to Gore (despite his alleged populism) than to Dukakis in 1988. The Protestant vs. Catholic division declined very slightly, even as Jewish voters moved overwhelmingly to Gore. Meanwhile, the gender gap increased ever so slightly from 1988 to 2000 while the racial gap between blacks and whites also grew slightly—to its highest size ever.

Despite the stability of the electoral divisions across time, we can be on the lookout for new cleavages. For 2000, new cleavages emerged that had been given little notice a few years before. In 2000, the polls gave considerable treatment to divisions between married and unmarried voters, between churchgoers and those who attend few religious services, and between gun owners and non-gun owners. Table 2 shows how these cleavages divided voters in the 2000 exit poll. For comparison, it also shows the 2000 electorate's divisions on religion, gender, and income. To facilitate comparison, each division is treated as a dichotomy.

What do we learn from this table? First, when expressed as dichotomies (women vs. men, Protestant vs. Catholic, rich vs. poor), we see that classical

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TABLE 2

2000 Exit Polls—Gore vs. Bush by Selected Voter Categorizations

	% of all Respondents	% Gore	% Bush
Income			
Under $50,000	47	52	44
$50,000 & Above	53	45	52
Protestant vs. Catholic			
White Protestant	47	34	63
Catholic	26	49	47
Gender			
Male	48	42	53
Female	52	54	43
Marital Status			
Married	65	44	53
Unmarried	35	57	38
Religious Attendance			
At least Once a Week	42	39	59
Less than Once a Week	56	55	43
Gun Ownership			
Gun in the House	48	36	61
No Gun	52	58	39
Role of Government			
Should do more to solve problems	43	74	23
Leave to businesses, individuals	53	25	71
Abortion Rights			
Should be legal all/most cases	56	65	32
Should be illegal all/most casts	40	27	71
Stricter Gun Legislation			
Support	60	62	34
Oppose	36	23	74

Source: Compiled and extrapolated from 2000 VNS Exit Poll.

cleavages have about the same magnitudes. The gender gap (10 or 12 percent), the Protestant-Catholic gap (15 or 16 percent), and the rich half-poor half gaps (7 or 8 percent) are about the same size—a differential of about ten percentage points in voting.[18] These are visible differences, but not huge. Notably, the gender gap—unknown and unanticipated a quarter century ago—has caught up to the cleavages along income and religious lines in terms of general magnitude.

But what about the new cleavage along lines of marital status, religiosity, and guns? We see that by 2000, these cleavages have grown to as large if not larger than the traditional cleavages discussed above. By a point or so, the gap between married and unmarried voters (13 to 15 percent) is greater than the gender gap. The gap between frequent and infrequent churchgoers (16 percent) is virtually identical to that between Catholics and (white) Protestants. The division between gun owners and nongun owners is the largest of all, at 22 points!

[18] The gap sizes in parentheses are presented as variable, because the gaps in the Gore vote are not precisely the same as the gaps in the Bush vote.

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Without much notice, a new life-style division has developed. Analysts will be trying to sort out its meaning. Is it between traditionalists and modernists? A renewed cleavage between urban and rural?

Both the new and old social divisions are reflected in contemporary partisan divisions on the issues. Table 2 also shows how people on different sides of certain policy issues divide between Gore and Bush. On the classic issue of government involvement in the economy, we see proponents of big and little government lining up in the predictable directions, with pro-government types voting Democratic about 3 to 1 and antigovernment types voting Republican by almost the same 3 to 1 ratio. The 48 to 49 percent gap is clear evidence that the classic issue differences between the parties have by no means died.

Let us see how the big vs. little government division has been supplemented by new issues. Abortion is not a new issue, of course, but it is only within the past twenty years that it has become a partisan issue dividing people into Democrats and Republicans. We see from Table 2 that pro-choice vs. pro-life positions on abortion divide Americans in presidential choice with a 38 to 39 percent gap—almost as much as does the role of the government.

Finally, let us look at the gun control issue. In the 2000 campaign, the two major candidates offered only muted, nuanced distinctions on gun control. Still, with a 39 to 40 percent gap, the gun control issue divided Americans as much as did abortion rights. Further research must shed light on the source of this as a cultural division that increasingly separates rural and urban America.

2000 Exit Polls: A View from the States

The story told from the exit polls is of an increasingly polarized electorate. Although we have approached the limit of what we can learn about this phenomenon from bivariate relationships in the VNS national exit poll, we can exploit the fact that VNS also reports exit polls for the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Rather than repeat the survey analysis on a state-by-state basis, I aggregate state exit poll data on respondent party identification and respondent ideological identification to ascertain the mean party identification and mean ideological identification of each state's electorate.

The aggregate data from state exit polls give several signals of an increasingly polarized electorate. We know that two good predictors of individual votes are party identification and ideological identification. Yet as recently as 1988, state-level ideological identification and party identification were essentially uncorrelated ($r = -.08$): to know how Democratic or Republican a state's electorate was provided no clue regarding the state's ideological preferences and vice versa. By 2000 this has changed: the state-level correlation between the partisan and ideological indicators rose to $+.78$, meaning that they share 61 percent of the variance. Statistical evidence suggests that states are shifting their partisanship to reflect their ideology rather than the other way around.[19]

[19] See Gerald C. Wright, John P. McIver, Robert S. Erikson, and David B. Hoolian, "Stability and Change in State Electorates, Carter through Clinton" (paper delivered at the meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April, 2000).

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FIGURE 8
State Ideology by State Partisanship, 2000



Data Source: VNS 2000 Exit Polls

Note: The following questions were asked in the exit polls:

No matter how you voted today, do you usually think of yourself as a:
Democrat
Republican
Independent

On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

States have not only become more alike in their partisanship and ideology. In addition, the two indicators have become even stronger predictors of the states' presidential voting. In 1988, state ideology and state partisanship from state exit polls explained 50 percent of the variance in the two-part vote. By 2000, the explained variance reached 92 percent, with partisanship and ideology having equal weight in this vote equation.[20]

The strong relationship in 2000 between state partisanship and state ideology is shown in Figure 8. States closer to the bottom left corner have the parti-

[20] The exact OLS equation predicting the states' 2000 vote from exit poll partisanship and ideology is:

Percent Gore = 0.83 + 0.57 (percent Democrats) + 0.43 (percent Liberals)

where Percent Gore = Gore percent of the two-party vote in the state, percent Democrat = the Democratic percent of combined Republican and Democratic identifiers and percent Liberal = the liberal percent of combined liberal and conservative identifiers.

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FIGURE 9
State Vote by Prediction from Exit Polls Ideology, Partisanship



san and ideological preferences typical of Republican voters; states closer to the upper right corner have the preferences indicative of Democratic voters. The graph in Figure 9 illustrates how strongly partisanship and ideology predict a state's presidential voting in 2000.[21] The state electorate's ideological and partisan preferences determine the state electorate's relative placement on the vote scale, with little left over for idiosyncratic variables to explain state voting.

Conclusions and Speculations

Can we conclude by speculating about the electoral future? Does their win in 2000 give the Republicans a leg up on 2004? Or does the closeness of 2000's verdict signal that the electorate will be in a mood to restore the Democrats in 2004? Despite the natural tendency to see each election as a harbinger of things to come, elections are remarkably difficult to forecast four years in advance. Knowing the vote in one election provides almost no leverage for forecasting the vote outcome in the next.

But, of course, we have more information than just the 2000 vote margin. The circumstances of this close election may provide the basis for a useful test

[21] See footnote 20 for exact equation.

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of political science theories. One crucial fact is that although the electorate was evenly divided, power tilted to one party—the Republicans. This imbalance will provide a test of theories about the dynamic relationship between public opinion and policy. With power in the hands of the Republicans, will the electorate vote the Democrats back into control of Congress in 2002 as theories of ideological balancing behavior by voters would have us believe?[22] Will the Republican government follow through on its commitment to a conservative policy agenda even if polls show it to be unpopular? If they do, will it make the electorate turn more liberal and restore the Democrats to power? Or will the next presidential election be nothing more than a referendum on George W. Bush's presidential personality or on the state of the economy over which the president has little control?

The transfer of the presidency from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush is the seventh transfer of the presidency from one party to the other since World War II. Like 2000, most switches were close. But unlike 2000, one could find an underlying explanation for the electorate's change of leadership to provide the appearance of a policy mandate: fix the economy, end the war, or provide an ideological change of course. In five of the six previous transfers, the new president was reelected and reelected easily, as the economy improved, the war ended (or deescalated), and/or the nation was grateful for the ideological change. The exception was Jimmy Carter's one-term presidency, a case that might provide still another historical model for 2000. When Carter got elected in 1976, the Vietnam war had ended, the economy was recovering, and the electorate was ideologically comfortable with the Ford presidency. Arguably, Carter was something of an accidental president, owing his victory to the Watergate scandals and to the fact that Ford was the first unelected president with no particular mandate other than to stay honest. On his watch, the world became more threatening, the economy went sour, and the electorate moved farther from the president ideologically—all contributing to the short four-year presidential tenure. We wait to see which path the Bush administration follows—the norm of eight or more years of power or the exception as when Reagan defeated Carter in 1980 after a single term.*

[22] For one version of balance theory, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Balance theory competes with the traditional thesis that withdrawn coattails contribute to the presidential party's midterm loss. There were no coattails in 2000 to withdraw in 2002.

* I am greatly indebted to several coauthors on different projects. Without these joint intellectual enterprises, the current article could not have been written. The discussions of campaign dynamics and statistical models of elections borrow extensively from my collaboration with Christopher Wlezien. The discussions of the Electoral College and state-level campaign polls borrow from my collaboration with Karl Sigman. The discussion of rival statistical models borrows from joint work with Michael B. MacKuen and James A. Stimson. The discussion of state-level partisanship and ideology borrow from my collaboration with Gerald C. Wright, John P. McIver, and David Hoolian.

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APPENDIX

In the late stages of the 2000 presidential campaign, Karl Sigman (Department of Industrial Organization and Operations Research at Columbia University) and I conducted a series of short-term analyses of the likely Electoral College outcome and the battleground states. Each was a computer simulation of the Electoral College outcome, conditional on the popular vote. We posted two analyses on the web.

In our first analysis, posted 4 November, we derived our conclusion from an analysis of the September-October state polls discussed in the text. Since we had estimates of state effects and date effects, and were confident in the assumption that trends were uniform across states, we estimate each state's expected vote as a conditional result dependent on the national popular vote. Moreover, since we had the sample sizes of the megastate polls (pooled across dates), we could apply confidence intervals and probabilities to these estimates. Then, in a crucial step, we performed millions of computer simulations to estimate for varying values of the national popular vote what the likely Electoral College would be. We concluded that the cutting point where the electoral vote chances of each were equal was a popular vote differential of 51.4 percent Bush to 48.6 percent Gore. Anything better for Gore in the popular vote, and Gore became the favorite. With a popular vote tie, we estimated a strong likelihood of a Gore Electoral College victory. Since most polls still were showing a greater than 3 percentage point lead for Bush, Bush was still favored from our calculations.

In our second analysis, posted 5 November, we simply estimated the national vote from fifteen battleground states by pooling the results of the late polls centered on dates 26 October through 4 November. Taking into account the pooled sample sizes per state, we computed for each the probabilities for Gore and Bush carrying the state. This meant assuming a straight line projection (no new trend, etc.) from the late polls to election day. We then conducted another million computer simulations of the election day outcome from the computed state probabilities. Our result was another forecast of a likely Gore victory.

With the benefit of huge numbers of polls, most states were easily classifiable for Bush or Gore. But Florida was one exception. As a large state, it was pivotal in a close election. Based on the late polling in Florida, we assigned Gore an 89 percent chance of carrying the state; based on late polling in all battleground states and our computer simulations, we reported the expected electoral vote tally to be close—282 for Gore and 256 for Bush. Based on our simulations, we assigned Gore an 85 percent chance of winning the most electoral votes.

As it turned out, the late state polls predicted the vote quite accurately in virtually every battleground state. And with a slightly different count in Florida, the Electoral College outcome would have been extremely close to our forecast. As it turned out, we got one important aspect of the story wrong, not anticipating that Gore could win the popular vote but not the Electoral College. How did this result come about?

When we and others foresaw Gore winning the Electoral College with Bush winning the popular vote, Gore was slightly behind in the vote nationally but holding steady in the crucial battleground states. If the national vote held at the level observed on 1 November, about 52 Bush and 48 Gore, Gore would have had a fighting chance in the Electoral College. By closing the gap, Gore should have become the Electoral College favorite, but only if the 2 point swing were uniform across the states. In fact, the late vote swing was not uniform. Gore gained 3.2 percentage points in the safe Gore states, where the extra votes went wasted. He gained 3.0 points in the safe Bush seats, and these new votes were also wasted. In the crucial battleground states, Gore gained only 1.3 percent of the vote—only enough to set him roughly even in the Electoral College tally.

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Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain

OMAR G. ENCARNACIÓN

These are heady days for civil society. From Moscow to Montevideo, a vibrant and robust network of civic organizations is being celebrated as the cure to virtually all the ills of the contemporary world. Little appears to be beyond the reach of civil society's virtuous hands. In recent years, civil society has been posited as the preferred vehicle to replace corrupt and incompetent states, deliver social goods and services, fortify civil and political liberties, promote economic prosperity, restructure outmoded economies, and consolidate fragile and fledging democratic institutions.[1] Among these claims, the last one is the most trumpeted and widespread. Operating from the assumption that a vibrant and robust civil society is either a prerequisite or a requirement for charting a successful passage from dictatorship to democracy, the strengthening of civil society has become a priority for a large cast of actors engaged in the

[1] For positive appraisals of the impact of civil society on politics and the economy, see Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: Societal Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995); Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Freedom: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Penguin Press, 1994); Don E. Eberly, ed., *Building a Community of Citizens: Civil Society in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994); and Brian O'Connell, *Civil Society: The Underpinning of American Democracy* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999). For positive and critical perspectives on the role of civil society in the process of democratization, see Alan Fowler, *UNDP and Organizations of Civil Society* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1997); Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society," *Foreign Policy* 117 (Winter 1999–2000); and Omar G. Encarnación, "Tocqueville's Missionaries: Civil Society Advocacy and the Promotion of Democracy," *World Policy Journal* 17 (Spring 2000).

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promotion of democracy abroad. Paradoxically, the presumed positive association that has been drawn between a strong civil society and successful democratization may well be the most problematic conventional wisdom about civil society. It may well amount to a myth.

Three central theoretical assumptions anchor this analysis. The first is that civil society, however vibrant and robust, does not supercede other conditions necessary for democratic consolidation, including political institutionalization. The second is that the principal reason why the role of civil society in the consolidation of democracy has been inflated is because we have misplaced or misunderstood how civil society actually impacts the process of democratic consolidation. Thus far, much of the debate about the importance of a strong civil society to democracy has focused on the capacity of civil society organizations (be it a trade union, a bird watching club, or a choral society) to generate social capital, understood as generalized trust among the citizenry. This commodity is thought to help eradicate authoritarian tendencies within both the state and society while greasing the societal collaboration that makes democracy possible. I argue that this view of the production of social capital is quite impoverished and that it needs to be expanded by incorporating the performance and legacies of political institutions.

The third and final assumption is that most of the virtues ascribed to civil society—especially the engendering of democratic values—can only be realized in the context of a political system that is active in the production of the attributes that we have come to associate with social capital, including a generalized sense of trust among the citizenry but also cross-class collaboration and general interdependence across civil society organizations and political institutions. In other words, a political system endowed with capable and legitimate institutions with deep roots in civil society is necessary. Taken together, these arguments suggest that what matters most about the configuration of civil society in the consolidation of democracy is not the vibrancy and robustness of its various components but rather the effectiveness of the institutional-political framework that surrounds them.

In making these arguments, I hope to underscore two points. The first is a rather familiar one by now: institutions and their historical legacies matter to politics by structuring preferences, interests, and values in society.[2] The second point is only just beginning to surface in the literature on civil society: social capital cannot be the product of purely social interaction among citizens within the sphere of civic associations, as it is presumed by leading civil society theorists.[3] We have to take into consideration the performance of political institutions and people's confidence in them.

[2] On this point see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstrech, eds., *Structuring Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[3] See, for example, Wendy M. Rahn, John Brehm, and Neil Carlson, "National Elections as Institutions for Generating Social Capital" in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), 112.

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These arguments emerge from an in-depth analysis of the political experience of post-Franco Spain, a pioneer of what has been called the Third Wave of democratization. Begun in earnest in the mid-1970s, with the demise of authoritarianism in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, this worldwide trend toward democracy intensified in South America with the collapse of military regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay throughout the 1980s, and it crested with the stunning disintegration of communism in the early 1990s.[4] Spain's transition from dictatorship to democracy pointedly challenges the assertion that a flourishing civil society is an essential ingredient for successful democratization. This analysis demonstrates how Spain constructed a viable and very successful new democracy with a notable deficit in civil society development as reflected in the absence of the conditions most conducive to the production of social capital. They include a high level of civic engagement, as suggested by a lively associational life, thriving social movements, and autonomous and well-institutionalized advocacy groups.

Certainly, we should be wary of any effort to debunk any theory or hypothesis based on a single national experience. But the Spanish case is not just another experience in the rapidly growing collection of newly democratic nations. In the words of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, the deans of democratization studies, post-Franco Spain has emerged as "the paradigmatic case for the study of democratic transitions, almost as the breakdown of the Weimar Republic has been for the study of the fall of democracies."[5] Such assertions reflect the fact that Spain is widely regarded as the most striking example of democratic consolidation in the last three decades and consequently is a model for other so-called Third Wave democracies. Adam Przeworski writes that the banner of the new elites and the peoples of Eastern Europe is "Democracy, the market and Europe" and "the optimistic scenario to retrace is the path of Spain."[6] In light of these developments, it is fair to regard the case of Spain as a crucial testing ground for any contemporary explanatory paradigm of democratization. In the case of civil society, the failure of this concept to shed much light on the conditions behind Spain's stunning democratic success should give serious pause to its most unabashed advocates.

The study is organized as follows. I first provide an analysis of the concept of civil society and the key contentions linking it to the consolidation of democracy. That analysis is followed by a summary of democratization politics in Spain in the post-Franco era that justifies the nation's standing as a paradigm of democratic consolidation. I then sketch the organizational landscape of civil

[4] On the Third Wave, see Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); and Larry Diamond and Marc Platter, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

[5] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 87.

[6] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 8.

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society in Spain and the underlying reasons behind its arrested development. I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical implications of this analysis to the comparative study of civil society and democratic consolidation.

On the Concept of Civil Society

Civil society is commonly regarded to represent "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, and bound by a legal order or set of shared values."[7] This realm is populated by a vast and diverse constellation of intermediary organizations formed by members of society outside of their households with the purpose of advancing their interests. A consensus on what organizations or groups belong within the boundaries of civil society, however, remains elusive. Nevertheless, most scholars of civil society tend to focus on a wide and diverse set of social organizations and institutions whose explicitly stated purpose does not involve the pursuit of political power; hence political parties are usually excluded from organizations traditionally circumscribed by definitions of civil society. Organizations conventionally regarded as part of civil society include grassroots and loosely organized groups such as churches, neighborhood associations, and private charities as well as national and highly hierarchical organizations such as employers' groups and trade unions.

The foundational work linking civil society to democracy was formulated in the mid-1800s by Alexis de Tocqueville, making him something of a patron saint for civil society advocates. His classic writings on American politics championed the thesis that a vibrant and robust civil society was the bedrock of America's democratic success.[8] In Tocqueville's view, America's democracy was sustained by the richness and diversity of its voluntary associations (from religious groupings to commercial associations). Through their diverse functions and operations, these organizations held the nation together in the absence of a monarchy and a highly centralized federal structure. More important, perhaps, voluntary associations served American democracy by assisting in the development of democratic values such as trust, tolerance, and compromise. Since the 1990s, these assumptions have inspired a new generation of neo-Tocquevellians within the academy and the policy-making community, which regards civil society as nothing short of a political panacea for all democracies, especially those seeking to overcome authoritarian legacies.

Prominent among neo-Tocquevellian voices is that of Robert Putnam, whose work on the political development of Italian regions almost single-hand-

[7] Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221. For a broader conceptualization of civil society that underscores the concept's historical and philosophical foundations, see Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[8] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969).

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edly revived the concept of civil society.[9] Seeking to explain the superior institutional performance of regional governments in the prosperous North vis-à-vis those of the impoverished South, Putnam argued that social capital, understood as "features of social organization such as trust, norms and networks" rather than socioeconomic development was the central explanatory variable.[10] He measured the stock of social capital largely on the basis of the density of associational networks and levels of civic engagement. For Putnam, the propensity of individuals to join private, voluntary associations—be it "a choral society or a bird-watching club"—contributes to the effectiveness of democracy because of its "internal" and "external" consequences. He argued that internally, associations "instill habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness." Externally, a dense network of secondary associations "contributes to effective social collaboration."[11] These theoretical musings led Putnam to the conclusion that where there is no social capital, democracy could not flourish.

Putnam's theorizing about civil society and democracy has found considerable resonance beyond the confines of Italian politics. This work has been reinterpreted by Putnam himself as a sharp critique of American politics and society. In a memorable essay he linked the decline of levels of "civic community" to the deterioration of American democracy.[12] He observed that in post-1960 America, there has been a decline of "traditional secondary associations" such as Boy Scouts, parent-teacher associations (PTA's), and, most famously, bowling leagues. In turn, this decline in social capital has negatively impacted American democracy by depleting the national reserves of social trust, generalized reciprocity, and mutually beneficial collective action.

Another area in which Putnam's work has been particularly influential is the study of the conditions deemed conducive to successful democratization. For scholars working within this subfield of political science, the revival of civil society could not have come at a more fortuitous time. The earlier dominant paradigm for understanding democratization—modernization theory—was largely discredited, if not altogether bankrupt, by the time the global democratic revolution got underway. Modernization theory had drawn a positive and linear connection between socioeconomic development and democracy by suggesting that the more developed the country, the higher the likelihood that it

[9] Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[10] Ibid., 167. Putnam has been taken to task for his convenient and selective use of history. He has been criticized for glossing over the rise of fascism in the Italian north, a development that casts significant doubt on the assumption that civic traditions can help preserve a civic community. See Sydney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*," *American Political Science Review* 90 (June 1996).

[11] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 89–90.

[12] Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995); also by Putnam, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America," *American Prospect* 24 (Winter 1996).

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would turn democratic.[13] Yet such theories could not explain the advent of authoritarianism in some of the most economically advanced nations of postwar Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay) or the persistence of dictatorship in other economically advanced nations such as Spain. Nor could modernization theory make sense of the return of democracy to many parts of the developing world under highly unfavorable economic conditions, as was the case in Latin America throughout the 1980s.

While few scholars would argue that civil society by itself can bring about the consolidation of democracy, it is astonishing how much of the discursive treatment of this concept in the democratization literature is predicated on this very notion. This is evident in the work of Larry Diamond, who has offered the most comprehensive theoretical assessment of the virtues of civil society in the context of democratic transition and consolidation. Although Diamond is careful to point out that we should be realistic about the potential contributions that civil society can make to the project of democratization, in his analysis there appear to be no limits on what civil society can do for democracy. He observes: "Democracy—in particular, a healthy liberal democracy—requires a public that is organized for democracy, socialized to its norms and values, and committed not just to its myriad narrow interests but to larger, common, 'civic' ends. Such a civic public is only possible with a vibrant civil society."[14]

Reframing Tocqueville's arguments about civil society and democracy to suit contemporary postauthoritarian situations, Diamond explains that civil society serves the "development, deepening and consolidation of democracy" by, among many other tasks, "providing the basis for the limitation of state power, ...supplementing the role of parties in stimulating political participation,...increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens,...educating the masses in democracy,...structuring multiple channels, beyond the political party, for articulating, aggregating, and representing interests,...empowering the powerless to advance their interests,...generating a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate the principal polarities of political conflict,...recruiting and training new political leaders,...developing techniques for conflict mediation and resolution,...giving citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it," and facilitating the spread of ideas "essential to the achievement of economic reform."[15]

In recent years, theories about the virtues of civil society elaborated by Diamond and others have leaped from the ivory tower into the hands of U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral lending bodies such as the World Bank, where they have been retooled and repackaged into concrete ideas about the promotion of civil society in postauthoritarian

[13] See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959).

[14] Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 221.

[15] Ibid., 239–250.

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settings.[16] Key purveyors of international civil society assistance include the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) created in 1984 under the Reagan administration with the explicit purpose of promoting democracy overseas and George Soros' Open Society Institute. More ambitious programs are those underwritten by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).[17] During the 1990s, USAID spent an estimated $400 million per year on three aspects of civil society promotion: advocacy-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media, and unions.[18] Among these groups, NGOs and their role as watchdogs for a wide range of issues including human rights, election monitoring, and the environment enjoy privileged attention by U.S. officials. For U.S. donors as well as much of the international aid community, the terms NGO and civil society have become virtually interchangeable.

In sum, following the footsteps of Tocqueville, a received conventional wisdom about democratization has formed around the notion that a strong civil society is crucial to democratic consolidation. But how applicable is this widespread assumption to the case of Spain, the most striking example of successful democratization of the last three decades? Before delving into this question, a brief discussion of what is meant by a "vibrant and robust" civil society is in order. After all, this is the type of civil society that is meant to generate all the good things ascribed to it.

For Tocqueville and Putnam, the strength of civil society resides primarily within the density of associational life, be it political or otherwise. Its connections to democracy rest principally on the manner in which associationalism promotes civic engagement and enhances social capital. For democratization theorists, the relevance of civil society to democracy rests on the capacity of advocacy groups to mount a vigorous opposition to dictatorship and to serve as counterweight to the state and keep in check abuses of power once the new democratic regime is in place. Not surprisingly, rather than focusing on the secondary organizations that animate Putnam's analysis (bowling leagues, choral societies, PTAs, etc.), democratization theorists focus almost exclusively on organizations and social movements that are most likely to assume a national and even political character, such as women's groups, human rights organizations, and trade unions, to name a few. These are the kinds of civil society organizations that the international aid community has identified as crucial to the prodemocratic functions of civil society.

[16] For a global overview of these efforts, see Alison Van Rooy, ed., *Civil Society and the Democracy Aid Industry* (London: Earthscan, 1998); Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Encarnación, "Tocqueville's Missionaries."

[17] For a detailed overview of USAID's civil society programming, see Gary Hensen, *Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs*, USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 12 (Washington DC: USAID, 1996).

[18] Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy," *Democratization* 4 (Autumn 1997): 112.

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More precise signposts for anyone interested in gauging the collective strength of civil society have been established by Diamond, who argues that for civil society to perform its democracy-building functions it must meet the following criteria. He notes that the chances to develop a stable democracy improve significantly if civil society does not contain "maximalist, uncompromising interest groups or groups with anti-democratic goals and methods." Although these groups are not a component of civil society, they are likely to bring about state repression and weaken and radicalize the more democratic elements of society. Another important feature of a strong civil society is the "level of organizational institutionalization," especially among economic interest groups. He writes that "Where interests are organized in a structured, stable manner, bargaining and the growth of cooperative networks are facilitated." A third requirement is the "internally democratic character" of organizations as defined by "decision-making, leadership selection, accountability and transparency."[19]

Democratization Politics in Spain

A quarter of a century into the global democratic revolution unleashed by the Third Wave, it is possible to sort out the winners, losers, and also-rans. And among the winners, no case shines brighter than post-Franco Spain. Although there is absolutely no agreement in the literature on what constitutes a "consolidated" democracy, few scholars would disagree with the categorization of Spain as a fully consolidated democracy.[20] The case of Spain is often posited in the comparative literature on democratization as the paradigmatic case of consolidation with some going even further. In the judgment of Richard Gunther and his collaborators, in the context of Spain one can speak not only about democratic consolidation but also about democratic "persistence," described as "the end product of a long democratization process whose attainment is contingent upon the successful negotiation of transition and consolidation by a multitude of actors in a given society."[21]

A number of notable features of Spanish democratization help make sense of all the praise that scholars have bestowed upon this case. The first one is the peaceful nature of the change between regimes. In Spain, the transition to democracy was orchestrated by state elites via the legal and institutional mechanisms of the old regime. Following Francisco Franco's death in 1975 and under the skillful leadership of Adolfo Suárez (designated by King Juan Carlos to head the transition to democracy) the Francoist parliament approved a law of

[19] Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 228–229.

[20] On the notion of democratic consolidation, see Omar G. Encarnación, "Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation," *Comparative Politics* 32 (July 2000).

[21] "Preface" in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), xiii.

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political reform that simultaneously liquidated the institutions of the old regime and liberalized civil society. It also set the framework for the return to democracy with the democratic elections of 1977, the first in Spain since the end of the Civil War in 1939. Following the elections, Suárez and his winning party, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), negotiated the details of the architecture of the new democracy with the historical opposition to the Franco regime—the Communist and Socialist parties. This orderly and negotiated democratic transition—the first of its kind in world history—provided a blueprint for similar transitions, especially in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.

A second feature of democratization in Spain is the dizzying pace with which the tasks of democratic consolidation were accomplished. By almost any measure, the speed and scope of political and economic transformations since the demise of the Franco regime are nothing short of breathtaking. Perhaps the most exuberant summation of political and economic accomplishments since 1977 is offered by Przeworski. He writes: "Spain is a miracle . . . in only fifteen years the country has succeeded in irreversibly consolidating democratic institutions; allowing peaceful alternation in power; in modernizing its economy and making it internationally competitive; in imposing civilian control over the military; in solving complicated national questions; in extending citizenship rights; and in inducing cultural changes that made it part of the European community of nations."[22]

Public opinion surveys confirm the status of democratic consolidation for Spain.[23] Since the democratic transition, Spanish public opinion has been strongly pro-democratic and has overwhelmingly rejected the major possible alternative to democracy, a military government. Ten years after the death of Franco, 76 percent of the population expressed pride in the transition, and only 9 percent said that the transition was not a source of pride. By 1978, 77 percent of Spaniards deemed democracy "the best political system for a country like ours" with 15 percent preferring an authoritarian regime. The very favorable impression of democracy in Spain has held steady over the years despite the many crises faced by the nation's new democracy including, most notably, widespread terrorism and Western Europe's highest unemployment rate. By 1981, 81 percent of Spaniards deemed democracy the best possible system; 85 percent by 1988; 87 percent by 1988; and 79 percent by 1993.

The recognition of Spain's new democracy as consolidated is also illustrated in the data provided by Freedom House, whose annual rankings have become something of a standard for those evaluating civil and political rights worldwide. With the death of Franco in 1975 and the initiation of political reforms, Spain moved from the category of "Not Free" to "Partly Free." After the democratic elections of 1977, it moved from the rank of "Partly Free" to "Free," a

[22] Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, 7–8.

[23] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 108–109.

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classification the country has retained ever since. More suggestive is that since 1982, just a few years after shedding its authoritarian regime, the average measure of respect for political and civil rights in Spain was virtually indistinguishable from those of older and presumably mature democracies such as Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

The Civil Society Landscape

Many conditions account for Spain's stunning democratic transformation, but a vibrant and robust civil society is certainly not one of them.[24] By all the conventional measures used by scholars to gauge levels of civil society strength, we must conclude that Spain embraced democracy in the aftermath of Franco's death with a very impoverished civil society. This state of affairs is hardly novel, for it mirrors the historical underdevelopment, fragmentation, and even retardation of the social organizations usually grouped under the rubric of civil society. Not surprisingly, the issue of civil society weakness has long been a central preoccupation for students of Spanish political development. The sociologist José Amodia writes: "throughout their modern history, going back to the early days of liberalism in the nineteenth century, Spaniards have shown a great weakness when it comes to organizing themselves into units or groups that will together form a stable social pattern capable of withstanding the tensions and struggles normally generated within the boundaries of any nation."[25] Amodia's analysis is echoed in Juan Linz's well-known historical review of interest group politics in twentieth-century Spain. Linz concluded that in Spain, "partisan cleavages are more important than interest conflicts. The articulation of interest groups on a permanent and continuous basis is therefore delayed and in part unsuccessful." He adds that "this does not mean that interest, economic and social groups do not exercise a decisive influence on the policy-making process but that their institutionalization and legitimization are less successful than in other countries."[26]

The conditions highlighted by Amodia and Linz are faithfully reflected in the configuration of civil society that consolidated in Spain as the country existed under decades of authoritarian rule and advanced through the processes of democratic transition and consolidation. The official awakening of Spanish civil society took place with the passage of the 1977 Law of Associations, one of the first steps toward dismantling Franco's forty-year old dictatorship. The

[24] On the democratic transition, see José Ma. Maravall, *The Transition to Democracy in Spain* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1977); John Coverdale, *The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco* (New York: Praeger, 1979); Donald Share, *The Making of Spanish Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1986); and Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fussi, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1986).

[25] José Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy* (London: Penguin, 1977), 203.

[26] Juan J. Linz, "A Century of Interest Politics in Spain" in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 367.

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law guaranteed the right of free association denied by the Franco regime since its inception in 1939. Spaniards certainly welcomed these signs of democracy with considerable gusto, but during the democratic period they have persistently shown very little enthusiasm for building the kind of civil society that most scholars would describe as vibrant and robust. This is most tellingly suggested by the very low levels of civic engagement in Spain in the post-Franco era.

Civic Engagement

The most comprehensive data on civic engagement in Spain is found in the study on the cultural dynamics of Spanish democratization by Peter McDonough, Samuel Barnes, and Antonio López Pina.[27] At the heart of the study is explaining "the puzzle of participation in Spain" and more specifically, the low levels of participation of Spaniards in voluntary associations, civic and otherwise. The opening paragraph of the study captures the bewildering nature of participation in voluntary associations in post-Franco Spain. The authors observe that while democratic procedures have been solidly institutionalized, political participation has stagnated. "Only about one-third of Spanish adults belong to any voluntary association, and more than two decades after the passing of Franco the fraction of the public identifying with a political party of any stripe stands at about the same low level as in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. Civic anemia is endemic in Spain."[28]

To illustrate how exceptionally low Spain's levels of civic engagement actually are, McDonough, Barnes, and López Pina incorporate into their analysis data from other newly-democratic nations representing three major geographic areas: Spain, Brazil, and South Korea. In contrast to the finding that in Spain only about a third of the public belongs to any voluntary association, a figure that holds steady from the onset through the consolidation of democracy, in Brazil only about one-third of the citizenry fails to belong to voluntary associations. The comparison with South Korea is even harder on Spain. Nearly nine out of ten South Koreans claim to be members of some sort of voluntary organization.

A broader sampling of participation in voluntary associations confirms Spain's standing as one of the world's least prone nations to engender the type of associational life attached to vibrant and robust civil societies. A study of fifteen democracies based on the findings from the *World Values Survey* (1981-1983, the peak years of democratic consolidation in Spain) concluded that among democratic societies Spain, together with France, Italy, and Japan, had

[27] Peter McDonough, Samuel Barnes, and Antonio López Pina, *The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

[28] Ibid., 1.

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the lowest levels of voluntary association participation.[29] In each of these countries, fewer than one-third of the population reported membership in a voluntary association compared with between one-half and three-fourths of respondents in the English-speaking countries (United States, Northern Ireland, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and Ireland) and several northern European countries (Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway).

Advocacy and Grassroots Groups

Perhaps a reflection of the traditionally low disposition of Spaniards toward joining and participating in voluntary associations of any type, the landscape of social movements in postauthoritarian Spain provides further evidence of the weakness of Spanish civil society before and after the democratic transition. Victor Pérez-Díaz, Spain's foremost observer of civil society during the democratic transition, offers the best summation of the state of social movements and advocacy groups as the country undertook to democratize. He writes that the fact that in Spain all types of associative links have been historically "tenuous" meant that "at the very moment of the transition, the experience of the population with voluntary association was scanty. This was true not only for those connected with industrialists and workers, but also for those representing the interests of farm-workers, consumers, professionals, cadres, students, etc."[30]

The conditions highlighted by Pérez-Díaz ensured that in Spain, in stark contrast to other experiences of democratization, the transition to democracy would not be accompanied by burgeoning social movement politics. To be sure, the country did witness the rebirth of organized labor as a major political force as well as an agitated urban grassroots movement, especially in Madrid. As a result, the years that preceded Franco's death saw significant mobilization of the masses, mostly in the form of spontaneous strikes and demonstrations. But grassroots groups and the labor movement suffered from a host of organizational and institutional problems, including low levels of membership, and both went into a precipitous decline as the consolidation of democracy got underway.

Neighborhood associations represent the most notable form of grassroots activism in Spain. This movement made its appearance in the early 1970s, encouraged by signs of political reform sent out by the Franco regime and the sense that the end of the authoritarian regime was imminent.[31] Mostly an urban phenomenon, the vast majority of these organizations were known as *Comisiones de Barrio*. They flourished mostly in the working class sections of Madrid.

[29] James E. Curtis, Edward G. Grabb, and Douglas E. Baer, "Voluntary Association Membership in Fifteen Countries: A Comparative Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 57 (April 1992).

[30] Victor Pérez-Díaz, "Economic Policies and Social Pacts in Spain During the Transition," *European Sociological Review* 2 (May 1986): 6.

[31] Patricia L. Hipsher, "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain," *Comparative Politics* 27 (April 1996).

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It is reported that in one Madrid shantytown the neighborhood association grew from only six residents in 1970 to over 1,400 families in 1977.[32] Despite their energy and auspicious beginning, the *Comisiones de Barrio* did not live to see the success of the democratic transition, as the movement died a very early death. Right before the first democratic elections, this movement went into rapid decline and a period of crisis. Among the reasons cited for the movement's demise are its inability to expand its membership and to develop the means to mobilize the masses on a large scale. It is reported that after the elections of 1977, the movement "abandoned its former tactic of confronting the authorities directly through street protests and demands."[33]

A similar fate befell Spain's trade union movement. At the inception of democracy, the art of association initially flourished among the workers, making the labor movement the largest, strongest, and best-organized component of civil society.[34] In 1977, more than 400 national and about 2,400 regional unions registered during the euphoria that surrounded the legalization of trade unions.[35] But despite this obvious sign of civil society vitality, the configuration of Spanish labor during the consolidation of democracy does not fit in any meaningful way conventional definitions of strength, especially in the institutional, organizational sense.

Because of the longevity and essentially repressive nature of the Franco dictatorship, the once vigorous trade unions of the pre-Franco years, the so-called historic unions—the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT) and *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT)—"had declined to the point of relative insignificance."[36] Of the UGT, it is reported that at the inception of democracy this organization stood for little more than "some historical initials" with a few thousand members concentrated in the Basque country and Asturias.[37] In significantly better shape was *Comisiones Obreras* (CCOO), a trade union illegally formed in the early 1960s to fight the Franco regime from within its very structures. In the new democracy, the CCOO emerged as one of civil society's

[32] Ibid., 288.

[33] Ibid., 291.

[34] On the labor movement during the transition to democracy in Spain, see José Maria Maravall, *Dictadura y disentimiento politico: Obreros y estudiantes bajo el franquismo* (Madrid: Ediciones Alfaguara, 1978); Victor Pérez-Díaz, *Clase obrera, orden social y conciencia de clase* (Madrid: Fundación del Instituto National de Industria, 1980); José María Zufiaur, "El sindicalismo español en la transición y la crisis," *Papeles de la Economía Española* 22 (1985); Robert Fishman, *Working Class Organizations and the Return of Democracy in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Omar G. Encarnación, "Labor and the Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, (forthcoming).

[35] José María Zufiaur, "El sindicalismo español en la transición y la crisis," 206–07.

[36] Robert Fishman, *Working Class Organizations and the Return to Democracy in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 97. For a view of labor under Franco, see Fernando Morcillo Almendros, Enrique Jiménez-Asenjo, Francisco Pérez Amorós, and Eduardo Rojo Torrecillo, *El sindicalismo de clase en España, 1939–1977* (Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsula, 1978).

[37] Katrina Burgess, "Unemployment and Union Strategies in Spain" in Nancy Bermeo, ed., *Unemployment in Southern Europe: Coping with the Consequences* (London: Frank Kass, 2000), 4.

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most important organizations and an important institutional bridge between the workers and the state and by extension between civil and political societies.

Despite an impressive mobilizing capacity, the CCOO operated in the new democracy more as a movement than a formal union. Coming out of the democratic transition, the CCOO experienced a wrenching period of reorganization in which many of its early leaders abandoned the organization once the decision was made to become a conventional union. Many of them would further fragment the labor union by creating new unions, thus making collective action among the various unions more difficult to attain. During the consolidation of democracy, the CCOO, as well as the rest of the unions, also suffered from an acute shortage of workplace leaders, a situation that hindered their ability to gain a foothold in many factories, to recruit new members, and to elect their own candidates to the system of factory councils created by the Franco regime in the early 1960s to replace union representation in collective bargaining. As late as 1980, it is estimated that the percentage of Spanish workers in firms that had the option of voting union representation in collective bargaining was between 52-57 percent. In the remainder of firms, with more than 40 percent of the eligible labor force, there was "no leadership and no union presence."[38]

The post-transition labor movement in Spain was also financially strapped, and direct financing from the government kept many unions from folding while simultaneously compromising their independence from the state. Official financing of the unions by the state began in 1982, with the infusion of 800 million pesetas (5 million U.S. dollars), a practice that would become a fixture in the national budget.[39] Labor's financial troubles were exacerbated by internal competition, since the unions have kept affiliation dues artificially low as a way to attract new members. For example, in 1986, nearly ten years after the democratic transition, the required monthly contribution by UGT members was eight-tenths of 1 percent of the minimum monthly wage, a very low subscription by European standards.[40] This problem is compounded by the high incidence of nonpayment among union members. It is reported that in 1983, only 58 percent of the membership of the UGT was paying dues and 34 percent for CCOO.[41]

A final contributing factor to the poor institutional state exhibited by Spanish labor during the process of democratization was a very low affiliation base, a compelling reflection of the aversion of Spaniards to participation in voluntary associations. Spanish workers fled the unions created in 1977 almost as fast as they joined them. The CCOO's membership fell from 1.6 million in 1978 to

[38] Fishman, *Working Class Organizations and the Return of Democracy in Spain*, 34.

[39] Joaquín Estefanía and Rodolfo Serrano, "Diez años de relaciones industriales en España" in Angel Zaragoza, ed., *Pactos sociales, sindicatos y patronal en España* (Madrid: Siglo XIX, 1988), 36.

[40] Roger G. McElrath, "Trade Unions and the Industrial Relations Climate in Spain," Multinational Industrial Relations Series, Industrial Research Unit, No. 10 European Studies, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (1989), 114.

[41] Ibid., 110 and 114.

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500,000 by 1985, while the UGT's membership dropped from one million in 1978 to 663,000 by 1985.[42] The decline in union affiliation rates is faithfully mirrored in the dramatic drop in the percentage of Spaniards choosing to belong to a union. As democracy began to consolidate in Spain, membership in Spanish unions virtually evaporated.

Having reached over 30 percent during the euphoric years of political liberalization of the late 1970s, when millions of workers rushed to join all kinds of workers' associations, the national rate of union affiliation descended dramatically to 6 percent by the early 1980s, the lowest level in the industrialized West and among recent cases of democratization in either southern Europe and South America.[43] To find comparable levels of union affiliation, one has to look at the postcommunist world. As suggested by Philippe Schmitter, only postcommunist countries, "where the association of previous unions with the Communist Party had severely discredited this form of collective action," have lower union affiliation rates than Spain.[44]

Uncivil Groups

Further complicating the configuration of civil society was an historical propensity toward political conflict, extremism, and violence. Not surprisingly, some of the vociferous and most politically charged social movements of the Spanish transition were decidedly of an uncivil nature. Many of them belong to a category of social movements described by scholars as "maximalist and uncompromising groups with anti-democratic goals and methods." The presence of such groups in any polity is not a sign of a healthy civil society, despite their popular appeal. As suggested by Diamond, social movements that espouse violence and an antisystem agenda can hinder and even cripple democratic consolidation. In an attempt to contain their influence, the government can resort to repression of civil society.[45]

Among the "maximalist and uncompromising" groups that surged during Spain's democratic transition, few proved to be as difficult to accommodate into the new democratic framework and/or as threatening to the consolidation of democracy than those espousing a radical, nationalist, and separatist agenda. The political transition created an exceptional political opening for the rise of a variety of subnationalist movements eager to assert their demands for political

[42] McElrath, "Trade Unions and the Industrial Relations Climate in Spain."

[43] Omar G. Encarnación, "Labor and the Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective"; and Curtis, Baer, and Grabb, "Voluntary Association Membership in Fifteen Countries," 145.

[44] Philippe Schmitter, "Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe" in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 294.

[45] Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 228–229.

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independence. The majority of these movements had been harshly repressed by the old regime, which was fully committed to the idea of a culturally monolithic Spain. Prominent among these groups was *Euskadita Askatasuna* (ETA), the armed branch of the Basque separatist movement, which in the aftermath of the demise of the Franco regime sought nothing short of the establishment of an independent Basque homeland.

At least until the late 1960s, ETA violence was restricted to acts of vandalism such as blowing up monuments and setting up bombs in front of Civil Guard stations, but with the assassination of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco in downtown Madrid on 20 December 1973, the organization's terrorist tactics would be dramatically transformed. Throughout the years of democratic transition and consolidation, ETA imposed a veritable regime of terror and violence upon the new democracy. Between 1973–1982, the critical years of democratization, ETA was responsible for 371 deaths, 542 injured, 50 kidnappings, and hundreds of bomb explosions and other acts of violence and terror.[46] Counter-violence from the extreme right groups, which got started with the end of Franco regime in 1977, served to worsen the situation. Right-wing groups were responsible for thirty-nine deaths in 1979 and thirty in 1980, as well as a long list of assaults, kidnappings, and disturbances in major Spanish cities.[47] Perhaps the most symbolic period of violence during the transition was the so-called *Semana Negra* (black week) of 23–28 January 1977. In a series of violent events that vividly brought back the ghosts of the Civil War, two students, five lawyers from the Communist party, and five policemen were assassinated in Madrid.

The mayhem generated by ETA and the far Right put the new democracy at great peril, since it directly threatened the nation's geographic constitution and the capacity of the newly-created democratic government to maintain the social order and guarantee civil liberties and other constitutional protections. Unsurprisingly, the perceptions that the nation was coming apart at the seams, that the new democratic government could not guarantee the social peace, and that, as Franco had argued decades ago, Spain could not handle itself in a civilized manner under a democratic system, triggered the failed military coup of February 1981. It aimed at derailing the project of democratization. But paradoxically, as some observers have argued, the failed coup was the critical test for the new democracy.[48] The refusal of the political class to cave into the military's demands and the unambiguous support for democracy shown by the public in massive street demonstrations signaled that by 1982 democracy was already an entrenched political value among Spaniards.

[46] José María Maravall and Julián Santamaría, "Crisis del franquismo: transición política y consolidación de la democracia en España," *Sistema* (November 1985): 105.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Felipe Agüero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America" in Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective.*

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The Problem of Civil Society

There is no shortage of explanations to account for the problematic nature of Spanish civil society. Perhaps the best-known explanation comes from political anthropologists and attributes the impoverishment of civic life to the proverbial individualism of the Spanish people. Similar conditions have also been found in other Catholic-Latin societies, especially southern Italy, and are believed to be rooted in lack of trust among individuals and ensuing failure to develop social ties and moral obligations to join groups outside of the nuclear family.[49] In discussing these issues, the political observer Francis Fukuyama notes that "excessive individualism, a narrow radius of trust and the centrality of the family have long been characteristic of Spain."[50] The resulting outcome is "a saddle-shaped distribution of organizations, with strong families, a strong state, and relatively little in between."[51]

More persuasive explanations for the peculiarities of civil society development are offered by McDonough, Barnes, and López Pina. Their analysis emphasizes structural factors including, first, the high rates of unemployment that afflicted Spain throughout the process of democratization, which gave the nation the most extreme condition of high unemployment among OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries by the mid-1980s. Spanish unemployment soared from 415,000 in 1977 to nearly two million by 1985. Among the principal causes for this crisis was a program of industrial restructuring that gutted many of the state enterprises created by Franco for the purpose of achieving full employment.[52] High unemployment was especially hard on the unions, whose core membership was located in the sectors most directly affected by industrial reform.

The late entry of females into the workforce is another factor suggested by McDonough, Barnes, and López Pina. In contrast to most European countries, as well as other new democracies such as Brazil and Korea, Spanish women are less likely to work outside the home and thus less likely to join voluntary associations.[53] Finally, the authors focus on what they deem is the most important variable in accounting for the difference in levels of civic engagement between Spain and much of the democratizing world: the role of the Catholic Church during the democratic transition. They observe that in most cases of democratization in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the church played a critical role in mobilizing the masses. In Spain, by contrast, the church sat out

[49] The classic statement on these issues is Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Chicago: The Free Press, 1958).

[50] Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1995), 56.

[51] Ibid., 55.

[52] J. Jiménez and L. Toharia, *Unemployment and Labour Market Flexibility: Spain* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1994), 1 and 21.

[53] According to McDonough, Barnes, and López Pina, the percentage of women in Spain defined as economically active is 22 percent compared with 30 percent for Brazil and 40 percent for Korea.

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the transition by assuming a neutral stance. They note that the church did not oppose democratization, but it stopped short of spurring the faithful to mobilization against the authoritarian system, and it declined to back efforts to organize a confessional party. "The result was to leave the link between popular devotion and political abstention intact."[54]

Another compelling explanation for Spain's deficit in civic engagement regards this phenomenon as a by-product of the ethos of tolerance and moderation that pervaded the transition from Francoism, a reflection of the political learning drawn from past mistakes.[55] Spaniards are thought to have entered democracy having learned the very high price the nation paid for its indulgences in the politics of extremism, especially during the Second Republic (1931–1936), Spain's brief and tragic experiment with democracy during the interwar years.[56] Associational life during the Second Republic and the Civil War was dominated by organizations whose commitment to democracy was at best suspect and whose political agenda did not extend beyond narrowly conceived interests.[57] A leading force behind the creation of mass organizations during the years of Republican government was the Catholic Church in its attempt to battle the anticlerical policies of the Second Republic. Especially influential was the *Confederación Nacional Católica Agraria* (CNCA), which organized thousands of farm laborers in north-central Spain and which was a supporter of the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA), the most important Catholic, right-wing party of the 1930s.[58]

During the Second Republic, Spain also developed a highly radicalized labor movement. Just prior to the creation of the Second Republic, Spain became "the only land to produce a mass worker movement of anarcho-syndicalism."[59] Bypassing more "conventional" unions such as the socialist-affiliated UGT (which itself became increasingly radicalized as a result of the workers' preference for revolutionary activity) thousands of workers in pre-Franco Spain flocked to join the CNT, the principal institutional embodiment of anarcho-syndicalism in interwar Europe. Founded in 1911 and outlawed until 1914, the CNT grew rapidly into an organization of more than 15,000 members by 1914

[54] Ibid., 2.

[55] Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros, "Introduction" in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, 22.

[56] The subject of political learning is a recurring theme in the study of Spanish democratization. See Paloma Aguilar, *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española* (Madrid: Alianza, 1996).

[57] On this period in Spanish history, see Juan J. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain" in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

[58] On the CNCA, see J. J. Castillo, *La subordinación política del pequeño campesino* (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1979). On the broader subject of religion and politics, see Juan J. Linz, "Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of Democracy," *Daedalus* 120 (Summer 1991).

[59] Gerald Meaker, "Anarchists Versus Syndicalists: Conflicts Within the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores, 1917–1923" in Stanley G. Payne, ed., *Politics and Society in Twentieth Century Spain* (New York: Viewpoints, 1976), 29.

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to just under one million by the time the Second Republic was inaugurated in 1931.[60] The tactics of labor terrorism that characterized the strategies of the CNT "left many employers in a state of panic and shock, and traditional structures of industrial control and authority were considered under mortal threat."[61] Unsurprisingly, during the turbulent years leading to the Civil War, relations between employers and unions descended into violent conflict, as radicalized unions terrorized employers by enacting a massive wave of seizures of business property. Business, with the assistance of the state and the approving eye of the church, declared war on labor leaders.

Other explanations for the problematic nature of civil society in Spain delve deeper into the nation's history and, particularly, its agonizing process of modernization and state building. Juan Linz has argued that Spain's failure to generate vigorous social movements of the like that emerged in Western Europe prior to World War II is rooted in the country's historic economic backwardness. He notes that whereas in 1930 only 10 percent of the population in the United Kingdom depended on agriculture, 22 percent in Germany, and 27 in France, it was 55.2 percent in Spain. Large-scale industrialization would not arrive in Spain until the early 1960s. Consequently, throughout much of the twentieth century, Spain lacked the conditions that are thought to have facilitated the growth of organized groups in other European countries, including the "Western urban social structure" of professional and bureaucratic middle classes, and of commercial activity and incipient industrialization." In its place, the nation developed into "a large agrarian and under-developed society in which organized interest groups were less important than the personal and family links between the political class and large landowners, bankers, railroad magnates and many new industrialists."[62]

Another weighty issue addressed by Linz is the multicultural and multilingual character of Spanish society. The state developed before the age of nationalism, and since the turn of the century it found itself increasingly challenged by emerging peripheral nationalisms in regions like Catalonia and the Basque country. This historical context has no parallels in Western Europe and cannot be ignored when accounting for the delayed and retarded development of organizations in Spain, especially those of a national character. To peripheral nationalism we can add a string of other political ills that have frustrated the growth of civil society, especially at the national level. As suggested by the sociologists Salvador Giner and Enrique Sevilla, the list of cleavages that thwarted group formation is both lengthy and complex. They write that: "Spain's en-

[60] Ibid., 43.

[61] Benjamin Martin, *The Agony of Modernization: Labor and Industrialization in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 215.

[62] Linz, "A Century of Interest Politics in Spain," 365. For a broader examination of this issue, see also Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism Against the State: The Case of Spain" in S. N. Eisenstandt and S. Rokkan, eds., *Building Nations and States* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973).

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demic cleavages such as industrial vs. agrarian, periphery vs. center, hegemonic nationalism vs. peripheral nationalism, clericalism vs. anti-clericalism, and despotism vs. anti-despotism have crossed the ideological, class and political composition of Spain for a long time and in such a manner that they have fragmented and undermined the functioning and expansion of other forms of social cohesion and coalescence, especially those which foster the growth of organized groups."[63]

Finally, a full understanding of civil society's weakness in Spain since the transition to democracy has to take into consideration the legacies of the preceding authoritarian regime. Over the course of his long regime, Franco manipulated the development of civil society so that it induced considerable apathy toward most kinds of association. Consequently, at the inception of democracy the legacies of Francoism "inhibited civil society's capacity for initiative, individual responsibility, self-organization and collective action."[64] Seeking to cure what he referred to as the "familiar demons" of Spanish society—"individualism, lack of solidarity, and extremism"—from its very inception in 1939, Franco rejected pluralist forms of interest representation and organization.[65] Instead, Franco fully embraced a project of social integration as dictated by the rigid doctrine of the "organic-corporatist" state.[66] Above all, this doctrine granted the state the right to grant and withhold legitimacy to civil society organizations. This in turn meant the sudden death of the flourishing but problematic civil society of the Second Republic.

After 1939, the Franco regime banned all political parties and jailed, murdered, or sent into exile many Republican leaders. It also passed a number of laws aimed at regulating associational life. In 1945 the state recognized "the right of all Spaniards to associate freely for licit purpose," but the limits of the law were "so narrow as to make the creation of any political organization unthinkable."[67] As a substitute for free associational life, an artificial, compulsory, and state-sponsored project of civic society building was enacted. Much of this task was assigned to the Catholic Church, a staunch ally of the regime at least through the early 1960s, when many church-created organizations began to support workers' strikes. Notable organizations from this period are the *Hermandades Obreras Católicas* and the *Juventud Obrera Católica*, created to carry out pastoral activities among students and workers. The regime also produced a number of schemes to foment students' associations. Until 1965, all university students were required to belong to the *Sindicato Español Universitario* (SEU),

[63] Salvador Giner and Enrique Sevilla, "Spain after Franco: From Corporatism to Corporatism" in Allan Williams, ed., *Southern Europe Transformed* (London: Harper and Row, 1986), 130.

[64] Victor Pérez-Díaz, "Economic Policies and Social Pacts in Spain During the Transition: The Two Faces of Neo-Corporatism," *European Sociological Review* 2 (May 1986): 6.

[65] Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy*, 26.

[66] On organic corporatism, see Alfred Stepan, *State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[67] Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy*, 137.

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"a falangist union founded in the thirties, and adopted as a means of control and indoctrination."[68]

Given that the Spanish Civil War was in essence a class war, the attempt to "corporatize" society under the Franco regime reached its apex in the realm of industrial and labor relations. Upon usurping power, the Franco regime declared illegal all the independent syndicates of the Second Republic, and attempts by labor leaders to organize the workers in the new regime were harshly punished. In place of independent trade unions, the Franco regime created a vast and complex system of compulsory "vertical syndicates" that united workers by profession and occupation and also incorporated the nation's employers.[69] In reality, the purpose of the syndicates was to subjugate, domesticate, and depoliticize the working class. This mission remained their *raison d'être* until their dismantling in 1977.

Political Institutions and Social Capital

The consolidation of democracy in Spain in the absence of the requisite civil society loudly echoes one scholar's contention that while there is strong evidence linking healthy civil societies with the existence of democracies, too little caution is usually exercised in relating civil society to the actual formation of democracy.[70] These links are conceptually attractive, but they are hard to sustain empirically. More importantly, the case of Spain demonstrates that scholars of civil society have been particularly shortsighted in their thinking about the production of social capital in either old or new democracies. To civic society advocates, the perceived capacity to generate social capital makes civil society crucial to democracy. Moreover, this endeavor is thought to be the domain of civil society, since social capital is meant to emanate almost exclusively from the social interactions that civil society organizations afford ordinary citizens. But in making these contentions, scholars of civil society such as Putnam fall into the trap of precluding the possibility that other organizations, especially political ones, can also serve to engender the same kind of values believed to build up social capital. This point is powerfully suggested by the Spanish experience. The absence of a vibrant and robust civil society should not be taken to suggest that Spain lacked the social capital to consolidate its new democracy. Indeed, no other new democracy has undertaken to democratize with as high a propensity among its citizens to engage in trust-based collective action for the sake of achieving the goal of democratic consolidation.

The most compelling evidence of the presence of an impressive stock of social capital during the transition and consolidation of Spanish democracy is

[68] Ibid., 180.

[69] On the OSE, see Manuel Ludevid, *Cuarenta años de sindicato sindical: Aproximación a la organización sindical española* (Barcelona: 1976).

[70] Alison Van Rooy and Mark Robinson, "Out of the Ivory Tower: Civil Society and the Aid System" in Van Rooy, ed., *Civil Society and the Democracy Aid Industry*, 44.

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the series of social accords signed by civil and political organizations between the years of 1977–1986.[71] The first and most important of these was the epoch-making intraparty 1977 Moncloa pact, which laid the political consensus embodied in the democratic constitution of 1978. Broadly supported by a public intensely desirous of living under a democratic system, the Moncloa accord committed the nation's political class from a wide range of political persuasions including Christian Democrats, Communists, Nationalists, Socialists, and Conservatives to a broad program of political and economic reforms with the aim of consolidating democracy in as nonconfrontational a manner as possible. Subsequent agreements incorporated the direct participation of unions and employers' groups and dealt with a variety of potentially divisive subjects such as inflation and wage policy, industrial and labor reform, and economic restructuring.

These pacts are rightly regarded as the linchpin of the democratization process in Spain. They served as symbolic benchmarks for the end of centuries of political divisiveness, extremism, and violence while simultaneously ushering in a new, democratic political culture based on moderation, consensus, and compromise.[72] More concretely, the pacts facilitated the consolidation of democracy by bringing together the social actors most centrally concerned with this task (the government, the party system, and organized economic interests) and giving them a platform for the recognition of mutual interests. The pacts also served the highly useful purpose of isolating those elements in civil society whose political agenda sought to derail the project of democratization—right-wing groups and separatist movements. These achievements of social pacts rested not only on the capacity of the political actors to enter into agreements with one another, but also on the public's support for them, clear signs of widespread generalized trust among political elites and the general public in Spain.[73] Key to our understanding of the origins of this trust is the constitution of the emerging political system, especially the overall legitimacy of the state apparatus, which sponsored the pacts, and the reach and influence of the party system, which served as the bridge between the state and civil society.

[71] On social pacts since the transition to democracy, see Enrique de la Villa and Juan Sergadoy Bengoechea, "Social Concertation in Spain," *Labour and Society* 12 (1987); Enrique Fuentes Quintana, "De los pactos de la Moncloa a la Constitución" in José Luis Delgado, ed., *Economía Española de la Transición a la Democracia* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, 1990); Omar G. Encarnación, "Social Concertation in Democratic and Market Transitions: Comparative Lessons from Spain," *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (August 1997); and Angel Zaragoza, eds., *Pactos Sociales, Sindicatos y Patronal en España* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1988). For transcripts of the pacts, see Enrique de la Villa, *Los grandes pactos collectivos a partir de la transición democrática* (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1985).

[72] See Victor Peréz-Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society: The Making of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[73] On popular support for the social pacts, see Omar G. Encarnación, "Labor and the Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective."

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Beginning in the late 1950s, the bureaucratic apparatus of the state underwent a wholesale revamping, which significantly raised the state's levels of competence as well as its credibility with the general public. By the mid-1970s, the state bureaucratic apparatus bore little resemblance to the one consolidated in the aftermath of the Civil War in 1939, which was characterized by its fascist-military leanings. This explains why by the time democracy was approaching, observers of Spanish politics such as Charles Anderson were noting that the Francoist state "demonstrated a flexibility and openness to change quite as great as that of most Western nations."[74] Not surprisingly, during the democratic transition "there was no groundswell of support for a purge of the state administration on the grounds that it was bloated and inefficient or staffed by incompetent hacks."[75]

Obvious signs of state modernization around the time of the transition were the overwhelming civilian nature of late Francoist governments as well as the opening and democratization of important fragments of the state's institutional apparatus. A compelling example of the latter was the liberalization of labor relations begun in the early 1960s, a major impetus in the development of trust, collaboration, and interdependence across the Spanish public. Ensuing from this development was the creation of a state-sponsored system of works' councils in factories hiring more than fifty workers.[76] In the years leading to the transition, the works' councils are credited with–advancing–workers'- economic gains, aiding in the acceptance of capitalism by a previously radicalized working class, and enhancing cooperation between capital and labor.[77] Entrusted with collective bargaining, the councils brought democracy to the workplace well before the formal demise of the dictatorship. They afforded democratically elected workers' leaders the opportunity to negotiate wages and work conditions with their employers. The works councils survived the democratic transition virtually intact because "employers, unions and state officials were convinced that they were an institutional element of the Franco regime that was worth including in the new system of industrial relations."[78]

The state's economic performance during the last phase of the Franco regime served to underscore and strengthen the societal interdependence embodied in the works' councils. Between 1959 and the mid-1970s, Spain experienced an economic boom that was bested only by Japan. The country was trans-

[74] Charles Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 223.

[75] Richard Gunther, "Spanish Public Policy: From Dictatorship to Democracy," Working Paper (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 1997), 13.

[76] See Modesto Escobar, "Works or Union Councils? The Representative System in Medium and Large Spanish Firms," Working Paper, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March, Madrid, 1993.

[77] See Encarnación, "Social Concertation in Democratic and Market Transitions: Comparative Lessons from Spain," 413.

[78] Victor Pérez-Díaz, *Clase obrera, orden social y conciencia social* (Madrid: Instituto de Industria, 1980), 33.

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formed from a primarily agrarian society into an industrial one whose economy was among the world's largest by the time the Franco regime was dismantled.[79] The impact of this development on the behavior of civil society in Spain cannot be underestimated. Above all, the economic bonanza generated during the late Franco period helped turn a formerly radicalized working class into a model of restraint and moderation. According to the historian Edward Malefakis, the economic boom of the late Franco period occasioned a "kind of embourgeoisement of the masses" and a "partial erosion of class barriers."[80] These outcomes are fully reflected in surveys of workers' attitudes around the time of the transition. They found "little hostility toward employers and the state and little willingness to transform the existing economic order."[81] More revealing, perhaps, is that 52.1 percent of the workers viewed their places of work as a team effort in which the common goal was to produce more and for the benefit of everyone.[82]

Political parties, although historically fragmented and organizationally weak in Spain, also served as important sources of social capital.[83] Before and after the democratic transition, left-wing parties were active in making deliberate investments in the development of civil society. This is most clearly the case of the reconstitution of the trade union sector in the post-Franco era. The PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) created the UGT in 1888, and until at least the late 1980s, the so-called Socialist family fought the common struggle against dictatorship. In 1982, the PSOE's rise to power propelled the UGT to its current position as the most important trade union in the country. Communist leaders created the CCOO during the 1960s to combat the Franco regime from within its very structures. During its clandestine struggle against the Franco regime, the Communist party used the CCOO and other popular organizations it controlled, such as the neighborhood movement, to promote democracy within and outside the workplace. These investments in civil society made sure that neither the parties of the Left nor the unions could be ignored by the center-right government that orchestrated Spain's transition to democracy.

In Spain's new democracy, the historic alliances between the organized labor movement and the party system proved critical to both the production of social capital and the consolidation of democracy. The Communist and Socialist parties are widely credited with inducing much of the moderation and compromise demonstrated by the unions throughout the process of democratic consolidation including restraint from excessive mobilization of the workers at critical and sensitive junctures in the transition process and acceptance of the

[79] On the Spanish economy before and after the democratic transition, see Joseph Harrison, *The Spanish Economy: From the Civil War to the European Community* (London: Macmillian Press, 1993).

[80] Edward Malefakis, "Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview," Working Paper, Instituto Juan March, Madrid, 1992, 2.

[81] Pérez-Díaz, *Clase obrera, orden social y conciencia social*, 99.

[82] Ibid., 101–103.

[83] On political parties in democratic Spain, see Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, *Spain After Franco*, 1986.

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social pacts. Many labor leaders entered the democratic era strongly opposed to the Left's participation in social pacts, which they deemed as "protectors of the capitalist status quo" and "a diminishing agent of workers' activism."[84] But party leaders prevailed in their decision that the unions support (or at least not openly oppose) the forging of the Moncloa accords. Especially forceful in assuming this position was Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Communist party, who perhaps more than any other politician throughout the transition to democracy stressed the need for moderation and collective sacrifices.

Conclusion

This study highlights the need to reconsider the critical and protagonistic role currently afforded to civil society in the consolidation of democracy. Perhaps Sheri Berman gets is right when she argues that civil society is best regarded as a politically neutral multiplier—neither inherently good nor inherently bad—but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context.[85] Incorporating the wider political context alluded to by Berman into the study of civil society requires unpacking the manner in which political institutions influence and mold civil society's behavior and proclivities. Thus far, political institutions—from parties to legislatures—appear to have been cast away from the debate on civil society in the politics of democratic consolidation. In the eyes of many civil society advocates, political institutions are colonizing pariahs whose penetration of civil society paves the way for the demise of democracy. This is evident in the model of civil society development advocated by many scholars, which is anchored on the attainment of autonomy from political institutions.

Underlying this model are two faulty assumptions. The first one is that only civil society can engender social capital. There is considerable reluctance on the part of civil society advocates to grant political institutions any role in producing the very same pro-democratic values and orientations believed to aid a flourishing civil society in consolidating democracy, including trust and solidarity. Blinding scholars of civil society to the importance of political institutions to the production of social capital is the popularity of the concept of civil society itself and its antipolitics orientations. Much of the civil society rhetoric belittles the importance of political institutions, leading to widespread skepticism about their importance in contemporary politics. Perhaps the expectation is that flourishing civil societies will either fix whatever ails political institutions, including the state, or else render them obsolete. As noted by Thomas Carothers, "the rise of civil society induces some to see a nearly state-free future in which tentative, minimalistic states hang back while powerful non-governmental groups impose a new, virtuous order."[86]

[84] *El País* (Madrid), 21 May 1976.

[85] Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Breakdown of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49 (April 1997): 427.

[86] Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society," *Foreign Policy* 117 (Winter 1999–2000): 26.

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But this logic is deeply flawed and even dangerous. Tocqueville himself acknowledged political institutions to be as important as nonpolitical ones, a point often missed by his many contemporary admirers. In his view, political associations were the engines of a vigorous civil society; and as such, they were indispensable to a healthy democracy. Tocqueville reasoned that the more people became engaged in political institutions, the more likely that they would become involved in nonpolitical ones. Political associations were "the large free schools to which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of association."[87] Tocqueville's belief in the importance of political institutions is echoed in the literature on political development. Samuel Huntington's landmark work on developing societies reminds us that a well-ordered civic polity requires a recognizable and stable pattern of institutional authority and political institutions that are sufficiently strong to provide the basis of a legitimate political order and working political community.[88] In the absence of these conditions, societies with highly organized and mobilized publics can degenerate into instability, disorder, and even violence.

The second assumption is that civil society cannot promote democracy by working in tandem with political society but rather by acting outside of the political system and mostly in a confrontational, watchdog mode. This is implicit in Diamond's critique of social pacts. He warns that such pacts between the state and the leadership of interest associations "pose a serious threat to democracy in transitional or newly emerging constitutional regimes."[89] He adds "that the risk appears greatest in countries with a history of authoritarian state corporatism where the state has created, organized, licensed, funded, subordinated and controlled 'interest' groups." Diamond may well have been writing about Spain, a prototype of state corporatism until the very last days of the authoritarian regime. But he was wrong in assuming that pacts could not be effectively put to use as vehicles for the rapid consolidation of democracy.

Finally, this article should give some pause to those engaged in promoting democratic consolidation abroad by assisting in the creation of a flourishing civil society. Aid to fragile and fledging democracies is a noble and worthy endeavor, but by equating civil society vibrancy with democratic consolidation, it appears that the point of many democratic aid programs is not just creating democracy but rather U.S.–style democracy. Democratic states around the world are configured institutionally differently, and a key variant among them is the size and vibrancy of their civil societies. To base assumptions about the quality and performance of democracy primarily on the institutional configuration of civil society can lead not only to inaccurate conclusions but also to serious misrepresentations.

[87] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 522.

[88] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 82–83.

[89] Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 250.

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More worrisome yet is that the strengthening of civil society as a strategy to support the consolidation of democracy is being pursued in the midst of deteriorating political conditions. Ironically, in many newly democratic societies, the political system is less legitimate and possibly even less consolidated today than when democratic government was first inaugurated. Largely a consequence of the economic disruptions with which contemporary democratic transitions are now traditionally associated (structural adjustment, high unemployment, and hyperinflation), life under democracy in many places in Africa, Latin America, and the former communist world is filled with profound skepticism and cynicism about political institutions. Consequently, party systems, state agencies, and legislatures appear to be growing weaker and less legitimate, causing people to retreat to civil society in desperation about the political system. Under these conditions, the prospects for political institutions to engender the attributes and values associated with the building of social capital appear decidedly inauspicious. In turn, such conditions cast a dark cloud over the long-term viability of both civil society and democracy.*

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

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The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limits of Crisis Management

RICHARD M. PIOUS

Nowhere do the constitutional prerogatives of the president seem greater than in the midst of national security crises; nowhere do we invest in the president greater resources of command. Although in the past half century presidents have surrounded themselves with a vast national security apparatus, consisting of intelligence agencies and the National Security Council, it is not at all clear that presidents have been effective as crisis managers. They often lack crucial information, use incomplete or misleading analogies to understand crisis situations, find it difficult to micromanage events, and are unable to project force effectively. Even when they are successful, it is often in spite of, rather than because of, the resources of the institutionalized presidency at their disposal.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 provides a case study of how John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev almost blundered into a nuclear war through the crisis management approaches of their advisory systems, but then managed to extricate themselves using personal diplomacy and old-fashioned political horsetrading. They did so without revealing to the world how they had defused the crisis, a decision to maintain confidentiality with far reaching consequences for subsequent presidential crisis decision making. The illusion that presidential crisis management can compel an adversary to submit and that a nuclear crisis can be successfully managed left Kennedy's successors with impossible burdens of public expectations.

The United States and the Soviet Union were on the brink of nuclear war between 22 October, the evening that President Kennedy announced a "quar-

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antine" on Soviet ships carrying weapons heading for Cuba, and 28 October, when the Soviet Union announced that it would remove ballistic missiles it had placed in Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade the island or undermine its communist regime. The resolution of the crisis was trumpeted in the United States as a great victory—"Reds Back Down" and "Retreat to Moscow" blared headlines in U.S. newspapers—and scholars of international relations and of the presidency attempted to learn lessons about crisis management. Roger Hilsman, a leading scholar of foreign policy making and at the time the head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, proclaimed that "President Kennedy had achieved a foreign policy victory of historical proportions."[1] Kennedy's speechwriter Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that "Kennedy was well satisfied by the performance of his government. The Executive Committee had proved a brilliant instrument of consideration and coordination.... As a whole, the government could hardly have performed better."[2] Schlesinger was most impressed with Kennedy's personal performance: "he coolly and exactly measured the level of force necessary to deal with the level of threat. Defining a clear and limited objective, he moved with mathematical precision to accomplish it," and "by his own composure, clarity and control, he held the country behind him."[3] Many other scholars drew the same conclusion.[4] As James Blight summarizes, the Cuban Missile Crisis is "typically described by specialists in crisis management as the calmest, coolest, most measured and laudable example of exerting rational control over a complex and dangerous international situation."[5]

At the time, these assessments seemed accurate enough, and as we will see, there is a sense in which this assessment still holds up, particularly if a loose definition of crisis management is used to define any successful negotiation between the superpowers. But given the access scholars now have to Cuban, Soviet, and American documents and to the recollections of many of the participants (recorded at a series of international conferences beginning in 1987), it is worth a second look at how these events were managed and what the historical record tells us about the limitations of the crisis management approach more narrowly defined: the tactical manipulation of military and diplomatic assets to compel an adversary to withdraw from its position. In that narrower sense, the Cuban Missile Crisis was an unsuccessful case study of presidential decision making.

His Finest Hour?

According to the conventional accounts, the Soviets backed down because Kennedy understood their psychology, and his national security advisers had

[1] Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), xii.

[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 832.

[3] Ibid., 840.

[4] For a discussion of the views of "traditionalists," see William J. Medland, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 36–50.

[5] James Blight, *The Shattered Crystal Ball* (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990), 151.

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correctly understood how to "handle" the Soviets. The experts wanted Kennedy to hang tough and make few if any concessions. Llewellyn "Tommy" Thompson, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, intervened at various points in ExComm (Executive Committee) meetings to take a hard line. He thought any deal with the Soviets would be a defeat: "I think they'll change their minds when we take a continued, forceful action, stopping their ship or—or taking out a SAM-site. That kills some Russians. . . ."[6] He told Kennedy that the Soviets would not insist on a Jupiter trade. "[W]e're going to have to take our weapons out of Turkey," Kennedy began at one point, and turning to Lewellyn, continued "Tommy, he's not going to take them out of Cuba if we . . ." But Thompson interjected, "I don't agree Mr. President. I think there's still a chance that we can get this line going." "He'll back down?" Kennedy responded. Lewellyn proposed the Trollope ploy, so that Kennedy would ignore a message in which Khrushchev had proposed a trade and instead accept an earlier message in which no trade was demanded: "Well, because he's already got this other proposal which he put forward. . . ."[7] The crisis managers, according to these accounts, had stayed the course against the ExComm hawks, who otherwise would have led the nation into a nuclear war, and also against the doves such as Adlai Stevenson, who wanted to negotiate with, rather than confront, the Soviets. Kennedy had given the Soviets room to retreat, had not rubbed salt in their wounds, and had allowed them to back away from confrontation. According to this version of events, Khrushchev had been emotional and frightened, while Kennedy had been cool and collected. The Soviets had not understood Kennedy at all, thinking him weak and irresolute; but Kennedy had understood the Soviets and knew how to manipulate them in the desired direction. The lesson here: do as Kennedy had done to ensure that adversaries' perceptions of U.S. strength come to correspond to the reality of U.S. power and willingness to employ it.

U.S. local and strategic military superiority was a decisive factor in ending the crisis without accepting Soviet terms, especially not the proposed trade of missiles, according to subsequent Department of Defense (DOD) analysts.[8] The DOD opinion was shared by the first published studies of the crisis: "The President had no intention of destroying the alliance by backing down," Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen wrote.[9] Secretary of State Dean Rusk denied that Kennedy had made a deal involving a trade of missiles when Senator Bourke Hickenlooper asked him to affirm during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a trade had in "no way, shape or

[6] David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88): 81.

[7] Ibid., 88, 59.

[8] "Some Lessons from Cuba," Department of Defense, 15 November 1992, in Laurance Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds. *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (New York: The New Press, 1992), 308–318.

[9] Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 714.

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form, directly or indirectly been connected with the settlement."[10] National security managers and military planners, in surveying the results of the missile crisis, concluded that the United States had come out of it with its power and prestige enhanced, and its alliances strengthened.[11] It was Kennedy's finest hour.

Power Stakes

This take on the crisis is incomplete and misleading. It gives us a distorted view of presidential capabilities in crisis decision making. It fails to answer the most important questions: Why did the Soviets and the Americans agree on a resolution of the crisis? How was the knot of nuclear war untied? An adequate understanding of the resolution of the crisis must begin with the fact that for the U.S. side it was not primarily a question of the military balance between the two superpowers. In large measure, Kennedy's response was shaped by domestic and international politics.[12] Put another way, the crisis was as much about presidential power stakes, prestige, and reputation as it was about a balance of nuclear terror.

What evidence do we have for this assertion? Consider the exchange between Robert Kennedy and his brother. As Bobby Kennedy recalled it, he was talking to the president about whether or not making an issue out of the missiles was justified: "I just don't think there was any choice," I said, "and not only that, if you hadn't acted, you would have been impeached." The president thought for a moment and said, "that's what I think—I would have been impeached."[13] Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara spoke about the political significance of the missiles in the ExComm meetings: "I don't think there *is* a military problem here [in Cuba], this is a domestic, political problem. . . . It's primarily a . . . domestic political problem."[14] Kennedy himself at the first ExComm meeting also was sensitive to domestic and international political considerations. "What difference does it make?" he exclaimed about the placement of missiles in Cuba, when "they have enough to blow us up now anyway." He concluded that, "After all, this is a political struggle as much as military." Republicans had claimed that the Soviets had put offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy had gone out on a limb saying they had not. Khrushchev had sawed off the limb, embarrassing the president. "He can't do this to me," Kennedy

[10] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Briefing on Cuban Developments," 25 January 1963, in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 15, 105–6.

[11] Raymond Garthoff, "Significance of the Soviet Backdown for Future U.S. Policy," Department of State, 29 October 1962. in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 304.

[12] This point has been made most cogently by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 95.

[13] Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: Norton, 1969), 67.

[14] Welch and Blight, "The Eleventh Hour," 45–6, 48. (Emphasis in original.)

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had exclaimed at his first briefing, upon learning of the results of the U-2 surveillance.[15] Had Kennedy not acted, Republicans would have exploited his lack of foresight, his intelligence lapses, and his irresolution in the forthcoming elections, much as they had attempted to do between August and mid-October before Kennedy had challenged the Soviets. Kennedy did not manufacture the Cuban Missile Crisis, and he certainly did not attempt to gain partisan political advantage from it during the tense days of the standoff.[16] But he, his brother, and McNamara all felt that the United States was required to confront the Soviets publicly out of political rather than military necessity.

Kennedy had drawn a line publicly, and the Soviets had stepped over it in a deceptive and disrespectful manner. Where the law was drawn in terms of a nuclear balance of power had been less important than the fact that a line had been drawn in the Western Hemisphere, and the Soviets had pretended to respect it and then had deceived the president, leaving him politically vulnerable. Had the Soviets publicly announced that they were placing forty missiles in Cuba, according to Sorensen, the United States likely would have accepted the deployment, then minimized the military importance of that number, "and said with great fanfare that we would absolutely not tolerate the presence of more than 100 missiles in Cuba."[17]

Kennedy thought the secret deployment indicated that Khrushchev had no respect for him. In ExComm meetings Kennedy was clear on this point: it was time for a showdown, time to get Khrushchev to pull back, to end his constant probing of U.S. positions, his constant escalation of demands. Kennedy thought Khrushchev had miscalculated his resolve and strength. But Kennedy had gotten it all wrong: he failed to understand the Soviet motives for putting missiles in Cuba.[18] Consider the decision to deploy from Khrushchev's point of view. He deployed, not because he thought Kennedy was weak or irresolute, but because he knew that the United States had strategic nuclear superiority and was beginning to act accordingly. The United States had just begun its satellite reconnaissance of the USSR in the summer of 1961, and with its new Corona satellites it had learned that it had four times the number of land based ICBMs as the Soviets. Consequently it revised down the numbers on the Russian side from 140–200 to a more realistic 10–25.[19] In October 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric in a public speech indicated that the United States now knew that the missile gap existed in the American favor. The Soviet missile sites were soft and vulnerable to an American first strike. Once the United States knew that it had the numerical advantage and that the Soviets were vulnerable, the Soviets were at a strategic disadvantage. In their analysis, Gilpa-

[15] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 67.

[16] Thomas G. Patterson and William J. Brophy, "October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962" *Journal of American History* 73 (June 1980): 87–119.

[17] David A. Welch and James G. Blight, *On the Brink* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 43.

[18] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 100.

[19] Roger Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Westport: Praeger, 1996), 6.

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tric's speech involved a U.S. move to exploit Soviet vulnerability by making the claim of nuclear superiority. Presumably the United States would soon act to exploit its proclaimed advantage.

Sending missiles to Cuba was a temporary stop-gap measure to counter this perceived American threat. The Soviets had a large supply of 1,000-mile-range MRBMs (SS-4s) and of 2,000-mile-range IRBMs, sufficient to cover most of the United States if launched from Cuba. Even with the Soviet deployment, by the end of October 1962 the United States had 172 ICBMs operational and on alert and 144 Polaris missiles at sea on station. It had 1,450 bombers on alert status with 2,952 weapons. The Soviets may have had 24 ICBMs operational, and the 24 SS-4s in Cuba doubled their total of missiles capable of hitting U.S. targets.[20] The United States was adding to its arsenal faster than the Soviets. There was a missile gap, and the Soviets were on the wrong side of it, with or without the Cuba deployment.

The Soviets were worried about an American first-strike capability. Kennedy in their view seemed unwilling to compromise on cold war issues: he had deployed Jupiter missiles in Turkey, had moved the missile gap in his favor, had engaged in a conventional arms buildup, had been unwilling to compromise on Cuba and Berlin, had sponsored an invasion of Cuba, and had approved new efforts to destabilize it. From the Soviet point of view, Kennedy's strength and firmness—not his weakness—were the problem that the deployment of missiles was intended to address.

Khrushchev in his memoirs claimed that his principal motivation had been to forestall new U.S. attacks on Cuba.[21] Had that been true, he would have had no objection to making the deployment public, as the Cubans wished. His primary motivation was to change the balance of power. In a letter he sent to Fidel Castro during the crisis, he recalled that he was on vacation in Varna, Bulgaria on the Black Sea, walking on the beach with Soviet Minster of Defense Roman Malinovskii, who told him the United States had bases on the far shore in Turkey that could wipe out Soviet cities. Khrushchev asked Malinovskii if missiles in Cuba could do the same to the United States and was assured they could. "The primary objective was to achieve a balance of power vis-à-vis the US," concluded Fedor Burlatsky, speechwriter and adviser to Khrushchev.[22]

The Jupiters in Turkey became operational in April 1962, the same month Khrushchev decided to put missiles in Cuba. This was not the first time the question of Jupiters had preoccupied Khrushchev. On 4 June 1961, at the sum-

[20] Statement by Garthoff in James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 134. Hilsman has the number at 44 ICBMS for the Soviets at the time of the missile crisis in the Soviet Union and the U.S. with 140. Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 6.

[21] Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, Strobe Talbott, ed. (London: Deutsch, 1971), 488–505.

[22] Fedor Burlatsky, "The Lessons of Personal Diplomacy" in *Problems of Communism* (Spring 1992): 9.

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mit meeting in Vienna, Khrushchev described Turkey as a U.S. puppet, equipped with U.S. bases and rockets; and he equated Soviet interests in Cuba with the U.S. presence in Turkey.[23] After the summit, the State and Defense Departments agreed that the missile deployment in Turkey should not be canceled, because it would send the wrong message to the Soviets.[24] In May 1962, Kennedy told Dean Rusk to raise the issue with the Turks, who responded that before the missiles were removed, the new Polaris submarines should be deployed in the Mediterranean. In August, Kennedy again told his diplomats to persuade the Turks to allow the missiles to be removed.

Crisis Resolution: The Real Deal

The missile crisis was not settled with a Soviet capitulation, but rather through political horsetrading. McNamara raised the possibility of a trade of missiles as early as 19 October. According to the minutes of the ExComm meeting that began at 11 A.M.: "More than once during the afternoon Secretary McNamara voiced the opinion that the United States would have to pay a price to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. He thought we would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey and would probably have to pay more besides."[25] At one point McNamara went through his scenario involving a potential Soviet response to U.S. airstrikes and invasion of Cuba. He then recommended that Turkey be notified to dismantle the missiles so that they would not be subject to a Soviet preemptive strike. Vice President Lyndon Johnson interjected: "Bob, if you're willing to give up your missiles in Turkey, you think you ought to . . . why don't you say that to him [Khrushchev] and say we're cutting a trade—make the trade there? Save all the invasion, lives . . . ."[26]

President Kennedy himself kept coming back to the logic of Johnson's question. On 25 October he broached the possibility of a trade of Turkish and Cuban missiles to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.[27] The following day at an Ex Comm meeting, "The President said we will get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons."[28] The State Department, based on an analysis by the U.S. ambassador in Ankara, opposed a trade, believing that it would weaken the alliance. Turkey issued a statement

[23] Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation: Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev," 3 June 1961, in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 11.

[24] George C. McGhee, "Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy," 22 June 1961 in Chang and Kornbluh, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 15.

[25] Leonard Meeker, "Minutes of the October 11, 1962 Ex Comm meeting" in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 127.

[26] *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88): 75.

[27] Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day: 1961–1963* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 210–11.

[28] "White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 10 (Summer 1985): 195.

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on 27 October rejecting the proposed trade. Nevertheless, the president kept coming back to it. At the ExComm meeting on the 27th, Kennedy observed that "to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man it will look like a very fair trade."[29] Later he contradicted McGeorge Bundy and George Ball, who were opposed to concessions, observing testily that "most people will regard this as not an unreasonable proposal."[30] Near the end of the meeting he considered the consequences if he didn't make the trade: "What we're going to be faced with is—because we wouldn't take the missiles out of Turkey, then maybe we'll have to invade or make a massive strike on Cuba which may lose *Berlin.* That's what concerns me."[31] Later, near the end of the meeting, he dryly concluded, "We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil, and as long as it's going to be, when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey. If that's part of the record I don't see how we'll have a very good war."[32] Clearly Kennedy was upset with the inability of his national security managers to see the political logic of domestic coalition-building and international alliance-building which impelled him to consider the trade.

In Robert Kennedy's account of the crisis taken from his diaries and published posthumously in 1969, he related that in talking to Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin at 7:45 PM (before Kennedy's acceptance of terms had been sent to Khrushchev), he had told the ambassador that, "President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone."[33] According to Robert Kennedy's published version, Khrushchev accepted this informal assurance, and at 5 P.M. (Moscow time) on Sunday evening, 28 October, Radio Moscow announced it would accept an arrangement "to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union."[34] If not an actual trade, it was a reassurance and an understanding that came close to the same thing; Soviet acceptance defused the crisis.

Yet there was more to the reassurances. The account offered by Robert Kennedy in his posthumous memoirs of his meeting with Dobrynin was incomplete and misleading; there was more to it than Kennedy or his literary executors had let on. To begin with, Kennedy had made up his own mind to make

[29] *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88): 36.

[30] Ibid., 37.

[31] Ibid., 55. (Emphasis in original.)

[32] Ibid., 83.

[33] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 108–109. No decision had been made about the status of the missiles, and there had been no orders to dismantle them. Kennedy was neither surprised nor angry at the fact that they had not been removed. See Barton Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" in James A. Nathan, *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), 102–4.

[34] "Back to the Brink: The Correspondence Between President John F. Kennedy and Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev on the Cuban Missile Crisis of Autumn 1962," *Problems of Communism* 41 (Spring 1992): 53.

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an explicit trade at any point that the crisis threatened to spin out of control. We know this, because late in the evening of the 27th, as the crisis reached its peak (Robert Kennedy had made the offer to Dobrynin but no response had yet been received), he ordered Secretary of State Dean Rusk to get in touch with Columbia University Professor Andrew Cordier and had Cordier draft a statement that UN Secretary General U Thant could issue, proposing the removal of the Jupiters in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The statement would be given to Thant on a signal from President Kennedy, with assurances that if Thant called for the trade, the United States would immediately announce its acceptance. Rusk was sure Kennedy would trip the circuit breaker rather than take the country to war.[35] Although the signal was never sent, and the statement never delivered to U Thant, the "Cordier Channel" is proof that Kennedy was ready for a public trade of missiles if he could not get a private trade: he had created his own emergency shutdown valve, which he could activate at any time.[36] In doing so, Kennedy had bypassed the ExComm, which was unaware of the Cordier channel; Kennedy was acting with his own prerogative powers. In working out ways to end the crisis, he didn't try to forge a consensus among his advisers, most of whom were strongly against making a trade.

To resolve the missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev relied on their own prerogative powers. They used Channels of Trust (*doveritel'nyye kanali*). The most important "backchannel" involved KGB officer Georgii Bolshakov, Ambassador Dobrynin, and Attorney General Kennedy. President Kennedy could bypass the ExComm, and Khrushchev could bypass the Presidium as they worked out a deal to trade the missiles in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba.[37] After the early evening ExComm meeting of the 27th, at which the Trollope ploy suggested by Tommy Thompson (and seconded by Robert Kennedy) had been approved, President Kennedy convened a meeting in the Oval Office with Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Sorensen, George Ball, Tommy Thompson, and Roswell Gilpatric. Its purpose was to set the terms of reference for the meeting that evening between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin. Participants agreed to a suggestion by Dean Rusk that Robert Kennedy would assure Dobrynin that the missiles in Turkey would eventually be removed.[38] As McGeorge Bundy later recalled: "Concerned as we all were by the cost of a public bargain struck under pressure at the apparent expense of the Turks, and aware as we were from the day's discussion that for some, even in our closest councils, even this unilateral private assurance might appear to betray an ally, we agreed without hesitation that no

[35] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 179; Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: Norton, 1990), 240–241.

[36] Barton Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey" in Nathan, *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, 55–129.

[37] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 105.

[38] Ibid., 120–3.

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one not in the room was to be informed of this additional message."[39] Robert Kennedy's memoirs (based on his memorandum to Dean Rusk after meeting with Dobrynin) somewhat muddies over the question of whether Kennedy offered Dobrynin "assurances" or a "deal": "He then asked me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no *quid pro quo*—no deal of this kind could be made." He then reiterated the "assurance" that if this were the only thing holding up a deal, within four to five months (per Rusk's proposal), "these matters could be resolved satisfactorily."[40]

At this point we are in semantic swamps with several possibilities. Kennedy probably had gone beyond the terms of reference and offered an explicit deal. He may then have provided a paper trail for Rusk that could be used to deny such a deal. Alternatively, he may have offered assurances based on Rusk's "no *quid pro quo*" limitations, but couched in language that Dobrynin took as an explicit deal. The preponderance of evidence seems to indicate that at the very least the Soviets assumed they had a real deal. Kennedy insisted that the trade be kept secret. Dobrynin in his memoirs later quoted Kennedy as saying "there is nothing the president could say publicly about Turkey in this context."[41] Kennedy told Dobrynin that only a few people beside the president were aware of the offer, which would have to be agreed to by the Soviets within twenty-four hours. In a confidential cable message transmitted through Dobrynin to Robert Kennedy on Sunday, 28 October 1962, Khrushchev agreed that "the issue of dismantling missile bases in Cuba under international control, raises no objections." The following day, acting on Kremlin instructions, Dobrynin was able to reassure Kennedy that the Soviets agreed to the U.S. insistence that the dismantling in Turkey would not occur immediately; instead, it would take place four to five months after the crisis was resolved. Khrushchev noted that "it is somewhat difficult for you at the present time to publicly discuss the question of eliminating the U.S. missile bases in Turkey," and he agreed that the terms for ending the crisis should be considered confidential. He emphasized that "all the proposals I presented in that message [his public radio address ending the crisis on 28 October] took into account the fact that you had agreed to resolve the matter of your missile bases in Turkey."[42] The documentary record indicates that, far more than a single "reassurance" delivered orally by the attorney general, there were explicit exchanges that followed, setting out the modalities of the missile exchange—specifically the timetable for removal and the need for secrecy. The Soviet version of what was agreed to was not denied by the administration. Robert Kennedy summoned Dobrynin the following day for

[39] McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), 433.

[40] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 109–110.

[41] Anatolii Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 91.

[42] "Khrushev [sic] Confidential Message of October 28, 1962" in *Problems of Communism* 41 (Spring 1992): 60. Also see Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 523–6.

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yet another conversation and told him that President Kennedy reaffirmed the accord but could not formalize it in any letters. He insisted that Dobrynin take back the letter from Khrushchev, so there would be no evidence of the exchange in the files of the U.S. government.[43] Subsequently, exchanges between Fidel Castro and Khrushchev involved heated discussions of the missile trade, with Castro accusing Khrushchev heatedly of betraying Cuban interests. Even a hunting trip in Russia arranged to mollify Castro did little to soothe the Cuban leader's anger.

Robert Kennedy's posthumous recollections did not include the specifics of the deal. "I was the editor of Robert Kennedy's book," speechwriter Theodore Sorensen later explained. "It was a diary of those thirteen days. And his diary was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret even on the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at that [Oval Office] meeting. So I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries. . . ."[44] McGeorge Bundy recalled, "As far as I know, none of the nine of us told anyone else what had happened. We denied in every forum that there was any deal."[45] Both men are explicit in their use of the term "deal," rather than "reassurance." On 25 April 1963, almost six months to the date the arrangement was reached, the last missile was taken down in Turkey.

In the ExComm transcripts there is no mention of any deal negotiated by the president as of the 27th, though Kennedy had on numerous occasions talked about the probability that a deal would be the only way to end the crisis.[46] In the discussions that occurred within the ExComm after Robert Kennedy returned from meeting with Dobrynin, it still seemed as if there were no explicit arrangement. Why did Kennedy not reveal his trade? It may be that Turkish intransigence about removal of the missiles and the difficulty of getting a NATO Council meeting organized within two days to take the heat for such a proposal had led Kennedy to bypass the ExComm, the Turks, the NATO allies, and everyone else that a consultative process would have required. Instead, Kennedy employed his own diplomatic prerogative powers, using his brother as a confidential intermediary. Just as Kennedy bypassed a slow and cumbersome State Department bureaucracy for routine business, in this situation he used a variant of the "invisible presidency" to settle the issue just as the crisis was spinning out of control. Having gotten the Russians to agree to secret diplo-

[43] See Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 224; also Michael Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), 536.

[44] Barton Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" in Nathan, *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, 96.

[45] McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (New York: Random House, 1988), 434.

[46] Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1997), 464, 482 on the possibility of trading Thor missiles in the United Kingdom; 499 and 512–13 on world public opinion; 511 on softening up the Turks to accept a deal; 528 on trading a cessation of work on the missiles for later withdrawal of missiles in Turkey; 529 on making the explicit trade after the Turks and NATO give approval; 554 on the need to be reasonable and make the trade; 626 on the need to trade if the Trollope ploy failed.

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macy, what would be the point of opening up an ExComm discussion and increasing his risks that the trade would wind up on the front pages?

Crisis Management?

Whatever else the Cuban missile crisis might have been, it was certainly not an example of successful crisis management. The term itself makes no sense in this context, because no crisis can be managed until one or both parties redefine the issue to the point at which it no longer remains a crisis and gamesmanship can be supplanted by traditional diplomacy and political deal making. In nuclear crisis management, the nuclear confrontation is treated by participants as a game in which pieces or territory can be won or lost, and a strategic balance can improve or deteriorate. A success in the game is supposed to establish an equilibrium of power based on the existing balance, and it is up to the president to manage the U.S. side of the game to the nation's best advantage.

A game has rules that are understood, even if broken by one or the other side. It has pieces on the board that can be directed centrally according to "plays." It involves patterned interactions with predictable consequences. A game with an equilibrium point has predetermined outcomes, or scores, with values known to the participants. But a nuclear crisis only superficially resembles a game. There are no predictable rules. The missile crisis itself was precipitated when the Soviets broke the rules (according to the United States) by placing missiles in Cuba. The Soviet response is that the United States broke the rules with an illegal blockade. Not all players can be directed from a central location. The interactions between players on the two sides are unpredictable and not fully controllable. There may be no equilibrium points, no preferred solutions once a game is underway—at least none that make sense when some outcomes involve a strategic or tactical nuclear exchange. The game is open-ended in the sense that it is somewhat chaotic and contingent: new possibilities, undreamt by any of the participants, open up constantly. There is no single game: there are multiple arenas in which organizations and individuals act, and the crisis can jump from one game to another, from military posturing to diplomatic exchanges to secret backchannel negotiations.

Crisis management requires reasonably high capabilities to acquire, manage, and process data rationally in accordance with effective theories about how the world works. Neither government demonstrated such capabilities. The United States was surprised that the Soviets placed missiles in Cuba. Its theories about Soviet capabilities and intentions were wrong, and its data about the missiles came in late—almost too late. The Soviets were stunned at the U.S. response, clearly expecting that at worst it would lead to a protest and negotiations, and at best to acquiescence to a fait accompli. The Soviets did not expect a quarantine. The United States expected and was surprised at the absence of a countermeasure from the Soviets. At each of the stages of the game, into the final two days, the players seem not to have understood the intentions of the

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other side nor its capabilities—particularly the nuclear capabilities of the Soviets, which the United States was to underestimate throughout.

Crisis management and game playing require effective control over the pieces on the board. Yet consider the number of near misses in the crisis involving these pieces, any one of which might have caused a cascading set of events to result in a nuclear holocaust. An American U-2 strayed 100 miles into Soviet territory. When Soviet MIGS went to intercept it, fighter aircraft from Galena Air Force base in Alaska went to its rescue. The U.S. planes were armed with nuclear weapons that could be fired on the pilot's own authority. An Atlas missile was test launched from Vandenberg Air Force base in California on 26 October. It was launched from a site next to other missiles that had already been mated with nuclear weapons and were on full alert. Had the Soviets monitored the launch (with the kind of reconnaissance they were to have only a few years later), they might have thought a preemptive strike was beginning and reacted accordingly with a strike of their own. A Soviet submarine was disabled by a low-level depth charge and forced to the surface; had it been sunk, naval hostilities might have ensued.[47] The Soviet submarine had nuclear armed torpedoes and was authorized to fire them if attacked.[48] The Navy sent its ships far out to sea to establish its interception line to enforce the blockade. President Kennedy ordered the line moved further in, to give Khrushchev more time to decide to comply. Many scholars have described the confrontation between Secretary of Defense McNamara and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson in the naval operations room, at which time McNamara ordered Anderson to move the line back. But according to Roger Hilsman, the Navy did not draw back, but kept its line well out to sea.[49] U.S.–sponsored agents infiltrated into Cuba committed acts of sabotage. Had they killed Soviet military officers, the Soviets might have begun shooting down U.S. low-flying aircraft. By 27 October, all of the medium-range ballistic missiles were launch-ready, and within a day could have been mated to the nuclear warheads that had been stockpiled for them.

Any military incident in Cuba might quickly have escalated into a nuclear confrontation on the island. Although U.S. intelligence at the time had no knowledge of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, reconnaissance photographs taken by the Navy over the intermediate-range missile sites revealed the presence of Soviet ground forces. The photos also showed six launchers for FROG battlefield nuclear missiles, and subsequent flights showed a total of fourteen missiles. Several Soviet officers in charge of planning later stated that they had twelve nuclear warheads for six FROG-7 tactical launchers, eighty

[47] See a listing of these and other close calls in James A. Nathan, "The Heyday of the New Strategy" in James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), 17–20.

[48] Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 214; Raymond Garthoff, "US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Intelligence and National Security* 13 (Autumn 1998): 30.

[49] Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 119.

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warheads for tactical cruise missiles, and several nuclear naval mines. They also claimed to have had several nuclear bombs for their Iluyshin bombers.[50] While Khrushchev gave initial authority for their use to General Issa Pliyev, commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in Cuba, there is some evidence that he centralized the command decision when the crisis broke out on the 22nd.[51] Nevertheless, in a U.S. invasion, local Soviet commanders might have disregarded command and control procedures and initiated a nuclear exchange. They had already shot down a U-2 at the height of the crisis on their own authority, in spite of orders from Moscow that they were not to do so. On the 26th, Pliyev ordered nuclear warheads moved from their storage areas closer to the MRBM missiles, as a prelude to possibly "mating" them.[52]

The United States, for its part, also had plans for use of tactical nuclear weapons. An invasion contingency plan, CINCLANT OPLAN 316, developed by the military commanders readying for an invasion, proposed among other things to have tactical nuclear weapons available to the invasion force. These would be used without further authorization only in retaliation if Soviets used FROG missiles with nuclear weapons against U.S. forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved a plan for nuclear capable mortars and howitzers and Honest John rockets, but with nuclear shells and warheads being used by the force only with the JCS approval. Top-level officials such as McGeorge Bundy were unaware at the time that the military had included such weapons in its planning.[53] The civilian authority did not authorize the use of nuclear warheads on the Honest John rockets, but did plan on using tactical nuclear weapons delivered by airplanes. Kennedy would not have authorized first use of such weapons, but no doubt would have sanctioned retaliatory strikes had the Russians used their tactical nuclear weapons first.

Nonstandard Operating Procedures

At every stage of the crisis, organizations acted (or tried to act) on their own. They were not following standard operating procedures. On the contrary, they were in a state of hair-trigger readiness, which distorted standard procedures. They wanted to get in on the action: intelligence agencies ordered flights over Cuban and Soviet territory; the FBI moved up the arrest of a Soviet agent; the Navy pushed for aggressive antisubmarine tactics and forced Soviet submarines

[50] This has not been corroborated. See Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-Makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Affairs* 70 (1994): 674.

[51] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 354. The Presidium was ready to send orders to Pliyev permitting the use of two kiloton Luna missile tactical nuclear weapons in case of invasion, but decided on the basis of Malinovsky's arguments to wait before sending authorization. Instead, the Kremlin put a hold on any use of nuclear weapons on the 22nd. See Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of A Gamble*, 242.

[52] Ibid., 268.

[53] Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 117.

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to the surface to recharge their batteries; the Air Force tested an ICBM missile; the special operations forces infiltrated agents into Cuba; the Air Force chief of staff ordered his planes to make ready for a reprisal attack on SAM sites. On the Soviet and Cuban side, the same phenomena occurred: Castro ordered his anti-aircraft artillery units to protect the Soviet missile sites, and local Soviet commanders then ordered the shooting down of a U-2 as a show of fraternal solidarity with their Cuban compatriots. Thereafter the Cubans used their anti-aircraft weapons against U.S. planes engaged in low-level reconnaissance. On the 27th, in the midst of the crisis, the ExComm found out that on the 26th the Soviets had launched an intermediate range ballistic missile armed with a 200 kiloton nuclear warhead; the warhead exploded as planned, while two other missiles went through the blast, in a "test" of missile capabilities.[54] Cuban saboteurs blew up oil refineries in Venezuela, crippling one-quarter of oil production in the Caribbean.

It is difficult to offer a rational explanation for organizational behavior that seems so counterproductive and irrational, but one might go along the following lines: the crisis did not freeze the U.S., Soviet, and Cuban bureaucracies and military forces into static positions, or into standard operating procedures, or into a mode in which orders from the top would be awaited and then acted upon. Rather, the crisis freed these organizations from the ordinary constraints, because a crisis by definition meant that they were acting in an uncertain environment. Each organization had to get information, test its own capabilities, and determine the capabilities and (to the extent possible) the intentions of the other side. In crisis management, these functions are supposed to be coordinated through a central decision-making mechanism (the ExComm and the Presidium). In practice, each organization acted autonomously, increasing the level of risk.

Political Leadership

The Cuban missile crisis was not resolved by presidential consensus building within the advisory systems of the United States (the ExComm) or the Soviet Union (the Politburo). Each leader relied on his own decisional prerogatives, which overturned or subverted the consensus position within their advisory systems. These decisions transcended the bureaucratic interests of the participants in the advisory groups and also transcended (or ignored) the chains of reasoning used by the advisers in recommending courses of action. The complex and chaotic real world environment in which the missile crisis was played out had more to do with the separate decisions made by Kennedy and Khrushchev to seek an end to the confrontation than any factor in the small-group advisory environment. Ultimately, it was the danger posed by the Soviet tactical nuclear

[54] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 638.

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capability in Cuba, combined with Cuban activities in the midst of the crisis, that convinced Khrushchev and Kennedy that the time had come to strike a deal.

Consider the events unfolding on the 27th. Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter raising the issue of IRBM Jupiter missiles in Turkey. He proposed that "the United States, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet State, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey."[55] The Soviets were hardening their terms. In Washington, the FBI reported that the Soviet embassy was preparing to burn its papers, often a signal that war is imminent. Things went from bad to worse as the day went on. Aerial reconnaissance showed the Soviet Beagle IL-28 bombers continued to be assembled at the San Julian airfield. A U-2 flight on a routine air sampling mission from Alaska strayed into Soviet territory over the Chukhotsk peninsula in Siberia and was chased back by Soviet fighters, who nearly got into a dogfight with U.S. planes that had scrambled to protect the U-2. Soviet merchant ships were moving once again toward the blockade line. Cuban air defense troops, acting under Castro's orders, broke away from Soviet command and control and began shooting at low-flying U.S. aircraft entering Cuban airspace. At 10:21 A.M. the news came in to the president that a high-flying U-2 had been shot down over Cuba by a surface-to-air missile launched from a SAM site at Banes, near the eastern tip of the island. No one knew at the time if the Russians had fired or the Cubans. Years later, it was learned that the plane had been shot down by the Russians under direct command of Major Georgy Voronkov pursuant to an order issued by General Stepan Naumovich Grechko, the deputy commander of Soviet Forces in Cuba. There had been no orders from Moscow, and the shooting had been on initiative of the local commanders; but the American side couldn't know that at the time.[56] Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, following standing orders, directed his command to launch a massive reprisal strike against Cuba. The White House reached LeMay before the planes had been launched, and presidential aides insisted that LeMay wait for direct authorization from the president. "He chickened out again," LeMay told his staffers after getting off the phone.[57] Kennedy decided to postpone for one or two days the retaliatory strike that had been decided upon if a U-2 were shot down. He wanted to send a message to Khrushchev and obtain a reply. Attorney General Robert Kennedy caught the mood at the White House when he later wrote, "there was the feeling that the noose was tightening on all of us, on Americans, on mankind, and that the bridges to escape were crumbling."[58]

It seemed on the 27th that the blockade had not gotten the Soviets to yield. If another SAM in Cuba had shot down another U-2, some military retaliation

[55] *Problems of Communism* 41 (Spring 1992): 48.

[56] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 105, 121.

[57] Dino Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball* (New York: Random House, 1991), 463–4.

[58] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 101–2.

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would have been inevitable. Presidential advisers calling for such action were in three camps. Some believed that a limited retaliation, tit for tat, would convince the Soviets to back off. Others thought a "surgical" strike could take out the Soviet strategic missiles, thus ending the crisis. Still others, including the Air Force commanders, did not believe a limited surgical strike could work. Their plans called for a massive attack, with 500 sorties against the missiles, preceded by 1,190 strikes on other targets, such as anti-aircraft weapons. The Joint Chiefs planned for another six days of strikes, then advised an invasion.

The danger, as all Kennedy's advisers were aware, was that the Soviets would respond somewhere else in the world. Would it be an attack on facilities in Turkey? Would they blockade Berlin? Secretary McNamara developed the scenario for Kennedy and his advisers to demonstrate that under certain circumstances a general nuclear war might occur. Unknown to the United States at the time, the alert status of Soviet ICBMs and bombers was increased to intermediate level, then to combat readiness. The evening of the 27th, with the crisis not yet resolved, and new U.S. aerial surveillance set for the next day, McNamara proposed an executive order calling up the twenty-four air reserve squadrons and 300 troop carrier transports required for an invasion. President Kennedy concurred. A U-2 would fly over Cuba on the 28th. If it were shot down, the plans for some military action would then go forward.

The Soviets had been under no illusion that the crisis could be managed as a war game. From the start, they were more interested in political negotiation, which they hoped would offset their weak military position. By 26 October, from the Soviet perspective, it must have seemed as if the American "hawks" and the Cuban "hotheads" (led by Fidel Castro himself) might take things into their own hands and escalate into all-out war. Castro reinforced Khrushchev's misgivings. He communicated to Khrushchev on the 26th in a "document" dictated to a bilingual Soviet officer, who relayed Castro's words to Moscow. Castro warned that the Americans were about to invade. He counseled Khrushchev not to be caught by surprise. The Russians must use their nuclear weapons, Castro advised, and prevent "imperialists" from having "the opportunity to launch the first attack in a nuclear war."[59] Castro also wanted local Soviet troops to use nuclear weapons against any U.S. invasion force. He later was to defend his position: "Would I have been ready to use nuclear weapons? Yes, I would have agreed to the use of nuclear weapons. Because, in any case, we took it for granted that it would become a nuclear war anyway, and that we were going to disappear."[60] Had the Soviets used tactical nuclear weapons, the United States would have responded in kind. "No one should believe that had U.S. troops been attacked with tactical nuclear warheads, the United States would have

[59] Letter from Castro to Kruschev, reprinted in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 189.

[60] Castro, in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 252.

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refrained from responding with nuclear warheads," McNamara was to put it later. "And where would it have ended? In utter disaster."[61]

Castro, pressing Khrushchev in his dictated communication, was under a colossal misimpression. He thought the Soviets had a thousand or so ICBMs and dozens of tactical nuclear weapons on the island. He was unaware of the real balance of strategic power. Khrushchev, under no illusions as to the real "correlation of forces" between the superpowers, already knew that an American U-2 had been shot down. But he did not know that the Soviet air command in Cuba had authorized the shooting on its own initiative, without waiting for its request to fire to clear in Moscow.[62] Krushchev believed that Castro himself had ordered the shooting down of the plane. Khrushchev understood that he no longer had full command of the military aspects of the confrontation. If any more planes were shot down, the United States would attack the missile sites, and there was no guarantee that it might not launch a retaliatory attack in the next day or two for the prior incident. Would the United States also invade, as Castro thought?[63]

Late in the day on the 27th, Khrushchev wanted an end to the crisis before events in Cuba got out of hand. He settled for private deal, even though a public deal would have been much better for him, in order to avoid any further delay. As his aide Oleg Troyanovsky saw it at the time, the Soviets were convinced after Kennedy's evening meeting with Dobrynin on 27 October that the United States was about to invade Cuba and would do so if the Soviets turned down Kennedy's offer. Khrushchev was convinced that the hawks in Washington were winning over the president. Troyanovsky observed, "This, of course, created a state of alarm during the [Presidium] session. . . ." Then they heard from their diplomats in the United States that Kennedy was going to make another speech to the American people within the day. They thought it would be the announcement of an invasion. "We had the feeling then that there was very little time to unravel what was taking place," Troyanovsky concluded.[64]

So Khrushchev made the deal because he was afraid the United States was about to go over the nuclear brink. He assumed that forces within the Kennedy administration in favor of an invasion would get the upper hand. Yet on the 27th he also believed that Kennedy did not want to invade Cuba (otherwise he already would have done so), and he believed that Kennedy would be amenable to a trade. In making his assessment, Khrushchev went against the consen-

[61] Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, xiii.

[62] Bruce J. Allyn et. al., *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992), 29–32.

[63] The answer was yes, if any military action had gotten underway as a result of the downing of more U.S. planes. Such an invasion would have eliminated Castro and installed a more sympathetic regime, under the supervision of the civil affairs units of the invasion force. See McNamara's briefing to the ExComm at the 9 P.M. meeting of the ExComm on 27 October in May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 627.

[64] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 74.

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sus position in the Presidium.[65] In defending his decision to deal before the Presidium, he called his removal of the missiles his "Brest-Litovsk"—meaning a forced concession to the overwhelming military strength of the imperialists.[66] Even so, dealing from a weak hand, Khrushchev had won two concessions from Kennedy—a trade of missiles and a no-invasion pledge. He was ahead of the game compared to his strategic position before introducing missiles, but could lose everything if the game continued. Khrushchev had misplayed the final hand. Absent more attacks on U.S. planes, Kennedy was not about to invade Cuba, according to McNamara. Had the Soviets stood firm on the 27th, the United States would have tightened the embargo and then repackaged the missile deal, presumably using the Cordier Channel, which allowed U Thant to go public with an offer to trade. Then the United States could have accepted the U Thant proposal unilaterally in an effort to end the crisis.[67]

Both Kennedy and Khrushchev misplayed their hands, but eventually they made a deal because by the final two days of the crisis they were frantically trying to keep the danger of nuclear confrontation contained. Khrushchev at this point ordered Pliyev not to use nuclear weapons and also ordered him to send twenty-four warheads stored on board the *Aleksandrovsk* back to Moscow. Neither leader was worried any longer that the other would prevail in a strategic game of one-upmanship or nuclear brinkmanship; neither was concerned that the other would gain a tactical advantage in the Western hemisphere, or a strategic advantage in the cold war. Each was far more concerned about blundering into a miscalculation. Each, in Theodore Sorensen's phrase, looked down "the gun barrel of nuclear war," and each was driven to end the crisis before events got completely out of hand.[68]

The Balance of Power

Khrushchev failed to improve his strategic position when he put missiles in Cuba, and Kennedy failed to improve his when he got the Soviets to remove them. Soviet strategic rocket forces were inferior before the crisis, and inferior thereafter. The Soviets did not intend their missiles in Cuba to change the military balance, though Khrushchev clearly intended their placement to redress the imbalance favoring the Americans until his own ICBMs could be deployed in sufficient numbers. Khrushchev gave strict orders to the military commanders in Cuba not to prepare these strategic missiles for firing, nor to "mate" them

[65] Fursenko and Naftali, "*One Hell of a Gamble*," 276.

[66] Vladislov M. Zubok, "The Missile Crisis and the Problem of Soviet Learning," *Problems of Communism* 41 (Spring 1992): 22.

[67] Statement by McNamara in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba On the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 163.

[68] The most elegant statement of this argument is made by psychologist James Blight in *The Shattered Crystal Ball* (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990).

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with nuclear warheads under any circumstances.[69] The warhead storage facilities for the intermediate range missiles were 300 or so kilometers from the launch sites. The operational orders indicate that these missiles were not intended to alter the balance of strategic power in such a way as to ensure their continued placement. They were at all times the object of the crisis, but not an independent factor helping to determine its resolution.

Balance of power was itself a somewhat suspect formulation. McNamara and Kennedy assumed that the Soviets had fifty to seventy-five strategic missiles, not the twenty or so they actually possessed. They did not think that the United States could launch a first strike and destroy enough of them, or the 200 or so strategic bombers armed with nuclear weapons, to prevent a Soviet retaliatory strike. Without realizing it, the Soviets already had a deterrent against a U.S. first strike, without having to place missiles in Cuba and without having to deploy missiles on their own territory. Only they didn't know it, because they couldn't read their adversaries' minds.[70]

Khrushchev and Castro failed to win iron-clad security guarantees for Cuba. "We feel that the aggressor came out the loser," Khrushchev wrote to Castro on 30 October. "He made preparations to attack Cuba but we stopped him and forced him to recognize before world opinion that he won't do it at the current stage. We view this as a great victory."[71] But the United States had not given the guarantees the Soviets had sought. To understand why, it is necessary to review some of the efforts the United States had made to destabilize the Castro regime.

The United States had already attempted to overthrow Castro in the Bay of Pigs operation. Subsequently, President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, a covert operation to overthrow Castro run by a Special Group (rather than by the CIA) which reported to Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor. Its chief of operations was an old hand at guerrilla warfare, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, who proposed to assist a Cuban revolution against Castro, in the latter stages of which the United States would use "military force, as necessary."[72] Agents would engage in covert action, and by September 1962, paramilitary units would be infiltrated into bases in the hills with "freedom fighters" from Latin America and elsewhere joining them.[73] "It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962," Lansdale reported to the Kennedys.[74]

[69] Raymond Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 59.

[70] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 137.

[71] Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 243.

[72] Landsale Memo to Special Group, "The Cuba Project," 18 January 1962, reprinted in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 23–5.

[73] Lansdale, "Program Review and Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba," 20 February 1962, reprinted in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 35.

[74] Lansdale, *The Cuba Project,* 18 January 1962, 23.

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President Kennedy instead authorized only the infiltration of agents to gather intelligence and low-level sabotage operations that would not spark open resistance to the regime. In early October 1961, McNamara had authorized new planning for an invasion by as early as 20 October 1962, but these were contingency plans, not likely to be approved.[75] Early in 1962, planning began on plots to assassinate Castro.[76] Cubans were soon aware of Operation Mongoose and naturally assumed the worst about U.S. intentions. On 4 October 1962, Edwin Lansdale got presidential approval to step up sabotage efforts against Cuban shipping.[77] On 16 October a further step-up in Mongoose activities was authorized by Robert Kennedy.

The United States also had taken other actions against Cuba. A full economic embargo was imposed on 3 February 1962. Throughout the year, the United States had conducted military exercises simulating an invasion of Cuba, including Lantphibex 1-62, simulating the overthrow of a dictator named "Ortsac" (Castro spelled backwards); Operation Quick Kick, involving landings of 40,000 troops in a simulated invasion of Cuba; and Swift Strike II, involving 70,000 troops. Another Marine amphibious exercise, Phibreglix, was planned for mid-October. Most of these activities (other than the plotting for assassinations) were known to the Cubans and Soviets, who could easily believe that U.S. intentions were to go well beyond intelligence collection and into a full-scale destabilization campaign, though that was not what the United States intended at the time. In fact, three new Mongoose operations in Cuba continued into November, even after Robert Kennedy ordered the enterprise suspended on 30 October, no doubt giving Castro even more reason to believe that the United States would continue efforts to overthrow him.

Khrushchev failed to get full assurances about Cuba, because Kennedy was determined not to give them. At the ExComm meetings there had been some discussion about how to avoid such a pledge, with the president taking the lead in revising draft language to make sure no such guarantee would be given.[78] On 6 November, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev in which he emphasized that his guarantees against invading Cuba were predicated on "the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction." On 14 December, well after Castro had rejected UN inspections, Kennedy reiterated his formula, and added the requirement "that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western

[75] James Hershberg, "Before 'the Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" *Diplomatic History* 14 (Spring 1990): 163–198.

[76] Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rep. 94–465, 94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 139–143.

[77] Edwin Landsdale, "Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented)" 11 October 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 52.

[78] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 556–560.

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Hemisphere." Kennedy had given himself considerable flexibility. The United States could define a large number of actions by Castro as aggressive. Clearly Kennedy still hoped to retain some freedom of action with regard to Cuba. Although in early 1963 Mongoose was terminated, that summer new destabilization attempts, including efforts to assassinate Castro, resumed.[79]

The resolution of the crisis caused a breech between Khrushchev and Castro. In his response to Khrushchev's letters, Castro wrote of Cubans experiencing "unspeakable bitterness and sadness" at the Soviet lack of resolve.[80] He was bitter about his "betrayal" by Russians, who had not told him of the missile gap favoring the Americans, had not consulted him fully during the crisis, and had not informed him of the offer to permit UN inspection in Cuba.

Kennedy succeeded in defusing the Cuban missile crisis. But as a diplomatic negotiator, he might have gotten a more advantageous deal had he actually tried the Trollope ploy. Is it true that Khrushchev had panicked on the evening of the 26th, believing that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent? If he was willing to take any way out, a speedy reply to the offer of the 26th could have ended the crisis without a trade of missiles. But it would have required a pledge not to invade Cuba, probably without any qualifications. That Kennedy was unwilling to give, though clearly Khrushchev mischaracterized the "no invasion" pledge to the Politburo and to Castro. It is hard to fault Kennedy for making the trade the following day, after the shooting down of the U-2 had demonstrated to both leaders that the crisis might soon get out of hand. One can hardly blame Kennedy for seeking a speedy resolution on terms he had felt comfortable with from the beginning.

Kennedy can be faulted for his unwillingness to trade publicly. By seeking to portray the resolution of the crisis as an American victory, Kennedy left himself vulnerable in the future to Soviet blackmail. At any time after the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey, Khrushchev could have revealed the trade, which would have seemed plausible to much of the world, even if Kennedy later denied it. Of course, the Kennedys' insistence on no documents changing hands was designed to prevent that possibility. That Khrushchev did not do so even after Kennedy's death probably had to do with the Soviet hope that the United States would honor what the Soviets still insisted was a noninvasion pledge. Both Kennedys believed that public disclosure of a trade would, in Bobby's words to Dobrynin, "tear apart NATO."[81] Had the Soviets gone public, the United States could have indicated its reservations on the noninvasion pledge, a revelation that would have caused problems for the Soviets with their Cuban allies. Each side had more to lose than to gain by revealing the terms it had accepted.

The crisis did not usher in an era of détente, contrary to the claims of national security managers on both sides. The United States had "learned" the

[79] Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 138.

[80] Castro to Khrushchev in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 244.

[81] Fursenko and Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble"*, 282.

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lessons of crisis management and nuclear superiority, and it was determined to continue an arms buildup that would keep its edge. It also continued its escalation of commitments in Southeast Asia, another arena in which attempts at gamesmanship and compellence superseded efforts at a diplomatic resolution of issues in the region. By 1964, Khrushchev was out of power, in part due to the simmering resentment in the Presidium over his Brest-Litovsk. The lessons the Soviets also had learned was that military superiority—or at least perceived parity—would be needed to avoid a new defeat. So they continued their arms buildup. There were some efforts at détente, including the test-ban treaty and the hot-line set up between Washington and Moscow. But until the end of the 1980s, the cold war was marked by rivalries and localized military conflicts far more than by détente. What one can say, however, is that never again would either superpower play fast and loose with strategic missiles or threaten nuclear exchanges.

Truth or Dare

Why was Kennedy unwilling to make his terms public? What was so terribly wrong about a diplomatic negotiation with the Soviets to resolve a nuclear crisis? His own discussion in the ExComm and those of his colleagues indicate his belief in the rationality of a diplomatic solution. From our post-cold war vantage point, the possibility that the world might have had to suffer a superpower nuclear exchange for want of a trade of missiles seems to be the ultimate folly—a point Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson both made, with some exasperation during the ExComm deliberations. Why would Kennedy wish to conceal his diplomatic efforts, rather than boast of them?

Perhaps our own expectations about national power and the presidency are the explanation. We simply expected that the U.S. president, as leader of the free world, as the head of the most powerful nation on earth, could prevail in superpower confrontations. The political dangers of seeming willing to compromise with the enemy had to be managed through the fiction that no compromise had occurred. Kennedy was vulnerable politically, and he was prepared to preserve an illusion rather than pay political costs at home. Yet Kennedy himself was aware of the issue that the fictionalized version would open. He told Arthur Schlesinger the day after the crisis ended that people might draw the wrong conclusions, and that they would assume that the Russians would cave in if you pressured them.[82]

"I claim not to have controlled events," Abraham Lincoln confessed in 1864 to a reporter, "but confess plainly that events have controlled me." Kennedy might well have made the opposite claim: in the end he managed to control events, much more than even his national security advisers had known. Kennedy was willing to seek a political solution to a political crisis, and when his

[82] Arthur Schelsinger, Jr. *Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 415.

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ExComm proved unsympathetic, he turned to his inner circle of advisers and finally to a secret diplomatic channel. And yet Kennedy's unwillingness to admit how the crisis had been resolved left an unfortunate legacy for his successors. He raised the bar for future presidents. His successors would be expected to manage crises: if Kennedy had stared down the communists in Cuba, should not Johnson and Nixon be able to do the same with North Vietnam?

Kennedy contributed to our ignorance about crisis resolution. What should have been learned was the need to negotiate in such a crisis and the meaninglessness of the nuclear balance of power. The lesson should have been that crisis management often does not work, that the experts are often wrong, that the military forces on both sides cannot be managed to prevent incidents. The lesson should have been that political horsetrading is often a more effective way to resolve a crisis than situation room attempts at micromanagement.

"On that night of the 26th, we saw no possible solution," Fidel Castro recalled. "We couldn't see a way out."[83] There was a way out, but it did not involve superiority in nuclear weaponry or gamesmanship. As Lyndon Johnson observed in the midst of a discussion in the crisis over intimidating the Cubans with nighttime overflights: "Well, hell, it's like the fellow telling me in Congress: 'Go on and put the monkey on his back.' Every time I tried to put a monkey on somebody else's back, I got one."[84] Both McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara later pointed out that it was mutual vulnerability and the fear of a nuclear holocaust that induced the leaders to settle.[85] When Soviet ships turned back from the blockade line, Dean Rusk boasted in an ExComm meeting that "we were eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow blinked." But in fact, everyone blinked.

Kennedy's failure in the Cuban Missile Crisis involved his abdication of the moral responsibility to educate the American people and rid them of their delusions of how the world works. He was not willing to make the terms public, for fear that negotiation would be taken for appeasement, that reasonableness would be taken for weakness. He was willing, for political advantage, to leave the American people with the most dangerous illusion of all: the White House could "manage" a superpower nuclear crisis and with sufficient military force could resolve it on terms favorable to the United States. The folly of such an assumption was laid to rest many years later by Robert McNamara himself. "It is impossible to predict with a high degree of confidence what the effects of the use of military force will be because of accident, miscalculation, misperception, and inadvertence," McNamara observed at a conference on the Cuban missile crisis held in Havana. "You can't manage crises; it's a dangerous metaphor,

[83] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 109.

[84] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 589.

[85] Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 445–58.

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because it's misleading."[86] At the point at which Kennedy abandoned gamesmanship, crisis management, and his advisory system, he validated Schlesinger's subsequent assessment about his judgment and performance, because thereafter he was able to use the craft of politics to turn away from the brink. If we can learn anything useful from Kennedy's performance, it is that the art and science of politics and diplomacy, not gamesmanship and the methods of crisis management, are the keys to successful resolution of nuclear crises.

[86] McNamara's remarks at the Hawk's Cay Conference are reproduced in David Welch, ed., *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Re-examine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 100.

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

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

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

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The Building of a Bifactional Structure: The Democrats in the 1940s

HOWARD L. REITER

Understanding the nature of social change is appropriately a central concern of historians and social scientists alike. Along these lines, the transformation of party systems is a subject that has occupied scholars for many years. Ordinarily, party system transformation has meant realignments, party decline, and changes in the functions that parties perform or fail to perform.[1] The present study aims to discuss a less familiar dimension of party system change: the cleavage structure within the major parties. To a great extent, a party is defined by its factional composition. From the fluid groupings of the U.S. Democratic party in the old south, to the highly institutionalized blocs of the postwar Italian and Japanese conservative parties, to the monolithic front of totalitarian parties, the very nature of a party is bound up in how it organizes and manages internal divisions. If it is divided, it matters greatly whether those blocs are based on ideology, patronage, personal ties, ethnicity, geography, or whatever. Moreover, how effectively a party carries out its functions in the broader political system may depend on how unified or divided it is and on what those divisions are based.[2]

More than half a century ago, the Democratic party in the United States underwent a transition from a party of relatively fluid factions to one with a fairly stable bifactional structure. The basis of that structure was sectional, with

[1] See Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997); Peter Mair and Gordon Smith, eds., *Understanding Party System Change in Western Europe*, special issue of *West European Politics* 12 (October 1989); Alan Ware, ed., *Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural Response* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987); and Steven B. Wolinetz, ed., *Parties and Party Systems in Liberal Democracies* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[2] See the essays in Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, eds., *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1978).

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the states that had seceded from the union in the 1860s occupying one pole and the states of the north and west comprising the other. This study will demonstrate that despite much rhetoric to the contrary, the south was not a particularly conservative wing of the Democratic party until the New Deal and that almost overnight it began to anchor one factional pole. When, why, and how that transition occurred is the subject of this analysis. I will examine two arenas where Democrats from all over the nation assembled—the national party conventions and Congress.[3]

Before proceeding, regional definitions are in order. In this study, "the south" will refer to the eleven former Confederate states. "Border states" are those where slavery was legal in the middle of the nineteenth century, but which were not part of the Confederacy: Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.[4] For the sake of simplicity of expression, the rest of the nation will be designated "the north," although "north and west" would be more accurate. Although there is much variation within each of these sectional groupings, my main concern is with intersectional differences, and I will not examine variation within sections.

The Timing of the Split

National Conventions

I begin my attempt to ascertain when northern and southern Democrats began going their separate ways by examining roll-call votes at Democratic national conventions.[5] This is appropriate, for the national convention is the governing body of the major party in the United States, the party's "most comprehensive representative body," the site of its "basic coalition-forming process," and "the arena where contests [are] fought out among the factions of the parties in support of rival candidates, and . . . over the positions that the parties . . . espouse on campaign issues."[6] For each Democratic national convention, I computed

[3] I also examined votes in the Democratic National Committee but was unable to locate enough to have confidence in the trends I discerned.

[4] Because our main concern is the north-south split, I will not focus on the border states. Appropriately, they often fall between the north and south on the variables I will be examining; this is presumably why they have often provided the party with its congressional leaders, from Alben Barkley to Richard Gephardt.

[5] Most votes through 1972 can be found in Richard C. Bain and Judith H. Parris, *Convention Decisions and Voting Records*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1973). More recent votes were found in official proceedings and *Congressional Quarterly*.

[6] Ralph M. Goldman, *The National Party Chairmen and Committees: Factionalism at the Top* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), xii; V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), 330; and Richard P. McCormick, *The Presidential Game: The Origins of American Presidential Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 190. On the utility of analyzing national convention votes and some of the methodological issues entailed, see Howard L. Reiter, "Why Did the Whigs Die (and Why Didn't the Democrats)? Evidence from National Nominating Conventions," *Studies in American Political Development* 10 (Fall 1996): 189–192.

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FIGURE 1
Index of Intersectional Difference on Roll Call Voting in Democratic National Conventions, 1832–1992



an index of intersectional difference (IID), which indicates how far apart the sections were. The method here is simple. I selected all procedural and platform roll-call votes on which the minority side received more than 10 percent, and the highest vote that each major presidential and vice-presidential candidate received before bandwagon effects set in. A "major" candidate was defined as one who received at least 10 percent of the vote on any ballot. For each of these votes, I computed the mean vote for northern delegations and the mean vote for southern delegations, and computed the absolute value of the difference.

If the northern delegations averaged 80 percent for a resolution, and the southern delegations averaged 55 percent, the index of intersectional difference is 25. That index would also be 25 if the southern delegations averaged 80 and the northern delegations averaged 55. For present purposes, I am uninterested in which section took which side, only in the degree of difference between them.

For each Democratic national convention except that of 1864, I computed the mean of all the IIDs for that convention. The results appear in Figure 1.[7] It is clear from the graph that north-south divisions were relatively high before the Civil War, quite low for many decades thereafter, unprecedentedly high from 1940 through 1960, and low again afterward.

[7] In 1864, for obvious reasons, the southern states were unrepresented. For the conventions of 1840, 1936, and 1964, at which no divided roll-call votes were taken, I interpolated a score as the mean of the indices for the adjacent conventions in order not to interrupt the graph. For 1860, I based the score only on those roll-call votes that occurred before the southern delegations began to leave the convention. Figure 1 also includes the off-year, nonnominating party conferences of 1974 and 1978; that of 1982 had no roll-call votes. The 1996 convention had no divided roll-call votes and is omitted from the figure.

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These data demonstrate that during the 1940s and 1950s the north-south split within the Democratic party reached an exceptionally high level. Not since before the Civil War were these intersectional divisions so great. After the Civil War, within Democratic circles, the south periodically allied with such agrarian westerners as George Pendleton and William Jennings Bryan against eastern conservatives. At other times it voted for eastern conservatives such as Alton B. Parker. During the early twentieth century, moreover, there were several dimensions of progressivism at Democratic national conventions, on only one of which was the south distinctive from the rest of the nation. However, the image of southern Democratic conservatism was persistent. In February 1918, Woodrow Wilson's closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, noted in his diary that Wilson had excoriated "the reactionary element in the South" as a barrier to making the Democratic party more liberal. Long before southern Democrats began to stand out as their party's most conservative members, they enjoyed that reputation.[8]

Congress

Unlike national convention votes, roll-call votes in Congress have occasioned a vast scholarly literature, and sectionalism has been a persistent theme. Comparability among these studies is hampered by different operational definitions of particular sections. Scholars who compared northern and southern Democratic voting patterns in Congress have tended to conclude that the sections voted fairly similarly until around 1940.[9] The methodologically most sophisticated treatment of this question, that of Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, concludes that, "The period from the late New Deal until the mid-1970s saw the development of the only genuine three-political-party system in American history."[10] These findings are also in keeping with studies of voting patterns among congressional Democrats in earlier periods, which found no consistent sectional patterns.[11]

[8] On Democratic factionalism in the progressive period, see Howard L. Reiter, "The Bases of Progressivism Within the Major Parties: Evidence from the National Conventions," *Social Science History* 22 (Spring 1998): 91–102. House is quoted in Ronald C. Schurin, "The President as Disciplinarian: Wilson, Roosevelt, and Congressional Primaries," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28 (Spring 1998): 411.

[9] Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, Edward V. Schneier, Jr., ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 169, 171; Barbara Sinclair, "From Party Voting to Regional Fragmentation: The House of Representatives, 1933–1956," *American Politics Quarterly* 6 (April 1978): 141, 143–146; Barbara Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment 1925–1978* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 51–72; Mack C. Shelley II, *The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1983), 131; and Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 62, 63, 83.

[10] Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress*, 44.

[11] On the late nineteenth century, see Carl V. Harris, "Right Fork or Left Fork? The Section-Party Alignments of Southern Democrats in Congress, 1873–1897," *Journal of Southern History* 42 (November 1976): 471–506. On the progressive era, see Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years: The Senate, 1909–1915," *Journal of Politics* 29 (August 1967): 577, 582; How-

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Studies of the famed conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats are less useful for our purposes than the previously cited studies, because, first, they tacitly assume that all Republicans and southern Democrats are conservative, and no nonsouthern Democrat is; second, if the subject of analysis is cleavages within the Democratic party, they should be studied without regard to how Republicans voted. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that studies of the conservative coalition also conclude that in both houses of Congress, the take-off period for the coalition was the early 1940s.[12] The convergence of so many methodologically diverse studies with our findings about national convention votes suggests that we are entitled to some confidence about the timing of the rise of the north-south split within the Democratic party.[13]

The most comprehensive study of congressional voting with the longest timespan is the exhaustive research of Poole and Rosenthal. They examined every roll-call vote taken in every session of Congress, excluding any vote in which the minority side won less than 2.5 percent. Then they performed a computer analysis of the votes to see if the votes fell along a single dimension; in other words, if the votes formed a pattern so that the vote of any individual member of Congress on any roll call could be predicted from his or her other votes. Poole and Rosenthal concluded that the vast majority of roll-call votes

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ard W. Allen, "Geography and Politics: Voting on Reform Issues in the United States Senate, 1911–1916," *Journal of Southern History* 27 (May 1961): 220–221, 225–226; Howard W. Allen, Aage R. Clausen, and Jerome M. Clubb, "Political Reform and Negro Rights in the Senate, 1909–1915," *Journal of Southern History* 37 (May 1971): 205, 208; Eileen L. McDonagh, "Issues and Constituencies in the Progressive Era: House Roll Call Voting on the Nineteenth Amendment, 1913–1919," *Journal of Politics* 51 (February 1989): 119–136; and Scott C. James, "Building a Democratic Majority: The Progressive Party Vote and the Federal Trade Commission," *Studies in American Political Development* 9 (Fall 1995): 365–371.

[12] John Robert Moore, "The Conservative Coalition in the United States Senate, 1942–1945," *Journal of Southern History* 33 (August 1967): 373; Turner, *Party and Constituency*, 186; W. Wayne Shannon, "Revolt in Washington: The South in Congress" in William C. Havard, ed., *The Changing Politics of the South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 647; John F. Manley, "The Conservative Coalition in Congress," *American Behavioral Scientist* 17 (November/December 1973): 236, 238; Joel Paul Margolis, *The Conservative Coalition in the United States Senate, 1933–1968* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1973), 24–25; David W. Brady and Charles S. Bullock III, "Coalition Politics in the House of Representatives" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), 191; Shelley, *The Permanent Majority*, 24–31; and Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, "Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Summer 1993): 296–297.

[13] No discussion of this question would be complete without reference to James T. Patterson's classic study of the rise of the congressional conservative coalition, which dealt with the years from 1933 through 1939. It included an analysis of a relatively small number of votes on New Deal issues—37 for the Senate and 31 for the House. While the southern and border-state Democrats in the House were more likely than other Democrats to oppose Roosevelt's policies, in the Senate there was little sectional variation. See Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 343, 350. Note that Patterson's definitions of sections are somewhat idiosyncratic.

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in each Congress fell along only one or two such dimensions. For each dimension they gave each member of Congress a score that reflected that member's position on that dimension; these scores are roughly analogous to the scores that organizations such as Americans for Democratic Action and the American Conservative Union have given to members of Congress in recent decades.[14] In the period we are examining, the scores could be used to predict more than 80 percent of the members' votes. When they examined the issues that fell along each dimension, Poole and Rosenthal discovered that the first dimension, which appeared in all Congresses, "represents conflict over the role of government in the economy," and "divides the two major political parties."[15] Therefore, it concerns the central domestic policy questions of the New Deal era and is an excellent gauge of ideology in this period. The fact that it is not explicitly about racial policy makes this dimension especially useful to us; it would be easy to demonstrate a north-south split over race, but division over general welfare-state ideology would indicate a deeper rejection by southerners of what had become central Democratic dogma after 1932. On the other hand, we should be cautious about how the meaning of "the role of government in the economy" has changed over time, for even within the twelve years of the Roosevelt administration, it has become commonplace to speak of "first," "second" and "third" New Deals.

Thanks to the generosity of Poole and Rosenthal in sharing their data, I obtained the coordinates for this dimension for each Democrat in the 73rd (1933–1934) through 78th (1943–1944) Congresses and can use these data to answer some important questions about the development of the north-south split in the Democratic party in Congress.[16] For the moment, the question is simply about the timing of that split. Figure 2 shows the mean scores for northern and southern Democrats in the Senate from 1933 through 1944. From 1933 through 1940 (and indeed since the 1890s), southern Democrats were somewhat more liberal than northern Democrats; in 1941 and 1942, the mean ideologies of the sections were virtually identical; and in 1943 and 1944 the southerners emerged as markedly more conservative than the northerners, a trend that would persist until the present day. As Figure 2 shows, the ideology of the northerners was fairly stable over time, while the southerners' ideology showed a dramatic turn to the right from 1937–1938 to 1943–1944.[17]

As Figure 3 demonstrates, the House of Representatives offers a somewhat similar picture. During Roosevelt's first term, southern Democrats in the House were markedly more liberal than their northern counterparts. By 1937–

[14] Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress*, esp. chap. 2.

[15] Ibid., 35, 46.

[16] See Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Study 9822, and http://voteview.gsia.cmu.edu. [Accessed 3 June 1998.]

[17] However, it is noteworthy that in each year of Roosevelt's presidency, the most liberal Democrat in the Senate was a deep southerner: Hugo Black of Alabama (1933–34), Theodore G. Bilbo of Mississippi (1935–36), Lister Hill of Alabama (1937–42), and Claude D. Pepper of Florida (1943–44).

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FIGURE 2
Conservatism of Democratic Senators, 1933–1944, by Section



1938, there was virtually no ideological difference between the sections, and afterward the sections increasingly diverged in the pattern that was to dominate the next few decades. During Roosevelt's first two years in the White House, the most liberal Democrat in the House was Miles C. Allgood of Alabama; during Roosevelt's last two years, the most liberal was William L. Dawson, an African-American representative from Chicago. This comparison neatly encapsulates broader trends within the party in the House.

For all the similarities between House and Senate, the differences are also worth noting. Most of the change in the Senate was among southerners, who

FIGURE 3
Conservatism of Democratic Representatives, 1933–1944, by Section



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became substantially more conservative as northerners more or less remained consistent. In the House, however, both sections moved at similar rates. Moreover, in the House the south emerged as the more conservative section by the 76th Congress (1939–1940), while in the Senate that did not occur until the 78th Congress (1943–1944). These differing patterns for the two chambers may have been due to one or more of the following factors: first, the more frequent turnover in the House resulted in opportunities for steadier trends; second, the greater number of members of the House, whose statistical means are less likely to be influenced by a few extreme cases; and third, the ability of southern senators to use the rules of the Senate to keep divisive issues, such as anti-lynching bills, off the agenda longer than their counterparts in the House could. For all these differences, however, the central finding is the same for both houses of Congress as well as for national conventions: the north-south split did not crystallize until well after Roosevelt's first term.

The Causes of the Split

The timing of the sectional cleavage within the Democratic party, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's well-known aversion to pushing for civil rights and splitting his party, suggest that the policies of Roosevelt's first term were unlikely to have been the catalyst of the split. As many scholars have argued, two events of the 1936 campaign led many white southerners to begin to move away from the New Deal.

Ira Katznelson and his colleagues have pointed out that the sectional agenda of the southern establishment was based on maintaining racial segregation and a cheap labor force. This required a minimum of federal interference in southern affairs. While early New Deal legislation expanded federal power, influential southerners in Congress were able to ensure that programs were decentralized and that they included such features as excluding agricultural and domestic labor from programs.[18] Such protections of the "southern way of life" in turn required southern clout over the Democratic party. Two events in 1936 threatened that influence.

First was the abolition of the century-old requirement that presidential and vice-presidential nominees receive two-thirds of the vote at national conventions. It is important to emphasize, as careful scholars have, that this development did not immediately polarize the party sectionally or elevate race to the top of the agenda.[19] Over the history of the Democratic party, the south did not consistently champion the two-thirds rule. As recently as 1932, when the vast majority of southern delegates supported Franklin D. Roosevelt's candidacy,

[18] Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, "Limiting Liberalism," esp. 296–299.

[19] See Richard L. Rubin, *Party Dynamics: The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 118; and Harold F. Bass, Jr., "Presidential Party Leadership and Party Reform: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Abrogation of the Two-Thirds Rule," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1988): 314.

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they were willing to countenance abrogating the rule so that Roosevelt would not be denied the nomination. No fewer than eight of the eleven southern delegations supported at least one of two anti-two-thirds-rule proposals by at least a five-to-one margin. Clearly their desire to get Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated outweighed any sectional commitment to maintaining the two-thirds rule, although northern delegations were even more committed to repeal.[20] Four years later, when there was no nominating contest, the southerners were free to indulge their sectional commitment to the two-thirds rule. They did so with rhetorical outrage at having the rule that was perceived as a line of defense for the south abrogated; in the rules committee, only two of the eleven delegates who spoke in favor of repeal were southerners, compared with nine of the ten defenders of the two-thirds rule.[21]

Since the south and north did not diverge much at Democratic national conventions before 1940, the two-thirds rule appears to have performed a largely symbolic function for southern Democrats. Not differing from the north by much, the south did not need special protection from convention majorities, nor did it go down the line for the two-thirds rule. However, by the time the rule was dropped, circumstances had begun to change.

The second critical event of 1936 occurred on election day. As in 1932, Roosevelt was the first Democrat since 1852 to win the White House with a majority of the popular vote, and the first since 1828 to win more than 51 percent.[22] Since the south had been the most consistently loyal Democratic section since the days of Andrew Jackson, its share of the national Democratic vote was higher when the party lost than when it won. With the unprecedentedly high (for a Democrat) percentages that Roosevelt won in 1932 and 1936, the southern proportion of the national Democratic vote was lower than it had ever been, with the sole exception of Al Smith's losing campaign in 1928. In 1936, it was barely 12 percent.

The fact that Roosevelt electorally owed less to the south than any of his Democratic predecessors was not the most troubling aspect of the 1936 returns as far as conservative white southerners were concerned. Even more were they jolted by the fact that for the first time in history, black voters turned from their traditional moorings and overwhelmingly backed the Democratic ticket. Before the election, John Temple Graves wrote in the *New York Times* that "the Negro has become a tremendously important factor in national elections and . . . the parties from now on may be expected to vie in offers for his support." After the election, Frank Kent wrote in the *Baltimore Sun* that the realignment of black voters was "the real political sensation of the time." In September,

[20] See *New York Times*, 27 June 1932; and ibid., 28 June 1932.

[21] The debate and vote can be found in *Proceedings, Committee on Rules and Order of Business of the National Democratic Convention 1936* (Philadelphia, 24–25 June 1936), John F. Kennedy Library, DNC files Part 1, Box 91.

[22] In the disputed election of 1876, Samuel J. Tilden won a narrow majority of the popular vote, but insufficient electoral votes to win.

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Virginia's Senator Carter Glass had fumed that Roosevelt's appeal to black voters "has incensed me beyond expression," and were it not for his desire not to rock the boat during the campaign, "I would bitterly denounce it in a public statement."[23]

It is conceivable that neither the abrogation of the two-thirds rule nor the addition of African Americans to the New Deal voting coalition would have begun to rend the party by itself, but in combination they made white southerners shudder. Sooner or later the national party, in its quest for black votes in the swing states of the north, would begin to accede to African Americans' demands that the condition of southern blacks be ameliorated; and while southern Democrats continued to hold powerful committee and subcommittee chairs in Congress, they would no longer have the veto over presidential and vice-presidential nominations that the two-thirds rule would have afforded them.

All this was still in the future, and there is no better indication of this than in how the party dealt with the issue of bonus votes. As a sop to anxious southerners at the 1936 convention, and taking a leaf from longstanding Republican practice, the party voted to grant states extra delegates—bonus votes—if their party had won the state. This would compensate the south for losing the two-thirds rule. However and most significantly, the party procrastinated about this change, and it was not until 1948 that it was implemented.[24] Apparently the rest of the party believed that its southern wing had nowhere else to go and that there was no need to compensate it until the north-south split had broken wide open both in Congress and at national conventions.

With the preconditions of sectionally-based factionalism in place by the end of 1936, all that was needed was a series of events to alienate the south. While some southern Democrats were prominent among those opposing the Supreme Court-packing plan of 1937, as well as among those targeted in Roosevelt's abortive purge campaign the following year, it was not until the 1940s that what southerners perceived as a long train of abuses occurred. As a condition of his renomination in 1940, Roosevelt insisted on the designation of Henry A. Wallace as his running-mate. A recent convert from Republicanism who as agriculture secretary had begun to pay attention to the problems of southern blacks, Wallace's nomination was deeply troubling to many white southerners; his chief opponent at the convention was Speaker of the House William Bankhead of Alabama. As Figure 1 shows, the 1940 convention was marked by the deep-

[23] Graves and Kent quoted in Nancy J. Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 180, 205; Glass quoted in Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism*, 98. On New Deal racial policies in general, see, Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); John B. Kirby, *Black Americans in the Roosevelt Era: Liberalism and Race* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980); and Patricia Sullivan, *Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

[24] Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1960), 168.

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est north-south split since the Civil War, with the sole exception of that of 1928. The coming of World War II occasioned numerous racially-related federal policy disputes, involving Roosevelt's executive order banning discrimination by defense contractors, legislation outlawing discrimination by the Selective Service System, controversy over proposals for federal administration of absentee ballots for those in the military, increasing agitation against the poll tax, and the proposals for a permanent fair employment practices commission. Wallace was in the forefront of those pressing for civil rights, and southern delegates were in the vanguard of those who denied him a second term as vice-president in 1944 by nominating Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri. By the late 1940s, with Truman's comprehensive civil rights program and the resulting bolt of four deep southern states in the 1948 election, the sectional split reached its crescendo.[25]

However, racial issues alone are insufficient to explain the trends depicted in Figures 2 and 3, which are based on questions of the government's role in the economy and not race. Katznelson and his colleagues have pointed out that southern Democrats were especially likely to defect on questions involving labor. Part of their motivation was to attract business investment to the south by minimizing labor costs, and part was to counteract the efforts of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to build a biracial labor coalition in the south. In his analysis of postwar roll-call votes in the House, David Mayhew wrote that "A case can be made that labor issues have divided the Democratic party by section more clearly and consistently than any other issue except race."[26] And so the intersection of race and class forced a wedge through the Democratic party.

While a study of this length cannot carefully assess competing explanations for these findings, they should be addressed if only briefly. In contrast to William Jennings Bryan-style populism, the New Deal has been interpreted as a largely urban phenomenon. Are the trends I have been discussing because of this shift in the content of the reformist agenda of the Democratic party, with the more rural south turning against the agenda because of its urban emphasis? Were this so, we would expect that within the north, Democratic representatives from the most urban areas would move farther to the left than other Democratic representatives. However, Democratic representatives from the five

[25] On Democratic sectionalism in the 1940s, see for example Robert A. Garson, *The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 1941–1948* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974); and Sullivan, *Days of Hope*.

[26] Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, "Limiting Liberalism"; and David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen: The Difference Between Democrats and Republicans 1947–1962* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 109. Of eleven policy areas examined by Joel Margolis in his study of the conservative coalition in the Senate from 1933 to 1968, the coalition took its most extreme form in the area of labor policy. See Margolis, *Conservative Coalition*, 120. See also Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., *The Democratic South* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), 60–74; and George Brown Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South 1913–1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 618.

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cities that in 1940 had populations that exceeded one million—New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, and Philadelphia—underwent an ideological shift from the 73rd to the 78th Congresses that was similar to that of other northern Democratic representatives. The urban/rural thesis has relatively little explanatory power.

In a recent and detailed study, Lee Alston and Joseph Ferrie argue that the white south turned against the New Deal because of a desire to protect the paternalistic agricultural system. They reject the following alternative explanations for white southern discontentment: first, conservative ideology, because many southern members of Congress had supported the New Deal, and continued to do so; second, lack of economic means to support social welfare programs, because as a section the south benefited more from the major New Deal programs than they had from earlier pension systems; and third, racism alone, because many southern measures during this period discriminated against all poor people of whatever race.[27] Their arguments support the view that only the nexus between race and class can fully account for the growing sectional cleavage within the Democratic party during this period.

This has been a very sketchy overview of the events that precipitated the north-south split within the Democratic party in the early 1940s. It suggests that a combination of institutional (the abolition of the two-thirds rule), electoral (the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic party), and policy developments helped produce the timing of the split. Perhaps the key word in the preceding sentence is "timing." It would be foolhardy to suggest that these events caused the split. On a more fundamental level, the ideology of the New Deal—egalitarian and focused on relief for the "one-third of a nation" in dire distress—contained the seeds of the party's growing antagonism toward the worst features of the southern way of life, as well as its appeal to black voters. Moreover, the New Deal's nationalizing institutional thrust raised in the eyes of southern whites the specter that had haunted Calhoun and the Confederacy: a northern-dominated federal government that would overturn the status quo in Dixie. In short, most likely it was simply a matter of time before the New Deal rent the Democratic party along sectional lines.

The Mechanics of the Split

By what process did the northern and southern wings of the Democratic party trade ideological places? How much was the shift due to individuals changing their minds, and how much was due to newer actors replacing older ones? These questions are of more than passing significance, as they go to the heart of understanding the internal dynamics of a party and the process by which the nature of intraparty factionalism changes. A party with a stable factional struc-

[27] Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie, *Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South 1865–1965* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 55–59.

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ture is likely to have a more difficult time uniting than a party whose factions are fluid. Not only are stable factions more likely to inspire deep allegiances among adherents that may compete with those adherents' loyalty to the party at large, but stable factions are also more likely to be based on longstanding differences of ideology and interest than evanescent factions are. The latter may be personalistic and therefore of shallower depth, consequently less threatening to the party at large. For this reason, the degree of stability of factionalism is an important dimension of a party and has a bearing on how united it is and how well it can carry out its functions. The process by which factionalism changes can have a bearing on the stability of factions. We can hypothesize that parties that owe their dynamism to individual activists changing their minds differ on three levels from those whose dynamism derives from the replacement of cadres: that of the individual activists, that of the party as institution, and that of the system as a whole.

A party whose development is driven mainly by changes in the attitudes and opinions of its activists, rather than by the replacement of those activists by newer cadres, is one that on the individual level is dynamic and flexible. Its activists show an admirably high level of adaptability to new political circumstances. On the institutional level, however, that very adaptability results in a low level of turnover and, therefore, persistence of cadres. Individual dynamism produces static membership. At the systemic level, this combination produces a fragile factional structure for two reasons. First, those adaptable activists might change their positions again as soon as political circumstances warrant. The second reason is that the very persistence of personnel suggests that sooner or later those long-tenured activists will depart the scene, leaving the future uncertain.

On the other hand, a party whose development is driven mainly by the replacement of older cadres by newer activists is probably one whose activists are mired in old ways of thinking. The main way the party can change is to replace the old with the new. On the institutional level, however, this infusion of new talent produces a healthy level of turnover. Individual stasis produces dynamic membership. At the systemic level, this combination results in a persistent factional structure. The newer cadres may be as resistant to change as their predecessors were, and therefore their fresh attitudes toward intraparty conflict will continue into the foreseeable future. Ultimately, how intraparty factionalism changes carries implications for how long factionalism persists and therefore for the health of the party as an institution.

Determining how the Democratic party was transformed during the New Deal requires examination of the ideology and behavior of individual activists over time. There are three barriers to ascertaining the voting records of individual national convention delegates over time. First, unless a delegate challenges his or her state's vote, state delegations simply announce the state totals without revealing which delegates voted which way. Second, until 1968 a number of states used the unit rule, by which a state delegation voted unanimously as the majority of its delegates wanted; in this way, some delegates were recorded

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as voting for a position that they opposed. Finally, studies of continuity of delegations over time reveal that there is a high level of turnover of individual delegates from one convention to the next. For example, Loch Johnson and Harlan Hahn found that fewer than one-third of the delegates at the 1944 Democratic national convention had attended the 1940 convention.[28] This makes it especially difficult to trace the ideology of individual delegates over time.

This leaves us with Congress, whose members' individual votes on hundreds of roll calls are a matter of public record and whose members enjoy a famously high rate of reelection. By analyzing the Poole/Rosenthal data, we can test three hypotheses about the process that underlay the trends depicted in Figures 2 and 3:

Differential attrition. This set of hypotheses posits that southern Democrats in Congress as a group became more conservative and northern Democrats more liberal, because "deviant" members—southern liberals and northern conservatives—were especially likely not to return. In particular, deviants were more likely than their sectional peers to decline to run for reelection, more likely not to be nominated if they chose to run, and more likely not to be elected if they were nominated.

The logic underlying this set of hypotheses combines the changing ideological base of the party in each geographic section with the increasing discomfort of the deviant members of Congress. If the mass of southern Democratic voters were becoming more conservative and the mass of northern Democratic voters were moving in a more liberal direction, it would be harder for southern liberal and northern conservative candidates to win nominations. In the north, those conservative Democrats who were nominated might have a harder time than their liberal counterparts winning the general election, as liberal party members would be less enthusiastic about campaigning and voting for them. (In the south, all Democratic nominees in this period won the general election.)

The prospect of a tough fight for nomination and election might have made southern liberals and northern conservatives less likely to run again. Moreover, they might have felt increasingly alienated from their sectional neighbors in Congress, and some of the fun of being in Congress would be lost. This might have contributed to deterring some from running again.

Replacement. This hypothesis states that newer members of Congress will differ from departing veterans, with the newer members being less likely to deviate from their sectional norm. Specifically, newer southern Democrats are more conservative than their predecessors, while newer northern Democrats are more liberal than departing veterans. While similar in some respects to the preceding set of hypotheses, this one does not focus on the electoral fates of

[28] Loch K. Johnson and Harlan Hahn, "Delegate Turnover at National Party Conventions, 1944–68" in Donald R. Matthews, ed., *Perspectives on Presidential Selection* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1973), 148.

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members of Congress. It simply suggests that regardless of how the veteran members left, they are being replaced by an ideologically different breed.

Like part of the rationale for the preceding set of hypotheses, the logic of this hypothesis stresses the changing mass base of the party. In the south, newer members must appeal to increasingly conservative activist and electoral bases, while in the north, those bases are more liberal than before.

Conversion. Unlike the preceding hypotheses, this one ignores turnover. It states that those members who remain in Congress over a period of time change in predictable ways. Southerners, especially liberal ones, become more conservative; and northerners, especially conservative ones, move to the left.

There are at least two reasons why this might happen. As sectionally divisive issues become more salient, members may sincerely change their minds and conform to the emerging sectional norm. In addition, in Downsian fashion they may seek to conform to the ideologically changing base of their activists and the general electorate.[29]

We will test each of these hypotheses with the Poole/Rosenthal data. Before doing so, it is important to emphasize that these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. All may have contributed to the growing sectional split in the Democratic party during the Roosevelt administration. It is also necessary to define liberal and conservative operationally. In most years during the New Deal, Poole and Rosenthal's first-dimension ideological scores separated Democrats from Republicans, so that nearly all Democrats lay to the left of the mean. In order to avoid defining nearly all congressional Democrats as liberals, I created standardized scores for only the Democrats, and I defined liberals and conservatives as lying to the left or right of that mean. This gives us the maximum number of members per group, which is especially important when I divided the group into geographic sections.

The Senate

Differential attrition. Were southern liberal Senators less likely than southern conservative Senators to return to the Senate? Were northern liberal Senators more likely than northern conservative Senators to return to the Senate?

For all the years from 1934 through 1944, I examined all the Democratic senators whose seats were up for reelection and designated them as liberal or conservative based on their ratings for the preceding two years. I found the attrition rates of liberals and conservatives within each section to be quite similar. The greatest differences are counter to the hypothesized direction of difference: southern liberals were more likely than southern conservatives to be nominated, and northern conservatives were more likely than northern liberals to seek another term. Clearly, differential attrition rates do not account for the north-south split within the Democratic party.

[29] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

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FIGURE 4

Mean Ideological Scores of Democratic Senators Who Served in 1943–1944, and the Most Recent Scores of Their Most Recent Democratic Predecessors, by Section



These scores, which were adapted from those that were developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, represents the members' votes on a dimension representing the role of government in the economy. A score of zero indicates that the member's votes were in the ideological middle of the Democratic party. The more positive the score, the more conservative the member; the more negative the score, the more liberal the member.

Replacement. Did newer senators conform more than their predecessors to the emerging ideological profile of their section? To test the replacement hypothesis, I examined all Senate seats that were serially occupied by at least two Democrats during the Roosevelt administration, one of whom served during the last two years (1943–1944), when for the first time, southern Democratic senators were more conservative than their northern counterparts. I calculated the standardized ideological scores for the senators in this group who served in 1943–1944, as well as the most recent scores of their most recent Democratic predecessors. I used the most recent scores of the earlier senators to subject the hypothesis to its toughest test, as I would expect the least ideological difference between senators who served closest in time to each other. This hypothesis appears to be borne out in Figure 4: the newer southern senators were substantially more conservative than their predecessors, while the newer northern senators were quite a bit more liberal than theirs. The trend was greater in the north than in the south. The validity of the test of this hypothesis is somewhat qualified by the small number of senators represented in the table: ten pairs of southerners and fourteen pairs of northerners.

Conversion. Did senators who served for a long time move in the direction of the emerging ideological profile of their section? The small number of Democratic senators necessitates adopting a loose definition of "serving for a long time." Only twenty-six Democrats served in the Senate in both the 73rd (1933–1934) and 78th (1943–1944) Congresses. Therefore, I nearly doubled the data set by examining the forty-seven who served in 1939–1940 and 1943–1944.

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FIGURE 5

Mean Ideological Scores of Democratic Senators Who Served in the 76th (1939–1940) and 78th (1943–1944) Congresses, by Section and Ideology in the Earlier Congress



In this and the following figures, scores, which were adapted from those that were developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, represent the members' votes on a dimension representing the role of government in the economy. A score of zero indicates that the members' votes were in the ideological middle of the Democratic party. The more positive the score, the more conservative the member; the more negative the score, the more liberal the member.

These were years that represent the last time that southerners were more liberal than northerners, and the last Roosevelt Congress, when the opposite was true.

Within each section, which ideological group moved the most in a liberal or conservative direction? In the south, liberals should move farther to the right than conservatives who are already on the right side of the spectrum. In the north, conservatives should move left more than liberals do. The variables in the table are coded in such a way that a positive sign in the last column denotes movement in a conservative direction, a negative sign indicating movement to the left.

As Figure 5 shows, the conversion hypothesis is not confirmed. In the south, those who were already conservative in the 76th Congress (1939–1940) moved farther to the right than did those who started the period as liberals. In the north, each wing moved farther in the direction it was in the 76th Congress. In short, in neither section were the deviants especially likely to move in the direction of most of their copartisans.

In the United States Senate, the movement of southern Democrats to the right was largely a function of replacement of liberals by conservatives. This was not because southern liberals had a more difficult time getting reelected; rather, when relatively liberal senators left the Senate, more often than not they were replaced by more conservative figures. In the early New Deal, the south was represented by such New Dealers and populists as Hugo Black, James Byrnes, and Huey and Rose Long; by the time Roosevelt died, such right-wingers as James Eastland and John McClellan had assumed office. In the north,

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FIGURE 6

Mean of Most Recent Ideological Scores of Democratic Representatives Who Served No Later than 1937, and the Mean of the Earliest Such Scores of Those Who Served No Earlier than 1939, by Section



too, a similar but less pronounced trend occurred, most dramatically in New York, where New Dealer James Mead succeeded the reactionary Hearst ally, Royal Copeland, who died in office in 1938.

The House of Representatives

Testing the hypotheses with data from the House of Representatives requires different strategies from those applied to the Senate. On the positive side, there are of course far more members of the House than the Senate, and biennial elections provide more opportunities to observe the reelection process. Less positively, reapportionment and redistricting make tracking the same district over time more difficult; after the 1940 census, no fewer than sixteen states experienced a change in their number of representatives.

Differential attrition. When examining the attrition rates of representatives, I took into account the fact that members of the House are considerably more likely than senators to seek other offices, usually Senate seats and governorships. Representatives who decline to seek reelection because they seek another elective office are hardly ending their political careers, and so I first classified all representatives who declined to seek reelection for any reason as retirees and then excluded those who were seeking other offices.

The results are similar for both versions. As with the Senate, there is little difference between the attrition rates of liberals and conservatives in either north or south. As the hypothesis predicts, the reelection rates of northern liberals were a few percentages higher than those of northern conservatives, but even here, the differences in attrition rates were less than 10 percent.

Replacement. When I tested this hypothesis using Senate data, I compared early and late New Deal senators who occupied the same seat. Reapportionment and redistricting make such comparisons problematic for the House.

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FIGURE 7
Mean Ideological Scores of Democratic Representatives Who Served in the 73rd (1933–1934) and 77th (1941–1942) and/or 78th (1943–1944) Congresses, by Section and Ideology in the Earlier Congress



Therefore, the House comparison is more crude than for the Senate. Within each section, I aggregated the most recent standardized ideological scores of all Democrats who served no later than 1937. I compared the mean of those scores with that of the earliest scores for those who served no earlier than 1939. (Figure 3 showed that in the 1937–1938 House, there was little ideological difference between the sections.)

As with the Senate, the replacement hypothesis seems confirmed by these data in Figure 7. In the south, Democrats who entered after 1938 were substantially more conservative than those who left before that year. In the north, the latecomers were far more liberal than their predecessors.

Conversion. The fairest test of this hypothesis is to examine those representatives who served at the earliest possible date in this period and at the last possible date. This gives each member as much time as possible to change his or her ideology. Therefore, I examined those Democrats who served in the 73rd (1933–1934) and (to increase the size of the data set) the 77th and/or 78th (1941–1944) Congress; there were 113 in all.

I saw little confirmation for the conversion hypothesis in the Senate. For the House, however, the hypothesis seems handsomely confirmed. Southern liberals moved in a markedly conservative direction, more so than their conservative neighbors. Northern conservatives moved far to the left, while their liberal neighbors changed very little. The net effect within each section was to reduce the ideological distance between liberals and conservatives.

In the United States House of Representatives, the growing sectional rift within the Democratic party was partly a consequence of replacement and partly of conversion. As in the Senate, newer generations of Democrats reflected the growing ideological profile of their sections. However, unlike in the Senate, veterans contributed to this trend by shifting their own voting patterns. Except for

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one border-state representative, nobody moved farther than Martin Dies, Jr. of Texas, notorious chair of the Un-American Activities Committee. The representative who traveled farthest in a liberal direction was Arthur D. Healey of Massachusetts.

Earlier I hypothesized that a stable factional structure would ensue when a party changed by replacement rather than by conversion. I then discovered that for the most part, the patterns of ideological change in the congressional Democratic party during the New Deal were far more attributable to replacement than to conversion. According to my earlier analysis, this may explain why the north-south split within the congressional Democratic party has persisted for so long—according to Poole and Rosenthal's data, for at least fifty years. As I speculated earlier, stable factions may be more divisive for a party than temporary factions. Surely the substantial erosion of the Democratic party in the south for decades after the New Deal is a prime example of how dangerous a stable factional structure can be for party unity.

In neither house of Congress did the process of replacement take the form of throwing the rascals out: on the whole, sectional deviants were no more likely to fail to seek or win reelection than those who were more compatible with their section's ideology. The portrait of the Democratic party that emerges is one of factional dynamism but also profound stability: activists (in this case, members of Congress) do not change their minds; nor do the Democrats back home try to oust them. In the long run, deviants are replaced by activists less out of tune with their neighbors, and this produces a highly stable factional cleavage. In many respects, the major parties in the United States are institutionally conservative,[30] and these findings confirm that generalization.

The exception to this picture is the fact that House veterans appear to have shifted their voting patterns to conform to their section's emerging ideological profile. That this did not occur among Democratic senators presents us with an anomaly. Perhaps the differences in the electoral structures of the two chambers explain this puzzle. Being tied to smaller constituencies and needing to seek reelection far more frequently, representatives continually need to adjust to changing political winds. In conformance with the expectations of the authors of the Constitution, senators are encouraged to be statesmen and stateswomen, and they have less constituent pressure to shift ideologically. During the Roosevelt years, Democratic representatives were more likely than Democratic senators to seek reelection, to be renominated, and to be reelected. The net effect was a 22 percent turnover rate in the House, and a 35 percent turnover rate in the Senate.

If this explanation has merit, we should expect senators who faced reelection to have shifted ideologically more than those who did not. I analyzed the shifts of the senators who served both in 1939–1940 and in 1943–1944. I hypothesized that those whose terms expired between 1938 and 1944 shifted ideologi-

[30] See Howard L. Reiter, *Parties and Elections in Corporate America*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1993).

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cally more than those who did not need to face the electorate during that period. First, I examined the absolute value of the shifts, to see whether any change had occurred, and found that in both north and south, those whose seats were up did shift more than those who did not have to run. Then I examined if senators in particular geographic sections shifted in the direction of that section's emerging ideology. In the north, those facing reelection did shift more in a liberal direction. Regardless of when their seats were up, those who shifted the most tended to be most electorally vulnerable. Five of the six who moved farthest to the left were from the large, diverse states of California (Sheridan Downey), Illinois (Scott Lucas), New York (Robert F. Wagner), and Pennsylvania (Joseph F. Guffey), and none received as much as 54 percent of the vote when seeking reelection in this period. The three northerners who shifted farthest to the right were from electorally tiny Idaho (D. Worth Clark), Montana (Burton K. Wheeler), and Rhode Island (Peter G. Gerry); and all won reelection easily. All these comparisons seem to support the argument that electoral considerations influenced the ideological switchers in the north. In the south, however, those whose seats were not up shifted farther to the right. This mixed result may be due to the far greater electoral safety of southern Democratic senators compared with their northern counterparts.

Another matter deserves attention. The Poole/Rosenthal measure of ideology is a statistical artifact; it does not take into account substantive changes in the question of the role of government in the economy. Can the trends that I have demonstrated be accounted for by such changes during the New Deal? Most recent research on the Roosevelt administration has emphasized the transformation of the ideology of the New Deal in the 1940s, with a loss of some of its radical tinge from the 1930s and a new emphasis on prosperity that foreshadowed a more tepid postwar liberalism. Both the downplaying of class conflict that World War II entailed and conservative gains in the off-year elections of 1938 and 1942 laid the groundwork for this moderation of party ideology. The newly powerful labor movement, which had provided shock troops for the class conflict of the 1930s, seemed to return to Samuel Gompers's emphasis on the full dinner pail rather than on the more social democratic thrust of the CIO. By the end of the war, liberal Democrats were placing their faith in a general prosperity, rather than class conflict, to better the condition of the lower classes. Moreover, labor, blacks, farmers, and other constituencies would be conceptualized as interest groups rather than as part of a class-based alignment. Any special attention to the concerns of African Americans would be based on individual rights, not broader concepts of citizenship. Ideology, if not dead, would be superseded by pluralism and civil rights. To Alan Brinkley, the transformation in Democratic ideology was from "reform liberalism" to "rights-based liberalism." To Ira Katznelson, it replaced "questions of social organization and class relations" with "issues of technical economics and interest group politics." To Katznelson and Bruce Pietrykowski, the "fiscalist state" won out over the "developmental state." To John Jeffries, these trends represented "the ascendancy of the compensatory state over the administrative state and the social

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welfare state." And to John Gerring, by the 1950s a "rhetoric of reconciliation replaced one of resentment." Whatever the terminology used, all are agreed that the 1940s marked a retreat from the sometimes crusading zeal of Roosevelt's first two terms.[31]

Such generalizations make our findings stand out even more. If the New Deal became tamer as the 1930s became the 1940s, then we might expect the more conservative elements of the Democratic party to feel more at home there. Southern conservatives who feared the effects of the redistributive side of the New Deal would have had reason to sigh in relief. Instead, the south moved to the right. No doubt, part of the reason is that the early 1940s also witnessed a rise in the salience of racial issues. The fact remains that sectional strife within the Democratic party increased, despite the taming of the New Deal on class-related issues.

Conclusion

This article began with the assertion that the texture of intraparty factionalism is an important characteristic of a party system, and therefore that change in that texture is especially important to understand. Pursuant to that goal, I developed a series of hypotheses about the nature of factional change, and applied them to the case of the sectional rift within the Democratic party that began in the 1930s and 1940s. By developing and testing these hypotheses and by the use of data both from national conventions and from Congress, I have added theoretical and empirical rigor to the study of intraparty factionalism and applied it to an indisputably significant historical case.

In particular, I hypothesized that parties of persistent factional structure are likely to be less united than parties whose factions form and dissolve more frequently. Moreover, I theorized that the method of factional formation would affect the turnover of elites as well as the persistence of the emergent factional structure. By rigorously testing these hypotheses, I have advanced our theoretical understanding of both factionalism and the New Deal party system.

- National convention and congressional roll-call data coincide in dating the split as beginning in the period from 1939 to 1944.
- A combination of institutional, electoral, and policy developments explain the emergence of the bipolar structure, which ultimately stemmed from the clash between the egalitarian and class-ameliorative emphases of the New Deal, and the racial-economic structure of the south.

[31] The quotations are from Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 10; Ira Katznelson, "Was the Great Society a Lost Opportunity?" in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 187; Katznelson and Bruce Pietrykowski, "Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from the 1940s," *Studies in American Political Development* 5 (Fall 1991): 306; John W. Jeffries, "A 'Third New Deal'? Liberal Policy and the American State, 1937–1945," *Journal of Policy History* 8 (1996): 397; and John Gerring, "Continuities of Democratic Ideology in the 1996 Campaign," *Polity* 30 (Fall 1997): 168. See also Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chap. 7.

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- In both houses of Congress, cohort replacement was in large part responsible for the transformation, and in the House of Representatives, there is also evidence of ideological conversion.

From earlier hypotheses, I concluded that the new factional structure of the Democratic party in the 1940s was likely to be both long-lived and especially divisive, conclusions that are consistent with subsequent political trends.

One cannot help notice the centrality of race to these developments. In recent years, a variety of students of American political development have emphasized how important race has been in American politics, often in subtle or subterranean ways.[32] Until the New Deal, the Democrats were governed by a tacit understanding between their northern and southern wings that race would be kept off the intraparty agenda. Even when the Ku Klux Klan became an issue at the 1924 convention, its role as enemy of Roman Catholics was more salient than its far more lethal record as persecutor of blacks. In the 1930s, for reasons sketched out earlier, that modus vivendi collapsed, and for decades afterward the south broke from the rest of the party on most domestic issues. Only the late 1960s and 1970s, as Figure 1 shows, saw a diminution of the split, as African-Americans entered the southern party in large numbers and the most conservative whites left.

The events discussed in this analysis produced the most stable intraparty factional structure in the history of the Democratic party, and therefore the New Deal was an important watershed in U.S. party development in a respect that has not been sufficiently emphasized by scholars. However, at least in Congress this revolutionary transformation was achieved by conservative means: primarily, an evolutionary process by which northern conservatives and southern liberals exiting from the institution were replaced by men and women of different ideology. This suggests the proposition that when the major parties of the United States undergo this sort of major change, they do so in ways appropriate to their notoriously weakly structured and minimally ideological character. Only examination of other critical moments in U. S. party development can ascertain if that proposition holds, and only examination of analogous turning points in the development of parties in other nations can demonstrate if the nature of this kind of change is similarly conditioned by the characteristics of other parties.*

[32] See Robert C. Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), esp. the last chapter.

* This research was first presented to the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association in Chicago on 20 November 1998. It was supported by a grant from the University of Connecticut Research Foundation. The author is indebted to Leon Epstein, John Gerring, Tom Hartley, Marc Maynard, Lex Renda, Ron Schurin, Phil VanderMeer, Ernie Zirakzadeh, and the staff of the John F. Kennedy Library.

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PROMISE AND PROBLEMS OF OLD AND NEW DEMOCRACIES

Xiaobo Lü, Editor

A collection of recent essays from the
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited and with an introduction by Xiaobo Lü, and a preface by Demetrios Caraley, this book includes some of the best scholarship on democracy that has been published. More often than not, studies of democracy in more advanced countries like the U.S. and U.K. are disconnected from studies of democratic transitions in developing countries. Grounded in political reality and guided by theoretical frameworks, ***Promise and Problems of Old and New Democracies*** attempts to bring the two seemingly unrelated bodies of literature together.

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Book Reviews

The Presidential Difference: Leadership Styles from FDR to Clinton *by Fred I. Greenstein. New York, The Free Press, 2000. 282 pp. $25.00.*

Fred Greenstein makes use of a tantalizingly simple counterfactual exercise to delve into the difference it makes who holds the nation's highest office. What difference would it have made, he asks, had Hubert Humphrey, rather than Lyndon Johnson, succeeded John Kennedy in the presidency, or if Richard Nixon had served as president in the 1950s in the place of Dwight Eisenhower?

From such counterfactual starting points, Greenstein develops criteria for analyzing the men who have held the presidency from Franklin Roosevelt through Bill Clinton. Each modern president's execution of the office is considered in terms of public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence.

Naturally, not all of Greenstein's case studies are equally revealing. He is most persuasive in his analysis of Dwight Eisenhower—highly familiar terrain for Greenstein—and Ronald Reagan. Eisenhower is praised for his political skill as a "hidden hand" president, but taken to task for abdicating the president's role as "Teacher in Chief." The "no hands" organizational style of Ronald Reagan is also deftly summarized and its consequences analyzed.

The Kennedy case study, by contrast, leaves fundamental issues unresolved. Did the cold war heat up in the 1960s because of what Greenstein terms a "lack of mutual understanding" between the superpowers (p. 65)? Maybe, but Greenstein's casual assumption of the truth of this proposition renders unsubstantiated the conclusion that Kennedy's presidency suffered from a lack of foreign policy vision. Kennedy arguably had a clear and explicit vision of foreign policy and military necessity, which he acted upon in Vietnam, setting in motion the policies that Johnson built upon in committing substantial American resources to the Vietnam War.

Another small defect is that Greenstein assumes away the potential for applying his approach to the pre-modern presidency, because "until the 1930s, Congress typically took the lead in policymaking, and the programs of the federal government were of modest importance for the nation and the world" (p. 3). To the contrary, applying the same counterfactual reasoning that Greenstein employs, one could quite profitably ask what difference would it have made

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to the nation and the world had Thomas Jefferson, rather than John Adams, succeeded George Washington, or if George Dallas rather than James Polk had been in office in the late 1840s.

These criticisms might easily be considered the price to be paid for a readable and concise volume. A more serious challenge, however, is that some of the very factors that Greenstein discusses in terms of the individual men who held the presidency may in fact have been determined not so much by personal qualities of the presidents as by the structure of the political environment. At the least, Greenstein's analysis would have benefited from taking up the possibility that the changing shape of the political environment that each president faces magnifies or diminishes the importance of particular personal traits. While all presidents surely should have political skill, for example, could any amount of political savvy have rescued Jimmy Carter from failure, given his unenviable status as the head of a Democratic regime on the verge of disintegration?

Nevertheless, Greenstein's volume is highly useful on its own terms. The presidency is more than the sum of "executive politics." *The Presidential Difference* provides numerous insights into why this is so, highlights the enduring value of personal qualities, especially emotional balance, in the person who wields the power of Article II under our Constitution, and provides a template for analysis well worth the attention of scholars, citizens, and even presidents themselves.

THOMAS S. LANGSTON
Tulane University

Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in Russia *by Timothy J. Colton. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000. 324 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95.*

This neat volume is a thorough statistical analysis of Russian elections by one of the foremost professors of Russian politics. Timothy Colton of Harvard has penetrated into the parliamentary elections in December 1995 and the presidential elections in June-July 1996 in a multifaceted regression analysis. With its thematic approach, this book complements the chronological study, *How Russia Votes*, by Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister.

But Colton has probed deeper, with the assistance of a large survey and sophisticated statistical methods. His presentation of regression results is admirably clear. Judiciousness is his trademark, though the reader often wishes that he were more daring. No doubt, this is the best analysis of any Russian election to date. It is likely to set a pattern for electoral analysis of Russia and other postcommunist countries.

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Few of Colton's conclusions are startling, but his quantification is illuminating, showing that Russian voting is a highly patterned and sensible behavior. The voters have clear views, which are more consistent than most commentators realize. After this book, nobody can argue that Russian voting is arbitrary.

Colton calls Russia a "protodemocracy," but he presents quite a healthy picture of democracy. "Voting is the consummate act of citizenship" (p. vii). Participation in elections has been quite high, and less than 10 percent of the population is politically totally inactive. Russian voters do not obey employers, which employers realize, so they do little to influence their employees. Voluntary associations are many, but not very strong, playing little role. Instead, the media, especially TV, help form people's understanding, but skeptical Russian viewers seek alternative information.

Russian voting reflects primarily partisanship and opinions about issues. Colton confirms that the presidential election in 1996 was a referendum on the political and economic system. Although Russian citizens thought little of Boris Yeltsin, they voted for him in support of democracy and market economy. Unlike opinions, charismatic personalities are of little consequence in Russian elections. Whereas parties remain weak, partisanship is much greater than generally understood.

One of Colton's strongest conclusions is that Russia is not much polarized in sociopolitical terms. Rural voters with less education and family income are somewhat more likely to vote Communist, but these factors make little difference, far less so than in Western Europe. Instead, age turns out to be the most decisive factor after personal opinions, with pensioners voting more Communist; and the next factor is living in the north. Colton considers the age divide as "transition-related," while he does not elaborate on the intriguing political north-south divide, with the north voting against Communists. Education and incomes matter, but surprisingly little. Gender, religious belief, and ethnicity are barely significant as influences. Selfish pocketbook concerns play virtually no role, but formal ideology is also weak. Despite a profound division over values, the lack of social and ethnic chasms is a reassuring feature of present Russia. This book reveals no dangerous political trap or abyss.

Colton prides himself on seeing Russian voting in a comparative framework, primarily drawing from U.S. studies of voting. This is useful, but unfortunately he makes few references to the experiences of other postcommunist countries, which are the obvious comparative standards. My other reproach is that his language is more cumbersome than necessary.

This admirable and well-structured study is likely to be the standard textbook on Russian elections until somebody incorporates the elections of 1999 and 2000 in a similar volume.

ANDERS ÅSLUND
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons *by T. V. Paul. Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2000. 228 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.95.*

This book amounts to a valuable corrective for any of us who settle for pessimism about the spread of nuclear weapons, for it offers a well-researched and well-written account of why a great number of states have forgone the acquisition of such weapons, even when they have had the physical ability to produce them. Addressing various strands of contemporary realist and liberal institutionalist theories of international politics, the book will have appeal not just for the policy-oriented reader working on issues of arms control, but also for teachers and students in international relations seminars. Paul concludes that as far fewer countries have acquired nuclear weapons than had been predicted in the 1960s and 1970s, the best explanation for this remarkable restraint lies in a "prudential" calculation by most near-nuclear states of their own selfish interest in power and security. This still weighs more than the establishment of any kind of new international "norm."

The chapters in the book on individual countries will be extremely useful for anyone wanting an update on how these decisions have been made. It reflects the author's careful survey of the existing literature, combined with his own interviews in the field. Paul includes detailed discussions of the evolutions of nuclear policy in Germany and Japan, Canada and Australia, Sweden and Switzerland, and Argentina and Brazil, all these being countries that have had the means to produce atomic bombs, but have thus far stayed away from doing so, sometimes after some extensive internal debate. There is a discussion also of South Africa (which apparently produced bombs and then gave them up) and Ukraine (which inherited some from the old Soviet Union and then gave them up). South Korea is analyzed, but there is a surprising failure to discuss Taiwan. On the side of the countries that more worrisomely have moved to acquire such weapons, the author gives a detailed discussion of India and Pakistan, and Israel, but does not do so for Iran and Iraq, and for North Korea.

Introducing some complex theory of his own, Paul makes the case that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has often been seen as not serving the power and security interests of these countries, in particular in regions where existing conflicts and security problems were not so serious and where a neighboring country might be panicked by the introduction of such weapons. The book thus demonstrates very well how someone can be a "tough-minded realist" and still expect nuclear weapons to be contained.

The author might possibly have been more parsimonious in his theory. For example, he might have addressed simpler explanations that do not get so much attention in this book. Perhaps much of what is described here is simply a copy of the "no-first-use" policy that some of the possessors of nuclear weapons have enunciated: "We will not use nuclear weapons as long as you don't," this time in a "no first acquisition" policy. Pairs of countries (like Brazil and Argentina)

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in effect declare: "We will not acquire nuclear weapons as long as you don't." And is it not also bizarrely possible that an important counterweight to nuclear proliferation has been the heavy weight of the first two nuclear arsenals, controlled by Washington and Moscow, which balance and deter each other? They also deter the use of nuclear weapons by anyone else, which generally makes it less useful and less necessary for any other state to pursue its national interest by acquiring them.

To repeat, this is a book that anyone interested in nuclear weapons questions or interested in international relations theory will want to read.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland

Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries *by Russell J. Leng. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 336 pp. Cloth, $64.50; paper, $24.95.*

How decision-makers learn from experience is a key question for students of politics. There are two broad views of learning in the social science literature. From a psychological perspective, what someone learns may be influenced less by actual experience than by the beliefs that may color what is perceived and the conclusions that are drawn. Strategic choice thinkers—those who focus on the implications of interdependent decision making—assume that actors learn by revising their beliefs in response to new information about the situational context they face, including the results of their previous choices. Rarely are linkages between cognitive and strategic factors explored; most scholars limit themselves to focusing on one or the other. Russell Leng explores both in a carefully crafted examination of some key military crises.

The issue addressed in this book is whether crisis experience affects bargaining strategies in subsequent crises. To explore it, Leng examines decision makers' behavior in three long-standing rivalries: U.S.–USSR, Egypt and Israel, and India and Pakistan. Because psychological research has shown that people's beliefs are typically sticky and thus slow to be changed by their experiences, a focus on enduring rivalries might illuminate how the processes identified by the two views of learning can contribute to our understanding of conflict choices.

Leng poses five research questions: Do the same interactions and influence strategies recur from one crisis to the next? Did the competitors manage their crises more or less effectively over the course of the rivalry? Can any behavioral changes be ascribed to experiential learning? Did rivals draw the same lessons from recurring crises, and did states in different rivalries draw comparable lessons from their crisis experiences? When learning occurred, did it lead to more

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or less effective crisis management? A mix of quantitative and qualitative data is brought to bear on these questions. Leng addresses the first question by focusing on the predominant kind of influence strategies used in crises, the mix of cooperative and conflictual actions employed, and the willingness to seek a negotiated settlement. The effectiveness of crisis management is captured through five indicators: the aggregate pattern of escalation and deescalation over the course of the crises; the nature and degree of reciprocity between the parties; the timing and intensity of negotiations; the duration of crises; and crisis outcomes. To determine whether changes in crisis behavior can be attributed to lessons learned from previous outcomes, Leng tries to rule out the contribution of noncognitive variables related solely to the structure of the situation the actors face. Only then might it be possible to discern whether movement along a continuum of hawkish-dovish beliefs produced a change in behavior.

Leng's findings are sobering. The states he examined often returned to the same influence strategies they had used before, even at the cost of recurring war in the Israeli-Egyptian and India-Pakistan relationships. If the effectiveness of crisis behavior is assessed in terms of dampening down conflict, only the Soviet-American relationship improved over time. But if effectiveness is defined to mean achievement of key policy goals, even at the cost of war, Israeli, Egyptian, and Indian officials acted effectively at times (though Egypt's record overall was weak in this regard and Pakistan's weaker yet). In terms of learning, Soviet and U.S. officials realized during the course of the Cuban crisis that a problem-solving rather than a strictly competitive approach to bargaining was called for, and that lesson survived for the balance of the cold war. It paid dividends during the U.S.–USSR alert crisis during the Yom Kippur War, which escalated much less than previous cold war crises. By contrast, "the strictly competitive strategies that were pursued in the eight Egyptian-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani crises did not change" (p. 278) over decades of rivalry in each case.

This book amply illustrates some synergies between the situational and psychological processes that shape learning, but it is less useful in helping analysts tease out the relative impact of these factors. Leng concludes that policy makers' realpolitik beliefs "frequently result[s] in similar influence strategies and tactics by states facing similar circumstances" (p. 271). From a situational incentives perspective, one would expect no less: actors should update their beliefs about others as a result of dealing with them. The fact that the hostilities observed in these cases typically resulted from calculated decisions, and not from the loss of control critics of coercive bargaining expect, suggests that a variety of leaders saw force as necessary in situations of incompatible national objectives and were willing to accept its consequences. To be sure, some distinctively psychological effects—self-reinforcing hostility, the use of inappropriate analogies, and erroneous causal attributions—were also evident, suggesting that policy makers experienced more conflict than an unbiased actor might have encountered. To unpack these two factors, analysts need to identify a priori the theoretical processes that explain variation in actors' lenses for making sense

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of the world and then figure out how those lenses interact with the situational incentives they face. The result would be a clearer understanding of how experience shapes learning. Still, this is a careful, informative, and thoughtful book, and well worth the time of interested scholars.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD
Georgetown University

The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World *by Avi Shlaim. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 2000. 670 pp. $32.50.*

Despite some twenty years of scholarship by Israeli new historians like Avi Shlaim and many others, there continues to be a vast gap between the received mythology on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the amply-demonstrated historical facts. To be sure, in Israel the gap is narrowing, for the cumulative weight of the evidence has become so great that it is finding its way into the media and the school curriculum, and it is increasingly informing enlightened public debate over the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the Israeli new history has had much less of an impact in the United States, where automatic "pro-Israel" views continue to dominate public discourse. "Pro-Israel," because knee-jerk American acceptance of many of Israel's worse impulses contributes to the ongoing deterioration of Israeli security, moral standing, and even the health and stability of Israeli domestic society.

Avi Shlaim, an Israeli historian teaching at Oxford, is one of the leading new historians; his earlier scholarship meticulously demonstrated that Israeli intransigence, ideological rigidity, and territorial expansionism prevented peace settlements with Jordan and Syria in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Shlaim's work was one of the major inspirations for the new generation of Israeli scholars who have been reexamining the mythology. Now Shlaim has extended his analysis to cover the entire history of the Arab-Israeli conflict through 1998. Based on a comprehensive review of the vast secondary literature, examination of Israeli, British, and American declassified documentation, and extensive interviewing of key policy makers, *The Iron Wall* is a powerfully-argued, elegantly written, and magnificent work of scholarship.

Among the book's major findings and arguments are the following: Contrary to the myth of Israeli defensiveness and Arab expansionism, the major early leaders of Israel, especially David Ben Gurion and his disciples (for example, Moshe Dayan) were clearly expansionist. Although Ben-Gurion accepted the 1947 UN partition plan for Palestine, he did so only as a temporary tactical expedient and continued to covet the Negev desert, the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza strip, Jerusalem, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. In the years to come, much of these territorial goals were realized—at the cost of continuous war with the Palestinians and the Arab world. Contrary

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to the myth that it is the Arabs who have blocked peace settlements, it has been Israel that has been responsible for various lost opportunities for peace. In great detail, Shlaim reviews the history of Israeli territorial expansionism, provocations, escalation, avoidable wars, and squandered diplomatic openings. The two key issues—to this very moment—have been Israeli unwillingness to compromise on its territorial demands and on a fair solution to the Palestinian problem. Contrary to its myth of "purity of arms," Israel has deliberately and ruthlessly targeted civilians throughout its history in defiance of the basic norms of morality in warfare: against Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian villages in the 1940s and 1950s, and especially in the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 1996. In all these cases the purpose has been to send neighboring populations and their governments a message: they should not support or harbor activist Palestinian political and guerrilla movements.

In the view of Shlaim and this reviewer, both the basic Zionist and the Palestinian case are persuasive. As Shlaim concludes: "The moral case for the establishment of an independent Jewish state was strong, especially in the aftermath of the Holocaust. But there is no denying that the establishment of the State of Israel involved a massive injustice to the Palestinians . . . a debt that must at some point be repaid" (p. 598). If a majority of the Israeli public comes to acknowledge this debt—and despite the ongoing violence that is the direction in which things are going—it will be in no small part because of the courageous, unswerving devotion to truth exemplified by Avi Shlaim and his Israeli colleagues.

JEROME SLATER
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The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System *by Richard Davis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 225 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $18.95.*

Informative and easy to read, this book describes the uses of and adaptations to the Internet by the participants in political communication in the United States. Chapters are devoted to news media organizations and their audiences, interest groups, candidates in campaigns and elections, government officials (the three branches are covered in one chapter), and ordinary Internet users.

The format of these chapters is to describe each development, give examples, then extrapolate to predictions of the future. Thus, the "Electronic Lobbying" chapter covers the way interest groups are using the Internet in their relations to their members, the mass public, and policy makers. This variously entails educating, persuading, recruiting, mobilizing, and lobbying.

Some of the data come from original research by the author: content analysis, surveys, and interviews. But the sites of only three Usenet groups are con-

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tent analyzed, the response rate to questionnaires sent out is quite low, and there is an oversampling of the sites of Democrats and challengers. Moreover, the results are not always convincing: 50 percent of groups with annual incomes of less than $1 million a year are said to lack web sites (p. 82), but that is only two of four (p. 190).

Davis's oft-stated thesis is that "the Internet will not lead to the social and political revolution so widely predicted" (p. 168). Because they are effectively adapting to the Internet, the existing power structure, traditional media, and powerful groups will continue to dominate the production of political news and information, the expression of opinion, and the mobilization of political participation. Internet users will continue to be the affluent, the already politically interested and active. Because the Internet is not an adequate tool for political involvement by the public, there will be no rise of Internet democracy in which people become political activists through acquiring information, registering opinions, making policy, and generally interacting with their government.

This thesis may be right. Certainly caution is called for to combat the high-flying hype, the wildly optimistic and fanciful predictions of revolutionary change from so many who write about the Internet. But Davis's analysis is problematically based on the assumption that people's interest in public affairs will not increase, a lack of recognition that situations and conditions change, and a reluctance to speculate. So he concludes that even though the Internet can enable people to be far more informed about, participate in, and influence politics and government, it doesn't matter.

A different scenario is possible, somewhere between the extreme alternatives of status quo and revolution. Fueled by the availability of computers in their classrooms, this country's children and youth will grow up to regard and use the Internet as a habitual source of information (fast-breaking and in-depth), a way of communicating, and a means to action. The American Association of Retired Persons will institute an Internet literacy program for those of its millions of members with the leisure to learn. Even if they are not politically inclined, people will be educated to take advantage of the Internet or will use it of their own volition. Events such as an economic recession will rouse the public from complacency to action. The Internet will make politically relevant information even more widely available and easy to access: campaign finance contributors in detail, analyses of political advertisements irrespective of where shown, congressional conference committee mark-ups. It will provide polling stations and electronic voting.

Americans have a penchant for gravitating to and exploiting new technology in ways that cannot always be predicted or controlled. It is reassuring to expect that we will be able to rely on future, more optimistic editions of Davis's book to keep us informed of new developments, their political implications, and effects.

DAVID L. PALETZ
Duke University

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Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News *by Ellis S. Krauss. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2000. 278 pp. $35.00.*

Western studies of post-World War II Japanese politics progress through three stages. From Potsdam in 1945, President Harry Truman and other Allied leaders set forth the reality of what surrender would mean for Japan: It could expect to be occupied until it had established a government responsive to the wishes of its people. First-stage writers concerned themselves with the question of whether Japan was establishing such a government.

In the decade after 1945, Japan had over fifteen political parties fighting to control the government. By 1958, these political parties had coalesced into two—the Socialist party, which opposed; and the Liberal Democratic party, which ruled and still rules. Second-stage writers concerned themselves with the study of how the Liberal Democrats stayed in power.

What other institutions and processes distinguished Japanese politics? Answering this question was the concern of third-stage writers. Ellis Krauss is such a writer. His book is about NHK. These initials stand for the Japanese words meaning Japan Broadcasting Corporation. It is a government-mandated media empire both reporting the news and entertaining the public over television and radio channels. Its broadcasts total more than 1,100 hours per week. It has had as many as 16,000 employees who manage fifty-four domestic and twenty-seven overseas broadcasting centers. Its annual budget is half a billion dollars paid for by 35 million households, which have contracts with NHK to pay receivers' fees.

Krauss concentrates on explaining the NHK news operation. He casts a broad net. He explains the recruitment of cub reporters and the selection of the NHK president. He walks us through a case study of the making of the NHK budget. He describes the making of the seven o'clock television program, the most-watched news program.

Other nations have government-mandated media and Krauss compares NHK to them. NHK has the power to tax, collect, and keep funds from its listeners. A board of governors provides a barrier between NHK and the government. This board selects the top leaders of NHK, who manage NHK. Article three of the Broadcast Law says, "Broadcasts shall never be interfered with or regulated. . . ." Krauss concludes the NHK has the greatest degree of autonomy in running its own affairs.

What about the content of news programs? The most typical NHK story involves the national bureaucracy. Its members are seen in groups resolving problems. The narrative of the story is factual and descriptive with frequent androgenous voice-overs. Only occasionally does the NHK reporter speak out, giving his own view of events. NHK functions less as a watchdog exposing civic wrong doing and more as a guide dog giving information necessary to understand political events.

Competing with NHK are five commercial media networks. They differ from NHK in their news programing: They offer local government and police

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stories, while NHK sticks with stories about the central government. The commercial media are more generous with opinion and analysis, and they allow themselves to be both cynical and humorous. Initially, NHK dominated the airwaves. Since the 1990s, the commercial networks have become equal to NHK in ratings.

How should the reader evaluate NHK's contribution to post-World War II Japanese society? Television came to Japan in a rush. During the five years between 1958 and 1963, most Japanese acquired a television set. During these same years, Japanese politics lost its sharp edge. Krauss argues that NHK was, at least in part, responsible for this moderation.

Why is NHK losing out to the commercial networks? Because, Krauss suggests, NHK has failed to keep abreast of the new political values that motivate the new Japanese generations. Japan is a bureaucratic state no more.

The reader need not accept Krauss's conclusions to derive great benefit from reading this book.

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Johns Hopkins University

Governing Race: Policy, Process, and the Politics of Race *by Nina M. Moore. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2000. 248 pp. $65.00.*

It should come as no surprise that civil rights policy making differs from the norm. But this important distinction is often treated as an unexplored assumption or ignored entirely by congressional scholars. The contribution that Nina M. Moore makes in this impressive study is to provide evidence and explanations for how and why the legislative process differs and why policy outcomes often fall short of their objectives when the subject is race. Moore argues that the salience and divisiveness of civil rights policy makes the "normal" mode of legislating impossible. Moreover, the primary impediment to reform shifts over time—from regional (southern) racial animus in the 1950s and 1960s to partisan (Republican) opposition to "big" government from the 1970s to the present. Despite leaving a few important questions unanswered, Moore's study amasses persuasive evidence in support of a crucial and often overlooked point: the use of institutional rules and norms is affected by the substance of legislation.

Moore focuses her investigation on the thirteen civil rights bills passed by the U.S. Senate from 1957 to 1992. Using a temporal framework, she details the procedural and substantive negotiations that led to bill passage in order to highlight the frequent departures from the norm. When dealing with race, the "normal" legislative route that most bills take—unanimous consent, voluntary committee action, and logrolling—is abandoned in favor of an "abnormal" mode, in which policy advocates must invest greater effort in procedural safeguards, attain supermajorities, confront cloture, and drastically compromise on

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policy substance in order to win uncommitted votes. Moore calls our attention to the unbargainability of race and the resulting weakening of civil rights legislation. This argument reaches a climax in the final chapter, where the author presents evidence of the dismal failure of race policy: the stark contrast between black and white in America. Moore's interpretation of this reality, as a result of the ungovernability of race, is both thorough and convincing.

Despite the appropriateness of Moore's case selection, two limitations bear mentioning. First, while the book portends to analyze race and civil rights, its focus is narrower—policies that directly target African Americans. This focus is warranted, even typical, but it points to the need for further exploration of governability as it more broadly affects race, ethnicity, gender, class, and disadvantage. While Moore provides a needed groundwork for such an expansion in the future, she misses some opportunities to compare African-American policy processes with those affecting other political minorities. She acknowledges the broadening of civil rights in the 1980s, but doing so calls attention to her avoidance of, for example, Chicano, American Indian, and women's movements in earlier decades.

Additionally, while it may be only fair that Moore ignores the House, after so many studies purporting to explain Congress have snubbed the Senate, her one-chamber focus leaves the reader wondering. Moore's claim that the Senate has been the key battle ground for civil rights legislation is legitimate, but a discussion of the dynamics of race policy in the lower chamber would enhance the breadth of this study. Attention to the House would also provide a glimpse of the many bills passed by that chamber that never made it through the Senate's labyrinth.

Such criticism not withstanding, this book will be an asset in any academic setting that seeks to explore seriously the legislative process and the role of race in American politics. Where many studies of congressional procedure leave out in-depth discussions of substance and many policy studies eschew procedure, Moore's effort targets the intersection, thus making an important contribution to the study of American politics.

CHARLES C. TURNER
California State University, Chico

In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive *by Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 230 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

From John F. Kennedy's eloquent call to public service in his inaugural address, "ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country," to Ronald Reagan's not-so-subtle critique of that service in his inaugural,

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"to make it [government] work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride our back," the issue of government performance has been salient, even dominant. Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman seek to examine that issue as it applies to the federal executive. In doing so, they focus on three basic themes: the quality and condition of the federal workforce; its responsiveness to the various political pressures exerted on it; and efforts to "reinvent" government.

Their analysis begins with a short institutional history that looks at the evolution of the bureaucracy in the twentieth century—its expansion, politicization, and reforms. Next they assess the workforce itself, looking at its representativeness, behavioral norms, and performance levels. A wealth of data derived from the authors' interviews with federal executives over a twenty-two year period, 1970–1992, and supplemented by other surveys, is presented to show that those who work in the upper levels of the executive branch are well educated and experienced, have become increasingly diverse, and still like their jobs, although perhaps less so than in the past.

Aberbach and Rockman then turn to the issues of responsiveness, how much and to whom. They examine the dilemma executive officials face in a government of divided powers and parties, one in which interest group activity has increased and decision making has become more open. Despite the increasing number and complexity of the political forces that impact on bureaucratic decisions, the authors note that the civil servant workforce has become more responsive, not less; and its bureaucratic structure is more flexible, not less. According to their surveys, attitudes of civil servants do shift over time, becoming more in accord with the administration in power. They also suggest that those who work in the bureaucracy have become more sensitive to the interests and desires of their congressional oversight committees, more frequently than not controlled by the party out of power. In brief, federal executives have found ways to placate their more numerous and diverse political bosses, so much so that when these bosses leave they usually do so with much respect and admiration for the civil servants who worked for them, even though they might not have entered government with such views.

Given the quality of the personnel, their sensitivity to political pressures, and the generally high quality performance of on-going missions and services, why reinvent government? You can probably guess how the authors answer this question. After reviewing the theory of the reinventing literature, indicating some of the changes that would have to be instituted if the recommendations of this literature were to be put in effect, the authors conclude that while the goals of reinventing are admirable, the assumption on which they are based is incorrect—that the government, (the executive branch) is too large, and the people who work there (bureaucrats), and the system of which they are a part are inefficient and unresponsive. The problem as Aberbach and Rockman see

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it lies in the system itself, the constitutional system that divides, checks, and balances; the political system that permits, even facilitates, divided partisan control; and the polity which is more organized, open, and democratically-oriented than ever before.

This is a wise book by two recognized scholars. It is well written, well argued, and well documented with sound empirical data. It refutes much of the antigovernment, antibureaucracy political rhetoric we have been subjected to since the mid-1970s, and it does so in a way to engender confidence not cynicism in those who serve us in the federal government.

STEPHEN J. WAYNE
Georgetown University

François Mitterrand: The Last French President *by Ronald Tiersky. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 438 pp. $29.95.*

French politics in the twentieth century has not been devoid of fascinating and controversial figures. In a new biography, written with grace and ebullient style, Ronald Tiersky tackles the individual he calls the most impressive political man of his generation, a great if flawed talent, the leading French politician of the second half of the century apart from Charles de Gaulle with whom the author constantly compares and contrasts him. Combining his considerable knowledge of French affairs with information stemming from private interviews with his subject, Tiersky acknowledges the ambivalence, enigmatic character, ambiguous legacy, and idiosyncratic nature of François Mitterrand, often referred to as "Machiavellian" or "Florentine."

Tiersky assesses different aspects of Mitterrand's personality: imperious, charming, subtle, arrogant, amoral, cunning, romantic, elegant, untruthful, cynical, realistic, manipulative. He offers a psychological explanation of Mitterrand's desire to dominate others as the need to conquer an innate diffidence. Politically, Tiersky defines Mitterrand as a "Machiavellian republican," with a shifting balance of Machiavellian instincts and republican concerns, or a kind of republican monarch.

To explain Mitterrand's complex character, Tiersky interestingly suggests that a defining moment was the 1959 Observatory Affair, the apparent assassination attempt on his life that he faked for political reasons. Yet, one remains dubious that following this incident, the man who had been a minister in eight governments in the Fourth Republic and was a master at the parliamentary game became more cautious, acquired gravitas, and moved to the political Left in the twenty-three years he was out of power.

More acceptable is Tiersky's discussion of Mitterrand's major policies and objectives during his presidency from 1981 to 1995. Mitterrand, long critical of

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the Fifth Republic, brought the French Left to accept its constitution and institutions and the idea of a strong presidency. He talked of himself as "the last of the all-powerful presidents." He skillfully steered his Socialist party to be the major party of the Left, relegating the Communists to a minor position. He adapted to four years of "cohabitation," sharing power with a non-Socialist prime minister and government. At the same time he was an Atlanticist, he adapted a pragmatic approach to European integration, favoring a kind of European "confederation" and strengthening the Franco-German partnership. The cosmopolitan Mitterrand was proud of his Parisian public projects—the new National Library, the Louvre Pyramid, and the Arche de la Défense.

Tiersky is fair but perhaps too generous about Mitterrand's controversial past, an issue that arose at the end of his life when his official position in the Vichy regime and a medal given him in March 1943 by Marshal Henri Phillippe Pétain were confirmed, as was his silence about the French discriminatory practices against and deportation of Jews to their death. Mitterrand never fully explained his continuing friendship and apparent protection of René Bousquet, head of the French police for a time during the war years, who was later indicted but never came to trial. Tiersky might have been more critical of Mitterrand's defense that new trials would do unwarranted damage to "national reconciliation" in a divided nation, more than "tardy justice meted out to a few old men for acts committed half a century ago."

A few slips: p. 355, the four cases were for crimes against humanity, not war crimes; pp. 57-58, Pierre Laval, whatever else he was, was not a fascist or Nazi sympathizer; p. 81, André Bettencourt, executive of L'Oréal, may have been a late resister but he was a more important supporter of right-wing and fascist groups; 345, in discussing the 3 October 1940 Statut des Juifs, Tiersky omits the major feature that Jews were defined by "race," not "religion."

MICHAEL CURTIS
Rutgers University

Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era *by Michael E. Latham. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 288 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $18.95.*

More than a decade after the demise of the USSR and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the question of the origins, course, and consequences of the cold war continues to be debated by scholars around the globe. Michael Latham's study of modernization fits into this genre. It offers a critique of the subject that conforms with the current emphasis on ideas and culture

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in the analysis of foreign policy, an approach that has become a post-cold war trademark of conventional accounts.

Distinguishing his work from previous analyses of the subject, Latham argues that past accounts have privileged the role of interests and strategic questions in foreign policy to the near exclusion of ideas, beliefs, and culture, pointing to the work of radical critics of U.S. policy as proof. In Latham's view, modernization was always more than an apologetic social science formula; it reflected a highly optimistic dimension of the Kennedy era. Latham, therefore, underscores the roots of the modernization enterprise in American society and culture, as well as in the cold war mission of the Kennedy administration. The result is an effort at the restoration of the legitimacy of American modernization theories and the view of politics and society that they reflected. It is a restoration that does not shy away from recognizing the policies that modernization theories were identified with, albeit while cautioning against adverse judgments of their authors.

Latham centers his investigation around three cases that are prefaced by an explanatory chapter that situates his approach to the subject: the Alliance for Progress; counterinsurgency and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam; and the Peace Corps. Two of the three focus on major areas of postwar U.S. intervention—Vietnam and Latin America—in which U.S. policy was publicly justified in terms of modernization. Latham, however, departs from such an interpretation to argue that modernization was more than an apology for U.S. foreign policy. He claims that it represented "a conceptual framework that articulated a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society and its ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally deficient" (p. 5). Latham concedes that the latter echoed ideas of Manifest Destiny and American imperialism. He maintains that "the ideology of modernization reframed imperial ideals, told Americans who they were and defined what a projection of their nation's power could achieve" (p. 68). As to those responsible for formulating this set of ideas and beliefs, Latham insists that their sincerity should not be questioned. They were true believers, convinced "that preventing 'wars of liberation' and promoting 'development' went hand in hand" (p. 67).

Latham's discussion, at times ambivalent and on other occasions blunt in its depiction of the role of social scientists as advisers and as legitimators of government policy, raises innumerable questions. Among them, are those of individual responsibility. But there is, in addition, the still nagging central question of how modernization, in the context of U.S. government policies such as counterinsurgency, can be justified in a democracy. The answer, I believe, is that it cannot, save by being defined in terms that essentially mask its objectives and the practice associated with it.

IRENE GENDZIER
Boston University

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Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politics and Interest Groups *by Brian F. Crisp. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2000. $55.00.*

Among several book-length efforts to explain Venezuela's recent crises, Brian Crisp's is the best effort in English to marry institutionalism and political economy. Some of its arguments will be contested, but it provides a promising framework on which to build. The political crises explained are rampant electoral abstention, rioting in 1989, two coup attempts in 1992, and the eclipse of the two largest parties after 1992. Crisp attributes these crises to two aspects of Venezuela's political economy: decades of stagnated development exacerbated by waste and corruption, and a failure of governments to adapt appropriately when the economic crisis came to a head. But he contends that these economic outcomes were consequences of the "institutional design" of the title. This design had concentrated policy making in the governing boards of the "decentralized public administration" (DPA) (state enterprises and independent agencies with budgets not subject to congressional approval) and myriad consultative commissions, bypassing the normal democratic politics of electoral representation. These commissions gave a privileged formal policy-making role to the peak business association FEDECAMARAS and the Confederation of Venezuela's Workers (CTV). These two monopolistic peak associations (business much more than labor) used this channel of influence to siphon off the state's oil wealth. Because they profited from the resulting exaggerated version of import substitution industrialization, exacerbated by the rentier statism typical of big oil exporters, these interests blocked a timely shift to a more market-oriented stance when the economic problems came to a head after 1979. Both presidents who attempted structural adjustment (Carlos Andrés Pérez 1989–1993 and Rafael Caldera 1994–1999) found their reforms frustrated. The same institutional design prevented an increasingly diverse civil society from demanding change through congress, so citizens either lost interest in voting or threw their support behind radically different leaders.

Crisp makes three contributions that are the best treatments available in English. First, his description of the formal legislative process is revealing. He authoritatively documents the inactivity of congress and its extreme dependence on presidential initiatives; he details the frequent resort to presidential decree powers and their various legal underpinnings; he also provides some useful new information on the growth and power of the DPA. Second, he pays exhaustive attention to the composition of the commissions, which had been almost wholly neglected by other scholars. Third, he connects the overinvestment of the state in the private sector to private disinvestment, profit-taking, and capital flight.

One controversial claim blames the weakness of congress and compensating strength of the executive entirely on electoral laws (controlled nominations, closed slates, concurrent elections, and legislative proportional representation).

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Some weight must be given to the underdevelopment of civil society, presidentialism per se, party traditions, and even the legacies of *caudillismo*. Another weakness is some ambiguity about what the state failed to adapt to. If policy makers had responded to the popular majority anytime between 1979 and 1996, as Crisp prescribes, they would have moved even farther away from structural adjustment, not closer. Crisp may also exaggerate the influence of the commissions. The fact that congress was weak, the executive strong, that business and labor were formally represented, and that public policy was biased in their favor does not necessarily mean that formal commissions were the channels through which influence was exercised. A less narrow explanation would recognize international policy diffusion, the imperatives of oil economies, political leadership exercised by politicians, and informal lobbying by mutually antagonistic conglomerates.

Overall, however, Crisp has made an important and provocative contribution to our understanding of Venezuelan politics that broadens the research agenda in an exemplary way and will be an essential reference for students of Venezuelan politics.

MICHAEL COPPEDGE
Johns Hopkins University

A European Security Architecture After the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy *by Gülnur Aybet. London, MacMillan, 2000. 316 pp. $69.95.*

The decade of the 1990s tells the story of how Western Europe and the United States—the "Western security community" in the author's words—sought to impose their values and institutional way of life on the losing side of the cold war—the former communist world in Europe. This was done through the medium of interlocking institutions: the European Union, NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The latter is a pan-European organization, coopted after the cold war into the support of Western values. Through the legitimacy conferred by these institutions—sometimes self-appointed, as in the European Union's Arbitration Commission for Yugoslavia, which "legalized" the transformation of the republics into sovereign states—the Western security community was to gain ascendancy for its views and claim for itself the conscience of the so-called international community.

Such is the thesis of Gülnur Aybet's dense and densely researched book on the post-cold war transformations in Europe and in Europe's "near abroad"—the Balkans, the Near East, and the Persian Gulf. The author makes the case that the Western security community deliberately set about in the aftermath of the cold war to project its values on a template of "interlocking institutions," referred to in NATO's communiqué issued in Rome in November 1991: "we

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are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation], the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other." At the beginning of the decade of the 1990s, NATO's New Strategic Concept, the EU's Maastricht declaration, and the CSCE's Charter of Paris constituted the West's blueprint. By virtue of the attraction of these institutions, the West was expected to "radiate stability" and establish a "hegemony of consent."

Unfortunately for the West, it encountered a series of anomalies in Yugoslavia and over time lost the nearly universal acceptance of its methods that was evident at the time of the Gulf War. These included most notably the proscription in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter on the use of force against the territorial integrity of member states. In the Yugoslav case, this was in contradiction with the principles of self-determination (Article 1.2) and respect for human rights (Article 1.3). The Western security community got around this by being able to portray a humanitarian crisis (in Bosnia) as a "threat to international peace and security" (p. 232).

Morally, as a result of these anomalies, the Western security community lost credibility and therefore its "legitimacy by consent" as it sought to impose itself on the postcommunist world. Institutionally, and partly because of these anomalies, the interlocking security architecture set forth in 1992 did not work as envisaged. Rather, it was NATO, together with the UN, that brought about the end of the Bosnian war. But in the process of its military liaisons with the former Eastern Bloc countries, NATO did exercise a certain stabilizing influence over the postcommunist world, as indicated by the inclusion of some of these countries' militaries in the intervention force in Bosnia.

The author's study of the complexities of the new security architecture, backed up by a wealth of supporting detail, ends in the aftermath of the Bosnian war. The further deterioration of the West's credibility vis-à-vis the outside world, as evidenced by NATO's unilateral bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999, could not be foreseen by the author. Neither could the revival of an autonomous European defense led by France, nor the emergence of a renascent chauvinism and strong-man rule in Russia. However, the author did anticipate that in a future crisis involving the above-described anomalies the United States might be reluctant to take the lead, and Russia might depart from the framework of intervention established with the West, such as through the Contact Group for Yugoslavia (p. 251).

At the end of the day, at Dayton, NATO had become the centerpiece of the European security architecture, replacing the OSCE, although the latter retained a certain role in spreading Western values through election monitoring and through observer groups in anticipated crisis areas. All along, however, and this is perhaps underemphasized by the author, the United States in the aftermath of the cold war was intent on developing new roles for NATO and ensuring that it did not go out of business. Much as France, and to a lesser degree Germany, wanted to make something out of the OSCE, even to the extent

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of equipping it with an intervention force, as France proposed, the United States would have none of it. Thus although these institutions—NATO, EU, OSCE—were interlocking, they were also in competition.

The author's overall argument becomes less convincing at a higher level of abstraction as she links it to Antonio Gramsci's thesis of a hegemony of consent, whereby the industrial nations of the West possessed a hegemonic power based on the elements of a civil society, including churches, schools, and the media. Though intriguing, Aybet's transposing of this thesis to the plane of relations between states seems more reflective of the need to conform events to a theory than of the task of illuminating the complexities of the events themselves; these the author recounts with compelling thoroughness and accuracy, albeit not without some repetition.

CHARLES G. COGAN
Harvard University

The Politics of Pension Reform: Institutions and Change in Western Europe *by Guiliano Bonoli. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 188 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95.*

Pensions are the heart of Western welfare states, so changes in them indicate the directions welfare states are heading. For this reason, Guiliano Bonoli chose to examine pension reform in a few key West European countries. The study contains detailed discussion of recent reforms in Britain, Switzerland, and France. In addition, shorter examinations of reforms in Italy, Sweden, and Germany help to add broader relevance to the book's major findings, which are compelling, though they significantly undermine the institutionalist theory he outlines at the outset of the study.

Bonoli's argument is that institutions, or more precisely constitutional structures, explain the success or failure, as well as the content of pension reform. Specifically, he argues that countries with majoritarian institutions allow dramatic changes in policy to be developed and implemented, even against strong public resistance. Polities with lots of "veto points" in their constitutional structure by contrast allow opponents of reform many opportunities to challenge government initiative. The result is either that reform fails or that it passes with numerous bargains and concessions to the concerns of organized interests. An analytic narrative is used to examine four cases in three countries; the 1986 pension reform in Britain, the Swiss reform of 1995, and two French reforms of 1993 and 1995.

The analytic narratives are well-done and provide good information for anyone interested in the history of these four reforms. But the complexity of the pension debates, so aptly demonstrated in the narratives, overwhelms the parsimonious argument. For example, in an effort to explain why the British govern-

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ment abandoned its effort to abolish the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme, Bonoli argues that the rift between the Treasury (which wanted to retain the scheme) and the Department of Health and Social Security (which advocated its abolition) constituted a veto point in the otherwise majoritarian system. One should wonder if it is appropriate to label a cabinet-level disagreement a veto point.

Also, in explaining the difference in the success of the 1993 and 1995 pension reforms in France, Bonoli argues that "cohabitation" in 1993 (Socialist president, right-wing prime minister) forced the government to strike deals with the unions, but that a unified right-wing executive in 1995 gave the government more room to maneuver. Yet the narrative indicates the president is not a significant actor in the area of pension policy. Therefore, cohabitation should not matter, and the difference between the two cases is due to electoral calculations of popular support for the government. Therefore, cohabitation really did not explain the difference anyway.

Armed with these counterfactuals, Bonoli draws the conclusion that institutions matter until they don't matter any more. Therefore, institutional analysis needs to be accompanied by a discussion of contextual factors that cannot be theoretically specified. At this point he briefly surveys pension reforms in Italy, Sweden, and Germany to develop a more interesting set of conclusions that attest to the role of political agency in the reform process. Bonoli argues that the success of a reform is determined by its timing, scale, and types of concessions governments are willing to make. In terms of timing, reform is easier after a few years of budget deficits have been accrued, because the government can use these to develop a sense of urgency. By contrast, projections of future budget deficits seem to generate opposition to pension reform. In terms of scale, reforms that tinker with the pension system are easier to implement than administrative reforms that upset the political balance of power. Therefore, changing the system of indexing is easier than disengaging labor unions from the administrative structure of a pension scheme. Finally, in contributory pension systems, reform is possible only by making major concessions to workers, who see themselves as stakeholders in the system. These findings are compelling grist for contemplating the new politics of pension reform and make this book a worthy read.

ROBERT HENRY COX
University of Oklahoma

Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States *by Matthew Krain. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 310 pp. $49.95.*

The literature on revolutions and revolutionary states continues to grow. We are experiencing something of a renaissance in their study, or so it appears given the number of books and articles published recently on these topics. This

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book is an interesting and informative addition to the list. In it, Matthew Krain examines whether an elite that comes to power through revolution chooses to repress or accommodate internal challengers in order to survive politically and build the new state.

The heart of the book is his effort to demonstrate what affects these choices and how they in turn affect the survival of the new rulers and the framework of the state being constructed. This produces three main conclusions: first, newly installed rulers who lack confidence about their political power tend to emphasize accommodation over repression; more confident rulers emphasize repression over accommodation. Second, rulers who repress tend to survive longer than those who accommodate, because the former likely weaken internal opposition to the new regime and the latter likely strengthen such opposition. Third, rulers who concentrate on repression early in their reign tend to create autocratic states, because without internal opposition they have "little incentive to give away rights and privileges" (p.151). Insecure rulers, meanwhile, trade away rights and privileges to the opposition in the hope of bolstering their positions in power. It is this early policy of accommodation—and its likely continuance—that supposedly lays the foundation for the building of a more democratic state.

There is a wealth of empirical evidence—both quantitative and qualitative—that serves to buttress these assertions. In addition, a variety of propositions, more or less related to the three main ones, are scattered throughout the volume. Each is tested in the context of four revolutionary conflicts: in Bolivia and Cuba beginning in the 1950s and in Iran and Nicaragua in the 1970s. As the choices a new leadership makes at the outset are critical to Matthew Krain's narrative—that is, from them follow the conditions for political survival and the direction of political development—the key propositions and tests are designed to isolate those factors that affect the use of repression and/or accommodation. Thus, he measures whether the new rulers view their internal power as strong or weak; a state's involvement in external war prompts one or another internal policy; and the success of past responses to internal challenges affects present ones. Along the way, much attention is paid to defining terms and the procedures for collecting data, detailing measurements and statistical computations.

The strength of the book is its attention to method and measurement. The data compiled to illustrate the discussion are also drawn from a variety of sources. But the focus on method and measurement is also its weakness: by comparison, less effort is expended on developing the theoretical facets of the narrative. This is despite the author's intent to offer a theory of state-building and elite choice. Reading the book, one comes away with the sense that Matthew Krain views individual chapters as stand-alone articles. One result is that everywhere narrative and method compete for space. And the former loses out.

For example, the author claims that rulers accommodate only if they must and repress if they can. Do rulers prefer repression? Why is internal opposition

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necessary for accommodation? Do ideas play a role in the choice of repression and/or accommodation? Do leaders learn of the risks that accommodation poses to their longevity? In sum, there is much to recommend about the book, though its value is greater empirically than theoretically.

PATRICK J. CONGE
University of Arkansas

Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European System *by Rey Koslowski. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2000. 256 pp. $39.95.*

In a pathbreaking new book, Rutgers University political scientist Rey Koslowski identifies the role of migration in transforming politics in Europe, with important implications for our understanding of the relationship between citizens and nation-states throughout the international system.

According to Koslowski, migrants in modern society are not assimilating into the host country in contrast to previous movements of peoples. Some migrants are displaced and end up in host countries with an intent to return to their countries of origin, while others are part of the global workforce, assuming a position abroad for a limited period. These temporary influxes of labor not only pose a political challenge for governance, but fundamentally alter the spatial relationship between citizen, the territorial boundaries of states, and political authority. For Koslowski (who examines early, nomadic migration as well as contemporary movements) international migration represents both a departure from and a return to the past, thereby requiring a reassessment of our traditional, territorially-bound conceptions of state sovereignty.

Koslowski's work itself crosses territorial boundaries. His analysis challenges international relations theory, which he finds to be a poor fit when applied to the phenomenon of migration. The study of international migration is not captured by classic international relations theories, which tend to be too state-centric and assume a fixed relationship between state boundaries and authority. Koslowski is more favorable to the social construction of territoriality, as developed by the constructivist school of international relations scholars. However, in contrast to other studies that focus on the interstate effects of migration, Koslowski examines the consequences of what he calls the "return to a polyethnic norm" (p. 71) for democracy and citizenship. The nation-state, as Koslowski argues, is the prominent organizing institution; yet this has not always been the case, nor is it likely to remain so in the future. The interdisciplinary nature of Koslowski's analysis and his capacity to move freely from empirical discussions of the effects of disease and mobility on populations to the implications for our theoretical understanding of the European state system and global politics differentiate this book from any other study on this topic.

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Scholars interested in law, state, and society will find fascinating comparative insights, such as the origin of differences between European and American nationality laws. "European states that experienced extensive emigration tended to adopt nationality laws based on the principle of ancestral lineage (*jus sanguinis*) so as to maintain ties with emigrants and facilitate the return of their children; settler societies of the New World tended to adopt nationality laws based on the principle of birthplace (*jus soli*) in order to facilitate the incorporation of immigrant children" (p. 27).

Scholars interested in the creation of a common European identity, or European Union (EU) citizenship and the challenges therein will find detailed accounts of the most recent developments in the much overlooked human dimension of European unification. Koslowski also documents the declining population of the EU, which he expects will create a demand for migrants and counter the political tendencies within these societies to be more restrictive regarding migrants. Thus, for those of us looking for materials to engage our students and to inspire our own scholarship, *Migrants and Citizens* is required reading.

CHRISTINE INGEBRITSEN
University of Washington, Seattle

Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine *by Paul Kubicek. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 284 pp. $49.50.*

The author, who spent the 1992–1993 academic year as a lecturer at L'viv State University in bleak newly-independent Ukraine and who was also supported by the Civic Education project, the Center of International Business Education at the University of Michigan, and by the College of Administrative Sciences and Economics at Koç University, Istanbul, has written a well-documented and theoretically very stimulating analysis of the travails of post-Soviet Ukraine. He terms Ukraine "somewhat [of] an outlier" even among the postcommunist states, all of which "are still grappling with institutional legacies from the past" (p. 218). Paul Kubicek's monograph is indispensable for understanding why, despite high initial hopes even by the Deutsche Bank, the Ukrainian economy still has not taken off at the turn of the twenty-first century, or almost ten years into independence. At the same time, his book gives a somewhat incomplete and misleading picture of Ukraine by not including the challenges to Ukraine from foreign powers, notably but not exclusively, Russia.

In the spring and summer of 1994, Kubicek gathered as many as fifty-three interviews from officials of about fifteen trade unions, eleven business and industrial associations, five agricultural groups, and nine government ministries and state bodies from all over Ukraine, and one interview in Budapest in 1997

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with an expert from the International Labor Organization. He has read widely in international professional journals, Ukrainian news magazines, and even newspapers. He shows convincingly that the socioeconomic development of Ukraine is being held back by "soft" authoritarianism or delegative democracy (p. 208) or by a "segmentary-coexistence, . . . which is typical of systems of limited state corporatism in which authoritarian elites have tolerated the survival of many pluralist features in order to fragment civil society and prevent the emergence of autonomous centers of power" (p. 208). Apart from the strong empirical sections on Ukraine itself, Kubicek is at his best in his comparisons with Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic under Vaclav Klaus, Hungary, and Poland, and when he briefly discusses and then rejects much of the teleological literature on "transitions to democracy" (pp. 13–19).

My only strong reservation deals with his neglect of Russia's consistent efforts to destroy Ukrainian independence from August 1991 on. Ukraine's declaration of independence from December 1991 until at least 1994 was abetted by U.S. ill-advised pressure to force the new Ukrainian state to give up its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Since then, weapons have been much more difficult to control than if they had been left in Ukraine. The books by Taras Kuzio and Sherman W. Garnett are necessary as a corrective to Kubicek's neglect of foreign affairs.

A sense of fundamental insecurity as a nation-state, the memories of having lost independence after only three years in 1920, the impact of the grisly genocide of the 1930s ill-disguised as collectivization, and pressures from Moscow and elsewhere in the 1990s, have led many Ukrainian workers and factory directors to give the existing government the benefit of the doubt. It was not an alleged "fetish of the state" (p. 196) but living historical memories and sound political judgment. If the Ukrainian political elites show equally sound judgment, they will return the trust by sharing their wealth with the workers and peasants and managers before Ukraine is sold piecemeal to Russia's large energy company, *Gazprom*, in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

YAROSLAV BILINSKY
University of Delaware

Uncivil Movements and Democracy in Latin America *by Leigh A. Payne. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 298 pp. $42.50*

In this book on armed rightwing movements in Latin America, Leigh Payne makes a substantial contribution to the literature on democratization. Theoretically, her use of a constructivist approach to explain the origins, evolution, and decline of armed rightwing groups is an interesting departure from existing approaches. Furthermore, the armed right wing is an understudied phenomenon whose importance is underscored by the increasing role of such groups in Co-

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lombia's internal conflict. Payne's field research on the Argentine *carapintadas* (camouflage face paint that rebels wore during 1987 uprising), Brazilian Rural Democratic Union, and the Nicaraguan contras generates new data on these groups and is an exceptional achievement in its own right, given the difficulty of gaining access to the often paranoid world of violent rightwing groups.

In this book, Leigh Payne adopts a cultural institutional approach that challenges the existing literature of democratization and social movements in its explanation of armed political groups, which she terms uncivil movements. She argues that uncivil movements, even if not large or enduring, can impose serious limitations on the quality of democracy in emerging regimes. She defines uncivil movements as armed groups that partake of both the institutionalized politics of parties and government and the mobilizing strategies of social movements to attack democratic governments. She also argues that uncivil movements rely on political framing to mobilize supporters against alleged threats to their interests arising from democratization, drawing on cultural cues for their repertoire of activities against the government and developing legitimizing myths to justify their behavior and existence. In the face of the threat that even relatively weak uncivil movements pose to democracy, Payne challenges existing assumptions that social movements are inherently good for democratic consolidation. She also argues against prescriptions for government moderation vis à vis conservative movements found in existing literature on democratization.

The field research used to produce this book is outstanding, making it well worth reading for its depiction and close analysis of the world of rightwing uncivil movements alone. Although some of the uncivil movements analyzed in this book are relatively well studied, such as the Argentine *carapintadas*, Leigh Payne has interviewed an exhaustive number of participants in these movements and presents a wealth of new material on this highly secretive world. Moreover, the case studies are clear and comprehensive, making good use of direct quotes from interviewees. Having conducted field research on similar groups, I can appreciate the difficulty of this endeavor and the exceptional quality of Payne's achievement in this area. As she shows in her concluding chapter, the theoretical framework used in this book can be extended to analyze other uncivil movements outside of Latin America.

This book does have two drawbacks. First, Payne dismisses the existing literature on democratization and social movement too quickly, essentially arguing that it underestimates the threat posed by uncivil movements. However, significant work in this area, such as that by Juan Linz on the role of semiloyal and disloyal parties in democracies, is only briefly discussed (p. 12). Some additional discussion of why such theories are not adequate to explain this phenomenon would have been useful and would have further substantiated Payne's argument. Second, in her case studies, Payne presents such a dense picture of these movements that her theoretical argument regarding political frames, cultural cues, and mythmaking is sometimes obscured. More explicit reference to the theoretical framework during the description and analysis of each of the

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cases would strengthen her argument. Nevertheless, this book is an exceptional achievement, and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the role of armed movements in democratic politics.

HAROLD A. TRINKUNAS
Naval Postgraduate School

Coming to Terms: South Africa's Search for the Truth *by Martin Meredith. New York, Public Affairs, 1999. 390 pp. $27.50.*

Public investigation into the ugly pasts of authoritarian regimes is now a global phenomenon, not simply in that investigations are widespread but also because their conduct in one setting influences their form and purpose in another. Convened after the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) both drew on past experiences in Latin America and has itself been touted as a model for replication elsewhere. Truth commissions in general have been celebrated as a means of "reconciling" antagonistic social groups and strengthening democratic transition and consolidation. But at the same time, they have met with a good deal of criticism, even cynicism, for the seeming trade-offs they encourage between truth and reconciliation on the one hand and justice on the other. The use of amnesty for those who committed heinous acts defined as "political," such as in South Africa, has been especially controversial. And the degree to which truth commissions accomplish reconciliation and where we would look for evidence are matters of no small dispute.

Martin Meredith, in *Coming to Terms*, does not address these questions in great depth. Instead, he focuses on the process of South Africa's TRC, on the stories of victims and their families, of torturers and their connections to the highest levels of the National party that ruled South Africa for close to fifty years. It is a sobering, even-handed account. Like the commission itself, Meredith focuses on the outrages perpetrated by the apartheid regime without neglecting the abuses committed by apartheid's opponents. The appalling lengths to which the regime went to reproduce its domination, even when well known, do not fail to shock. Hearing these stories told in the voices of those who suffered (the forgiving and the angry) and those who committed awful acts (the remorseful and the defiant) allows the reader to imagine how complex the new South Africa's future will be, how the memory of political acts of the past transmutes into a politics of memory in the present.

An extraordinary amount of *Coming To Terms* is comprised of direct transcriptions of testimonies made to the TRC. There is very little in the way of interviews or other documentation outside of what took place in front of the commission. Thus, the impact of this book beyond the visceral effects of the testimony is minimal. Certainly there is little new in it for South Africans, where

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this ground has been covered with obsessive fervor by journalists, academics, and members and staff of the commission. Even for the non-South African reader, many of the more dramatic cases, such as those of Eugene (Prime Evil) de Kock and Winnie Mandela, were heavily covered in the Western press at the time of their hearings. We do hear of less publicized events: the frightening and bizarre efforts to develop a black-only "race poison" and other attempts at chemical and biological warfare are especially chilling. But by sticking so closely to the TRC text, Meredith does not go very far in illuminating the effects of the public airing and recording of apartheid's awful legacy.

The lack of in-depth analysis makes *Coming To Terms* well-meaning but superficial. There are insights to be gleaned, but most are implicit in the stories. It is only in the last pages that we get the author's sense of the TRC's impact: even for those amnestied and thus immune to criminal prosecution, the very fact of their public naming constituted a form of justice; at a societal level little reconciliation had been produced by the TRC but the commission has set "the foundation for a common understanding of the past" (p. 323). However, Meredith has little to say about how we, and more importantly South Africans, would know that this is the case.

Fortunately, Tina Rosenberg's foreword and afterword to *Coming To Terms* add some needed analytical weight. The afterword in particular helps contextualize the South African case by putting it into a comparative perspective. Rosenberg also argues for the growing importance of international law and institutions, especially internationally organized criminal courts. One hopes that future research will test her claim that the most powerful effect of these mechanisms is to "persuade perpetrators to do things they would not otherwise do—come forward with the truth . . . or submit to national justice" (p. 366). To catch up on the basics of South Africa's TRC is the reason for reading Meredith. To get a sense of the strengths and limits of publicly organized memory institutions like truth commissions, and to find something to nod your head to and to argue with, skip directly to Rosenberg's afterword.

RONALD KASSIMIR
Social Science Research Council

Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality *by Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000. 511 pp. $35.00.*

As with Ronald Dworkin's other leading works, there is much to commend and much to criticize in this book. It brings together a collection of his previously published essays on issues of equality, along with three new chapters. Not all will endorse Dworkin's style of argument or the positions he stakes out. But even those who are unpersuaded by this book's central claims may benefit from engaging them.

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Sovereign Virtue is divided into two parts. The first offers a theory of equality. It contains classic Dworkinean abstract analysis, including heavy reliance on artificial distinctions and elaborate analysis of hypothetical scenarios. Part Two, "Practice," examines issues of equality in relation to contemporary political controversies involving the provision of health care, welfare reform, campaign finance, affirmative action, genetics, sexual choice, and assisted suicide. The two parts are designed to offer complementary treatments of the same argument, developed from different perspectives.

Among the most creative and original parts of the book are those utilizing the device of a hypothetical insurance market as a model for analyzing conceptions of equality, evaluating existing institutions and distributions of resources, and implementing particular redistributive policies. Dworkin's unifying commitment is to "equality of resources," which he distinguishes from "equality of welfare." His initial construct to conceptualize the former is a distribution of privately owned goods through an auction among equal individuals. He emphasizes, however, that these individuals would differ in their respective abilities, luck, earning power, and the like. Thus Dworkin introduces the idea of a hypothetical insurance market to identify premiums that rational actors would choose if they faced equal risks of benefiting or suffering from the relevant advantages and disadvantages. In his view, equality of resources would be promoted by taxing and spending at levels corresponding to the premiums and payments that would be set by such a market.

In the "practical" chapters, Dworkin extends these arguments to analyze a range of policy issues. More specifically, he argues in reliance on the insurance model both that Americans spend too much overall on health care and that government provides too little such spending. Similarly, he argues that recent welfare reforms establish levels of unemployment and underemployment compensation below what a reasonable person would choose under conditions of equal resources. Thus he argues that government should raise taxing and spending levels for health and welfare so that they approximate more closely the results yielded by his insurance scheme.

Though the main focus of the book is distributional equality, two chapters focus on political equality. The earlier one advocates a "dependent" conception of democracy: one likely to produce results that treat all members of a community with equal concern. A later chapter extends these arguments by advocating expenditure limits on political campaigns along with other restrictions designed to make political participation available to more citizens on an equal footing, improve the quality of public discourse, or both. Interestingly though, Dworkin leaves little room in his theory for assertions of political power by the purportedly sovereign people or their governmental representatives based on conceptions of equality at odds with what he claims are the requirements of "true equality."

I find various aspects of this book, like much of Dworkin's analytic writing, simultaneously brilliant and tedious, fascinating and offputting, provocative

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and annoying, insightful and misguided. Few will deny the importance of continued thinking about problems of distributive justice, and those seriously considering these issues will find it difficult to ignore Dworkin's distinctive and original contributions. His work will doubtless be at the center of ongoing debates about principles of equality, their implications in practice, and their relationships to other political ideals.

WAYNE D. MOORE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain *by Peter Grose. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000. 256 pp. $25.00*

Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956 *by Gregory Mitrovich. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2000. 235 pp. $32.50*

Over the past quarter of a century, as archival records have been declassified, it has gradually become clear that in the later 1940s the United States adopted a strategy not only of containment of Soviet aggression but also of subversion of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. This marks a considerable revision of the contemporary impression that the Truman administration had adopted containment, and the successor Eisenhower administration had undertaken to roll back communist rule and Soviet hegemony. As these two new studies document, as early as 1946 the Truman administration had in secrecy adopted a strategic concept that also embraced the aim of rolling back communism even in the Soviet Union itself, and that the high point of such efforts was the period 1948 through 1952. By the time the Eisenhower administration came into office proclaiming a need to roll back communism, it had become clear within the government that earlier expectations of opportunity to roll back the Iron Curtain had been excessively optimistic, and efforts to do so had been woefully unsuccessful. From 1953 through 1955 covert activities aimed at undermining Soviet rule continued, but diminished. By 1956, Western inaction during the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising demonstrated to all that the United States and NATO were not prepared to aid an actual attempt to roll back communist rule.

The two books under review complement each other. Peter Grose's *Operation Rollback* provides the context of American wartime covert operations in Eastern Europe and a transition to postwar covert subversive action against the Soviet Union in the same area. Albania appeared to be the most vulnerable, isolated, and easy target; but U.S. and British efforts failed dismally (not only because Soviet mole Kim Philby was involved). Grose notes briefly other failed

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attempts to aid indigenous resistance in Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with Russian and Ukrainian agents and émigré organizations.

Gregory Mitrovich in *Undermining the Kremlin* makes but passing reference to such operations. His contribution is rather in research in the declassified archives on U.S. policy making and policy on covert activities from 1946 to 1956. Both Mitrovich and Grose emphasize the important and active role that George Kennan played in the late 1940s in advocating covert subversive operations—personifying the "offensive" side to containment. Mitrovich also advances new evidence of the role played by Charles (Chip) Bohlen in the early 1950s in moderating such attempts to roll back Soviet power.

Mitrovich's most original and controversial argument is that the changing strategic balance played a major part in leading the United States to moderate and then abandon its rollback strategy. He sees growing Soviet ability to strike the United States, even though the United States maintained superiority, as undercutting American belief that it could press a challenge in covert political warfare. I believe Mitrovich exaggerates this impact. He argues that when in 1952, "Intelligence estimates warned that by 1954 a Soviet nuclear first strike might be able to destroy U.S. mobilization capabilities and preempt its retaliatory atomic forces," this meant that "the balance of power had now swung from American preponderance to Soviet advantage" (p. 12). While this alarmist estimate of what the Soviet Union might be able to do in two years did have impact, it did not mean that the balance of power had changed. The predicted growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile for 1954 did not materialize. Similarly, Mitrovich argues that although the United States had unquestioned strategic nuclear superiority throughout the 1950s, "it did not possess secure second-strike retaliatory forces" (p. 187). Although at the time many argued that the United States was in danger of losing its assured retaliatory capability, in retrospect and with a realistic evaluation of Soviet capabilities, it seems clear that the United States never was in danger of losing assured retaliatory capability. Most important, there is no evidence that the Soviet political or military leaders ever thought so. The changing strategic balance in the 1950s may have added to other considerations that led to abandonment of rollback, but as Mitrovich's account bears witness, there were other good reasons for reconsidering a failed policy of covert political warfare aimed at overthrowing communist rule.

Both books note the broader American propaganda and political warfare programs represented by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the covert funding of such organizations as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Mitrovich, however, refers to them only in passing. Grose discusses these aspects of political warfare more extensively, although he adds little that is new. Mitrovich does note attempts to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Soviet Union. Under auspices of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in the Truman years, there were programs to disrupt Kremlin decision making (Operation Overload), to induce Soviet officials to defect (Operation Engross), and to exploit anticipated

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Soviet disorientation and disorganization after Stalin's death (Operation Cancellation). But apart from identifying the existence of these operations, Mitrovich has not been able to learn whether they actually led to any active efforts, much less any identifiable results.

Mitrovich deals primarily with policy making on political warfare in the first decade of the cold war, Grose with implementation of the policy. Both are useful, documented books. For the student of policy making, Mitrovich's study is the most comprehensive but can be usefully supplemented with Grose's. For most readers, Grose's book is the easier read and offers more information on what happened. Some errors in the Grose volume raise questions of confidence in detail, but they do not vitiate the account.

These books are welcome contributions to better understanding the early cold war concerns and responses of American decision makers, especially the offensive edge to the policy of containment. What we still do not know is the impact actions to realize such offensive objectives had on the Soviet leaders. We know they took very seriously Western programs of subversion and almost certainly exaggerated the scope of actual covert action. But how did that affect their own policy and actions? Perhaps further digging in yet unopened Soviet archives will help us determine what influences on Soviet policy, for better or worse, these Western activities may have had.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries *by William Ascher. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 340 pp. Paper, $17.99.*

Why is there such waste and degradation of natural resources in developing countries? Why do governments limit their own earnings through the adoption of policies that promote wasteful resource extraction? Why do governments underprice timber and oil and promote inefficient use of energy through subsidization? These are some of the puzzles that William Ascher addresses in his extensive and broad-ranging analysis of government failure to manage natural resources effectively and efficiently. The puzzles are fascinating and important. Ascher sets out to answer these puzzles through case studies of the management of forest, oil, mining, land, and water resources in sixteen developing countries: Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Mexico (2 case studies), Sabah, Sarawak, Chile, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Peru, Venezuela. He makes use of this unusually large number of qualitative case studies to draw out patterns of behavior across a diverse set of countries and resource areas. The case studies are generally of good quality, although a few are a bit

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dated. The reader will find very useful the various tables that typologize instances of policy failures and the causes of those failures.

Ascher finds that poor resource practices are caused by bad government policies that result in the mispricing of inputs and products. Other factors also play a role. These include poor information, vague property rights, monopoly arrangements, direct orders to over or under exploit the resource base, and under or over capitalization of the state agencies dealing with natural resource exploitation. Not infrequently, natural resources are exploited to finance controversial development projects, to provide economic benefits to particular groups, to capture natural resource rents for the central treasury, or to win political allies for other objectives.

The concluding chapter provides suggestions for policy improvements. First and foremost, Ascher suggests, natural resources should not be under governmental control, but rather in private or communal hands. Second, there should be transparency in decision making and a role for nongovernmental organizations. In addition, governmental bodies should be restructured and the mandates of state agencies simplified so that agency jurisdiction is clear and each agency is given only one mandate. In his closing paragraphs, he contends that natural resource extraction should not be subsidized in an effort to achieve other political goals, such as income redistribution or poverty alleviation. These issues should be addressed through taxation and budgeting and not the diversion of funds from natural resource exploitation. These suggestions may be reasonable, but they will be difficult to apply in the diverse political, economic, and social conditions that characterize the developing countries examined in this work.

This book is an important addition to the literature on the causes of natural resource abuse in the developing world. It is rich in both politicoeconomic theorizing and case study analysis. The book does focus rather heavily on economic explanations and gives only more limited attention to institutional, structural, and cultural factors that play a role in how natural resources are viewed and managed in different countries. It places primary responsibility for bad management in the lap of governmental actors and governmental policy. Some readers will question whether a study of natural resource management success stories in the developing world would lead to any different conclusions about the role government can play in natural resource management. The book's focus on natural resource exploitation in the developing world also leaves open questions about the responsibility of the industrialized nations of the world and the pressures they may place on developing nations to exploit natural resources in an inefficient way. Most readers will agree, however, that this is an impressive scholarly work. It will be important reading for students of environmental politics and international development, policy makers, and activists concerned about the wasteful use of natural resources.

MIRANDA A. SCHREURS
University of Maryland at College Park

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Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran *by Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi. New York, New York University Press, 1999. 312 pp. $75.00.*

Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi have chosen an interesting moment to publish their extraordinary study of the "art of persuasion" in the Islamic Republic of Iran. After all, some twenty years after a coalition of clerics and lay ideologues stirred a "nation into revolutionary trance" (p. 6), the former minister of Islamic guidance now leads a reform whose spokesmen include many of the once radical students who stormed the American Embassy in 1979. People will read this book not only to discover how a "whole national psyche" turned "itself into a museum of . . . furious art" (p. 10); they will also look to it for clues as to why some of the architects of symbolic rage—such as President Mohammad Khatami—became advocates of symbolic tolerance. The conceptual framework deployed in this book does a very good job of addressing the first question, but must be mildly tweaked to shed more light on the second.

At the outset, it appears that this framework is inspired by a kind of psychological or cultural reductionism. However, while the authors assert that the "Islamic Revolution extended the full metaphysical possibility of the ancestral faith to the furthest corners of radical political life" (p. 22), their principle conceptual goal is to transcend the pitfalls of both cultural essentialism and instrumentalist universalism. They do so by linking a Weberian-Durkheimian analysis of the sociopsychological dynamics that create alienation and disenchantment to a semiotic analysis of how the elite recast prevailing cultural symbols into revolutionary ideologies that address man's existential need for collective and personal meaning. In analyzing this shift from symbolic disorientation to ideology, paradigm or *episteme*, Chelkowski and Dabashi serve up a theoretical and empirical treat that should attract attention from scholars and students whose interests reach far beyond the shores of Iran, the Middle East, or even the Islamic world. Critical to this feat is their deft use of well-chosen examples of the colorful, moving, and sometimes shocking posters, graffiti, primary school text books, banknotes, coins, calendars, and political rhetoric that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his allies used to make and sustain the Islamic revolution.

The authors' attempt to bridge the Weberian sociology and postmodern semiotics works well, although I often found the scholastic discourse used to explain mass alienation more accessible and coherent than the specialized and at times fuzzy concepts used to explain "signification." The authors rely on the analyses of myth devised by Ernst Cassirer and Hans Blumenberg to access the former. Cassirer's argument that myth addresses the innate desire of *animal symbolicum* (or symbolic man) to be—in the words of Chelkowski and Dabashi—"perpetually enchanted with the world" (p. 33) is compelling. Similarly, Blumenberg's argument that when faced by the "absolutism of reality"—or as Chelkowski and Dabashi put it, the "unbearable angst of facing an infinite world" (p. 64)—myth helps man to "make life meaningful and trustworthy"

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(p. 38) and also builds on the ideas of theorists of alienation such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim, and Edward Shils. These scholars sought to explain how cultural symbols become avenues for charismatic or utopian experience during periods of rapid modernization. But what they did less well was to explain the mechanism by which the traditional symbols become tools of a new revolutionary ideology.

To plumb this dynamic, Chelkowski and Dabashi employ Roland Barth's "ontology of . . . signification" (p. 41). As I understand it, Barth made a key contribution by theorizing the link between iconic symbols and the written language that accompanies such symbols. Iconic images speak to the often unconscious visions of community transmitted in paintings, plays, or religious rituals. They are the bait revolutionary ideologues sink to hook the imaginations of their prospective followers. The written language—often a well crafted slogan—directs disciples toward a desired conclusion, one that irrevocably transforms myths in ways that facilitate the goals of the ideologue.

Chelkowski and Dabashi vividly display this dynamic. Using photos, posters, and words, they show how Ayatollah Khomeini and his lieutenants transformed the annual Shi'ite processions which recall and reenact the martyrdom of Abu Abdullah Hussein ibnAli (the second leader or "Imam" of the Shi'ites) into an ideology of deliberate—as opposed to inadvertent—self-sacrifice. This metamorphosis facilitated both the toppling of the shah and the eight-year struggle to repulse Iraq's invasion, during which Khomeini galvanized tens of thousands of young people to surrender their lives. But their semiotic analysis becomes rather fuzzy when it comes to addressing a key issue: the critical relationship between intellectual ideologues and followers. Are both animated by a similar logic, as the authors suggest when they assert that "observer, the observed and the act of observation become one" (p. 40)? Or does the ideologue's blatant instrumentalization of culture suggest a more complicated and contradictory relationship between elites and masses?

DANIEL BRUMBERG
Georgetown University

The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century *by A. James Gregor. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 256 pp. $30.00*

Brief as this book is, it is actually two books in one. What I will call the first book is the fascinating story of attempts by Marxist analysts after World War I to come to terms with the nature of fascism, culminating in the extraordinary conclusion in the late 1960s and 1970s that Leninist governments themselves could apparently be fascistic.

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Here Gregor recounts the Herculean efforts of Marxist theorists in the 1920s and 1930s to make sense of fascism, which led to pretentious and contradictory analyses that revealed more about the paucity of Marxist theory than about the nature of fascist politics. However, with the thaw in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death in 1953, and more especially with the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet struggle less than a decade thereafter—with theorists in China and the Soviet Union regularly denouncing each another's states as fascist—it was not long before some thinkers began to have the awful insight that Marxist-Leninist regimes themselves might be fascistic wherever they were found.

Significant as Gregor's story certainly is, it would have profited from a clearer statement of the theoretical conundrum Marxist analysis was unraveling. For it was axiomatic to this thinking that the socioeconomic "base" of any people determined the form of a country's political "superstructure." Gradually, however, the terrible light began to dawn that political life might have its own logic and be a historical force in its own right, not simply independent of its base but capable of actively restructuring it. Hadn't this been true of Stalin? And Mao? And Mussolini and Hitler?

Far from the scene it might appear to many in the West that Sino-Soviet name-calling was of no real substance. But in fact, the self-realization that some Marxists were coming to was profoundly unsettling, doing much by the 1980s to deideologize, delegitimize, and ultimately discombobulate Moscow's ruling elite. While most readers may find tiresome Gregor's synopsis of one Marxist analyst after another, the story he tells is so amazing that it deserves the careful account he gives it.

Gregor's second book deals with the nature of fascist thinking in its own right. Whatever the varieties of fascist thought, Gregor wants to establish as well the identity of a generic fascism, a militaristic state capable of surfacing in situations of late economic development where national pride has been humiliated by powerful outside forces.

Gregor is persuasive in arguing that fascism should not be seen as "irrational" and so dismissed as a serious political ideology. To the contrary, he speculates that it may be based on a better understanding of the human condition than Marxism (whose hyperintellectualism Gregor roundly mocks), a conclusion likely to surprise and instruct many. As a serious political argument with appeal in a variety of historical contexts, fascism remains a threat in our day as well.

Where Gregor stops short, however, is in applying this final point to contemporary conditions. He analyzes certain groups in today's Russia as fascist; he implies that present-day China is fascist, as is North Korea as well. But the reader is left without a fuller application of Gregor's worrisome analysis to Latin America (Hugo Chavez in Venezuela) or the Middle East (Saddam Hussein in Iraq). Nor does he attempt to tell us how America and its democratic allies might react to the resurgence of neofascism. For an answer to these press-

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ing questions, we presumably must await Gregor's next book in the hope that he will apply his telling analysis to the world of the twenty-first century.

TONY SMITH
Tufts University

Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: An Essay on Financial Globalization and Fragility *by Alexandre Lamfalussy. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 200 pp. $25.00.*

As many emerging market countries have recovered from the recent financial crisis, government and business leaders have begun losing interest in the various proposals to reform the international financial architecture. Alexandre Lamfalussy warns against such complacency, arguing that globalization has made future crises all but inevitable. In this book, he attempts to do two things. First, he compares four financial crises—Latin American 1982–1983, Mexico 1994–1995, East Asia 1997–1998, and Russia 1998—and looks for similarities and variation in international and domestic developments before each crisis, how the crises unfolded and spread, and how the international community responded. Ultimately, this inductive exercise, though informative, does not generate many useful conclusions. As the author points out, the four episodes have too many differences, and therefore the only generalizations that emerge are vague and obvious: for instance, "large-scale accumulation of short-term external debt, which eventually became unsustainable, was at the heart of the four crises" (p. 65).

Lamfalussy is more successful in his second task: examining the effects of globalization on the crises and considering what can be done to avert or at least mitigate future crises. His discussion of globalization's aggravating effects covers some familiar ground, taking note of the difficulties emerging markets have in absorbing enormous capital inflows, the dynamics of contagion, and the characteristic herd behavior of investors. Less familiar are some of the ways globalization can alleviate crises; for instance, the global concentration of the financial service industry may enhance the capability of these institutions to hedge risks, to absorb losses, and to take a longer view when participating in organized International Monetary Fund-(IMF) rescue packages. On balance, however, he sees an exacerbating effect. In particular, increasing global competition has led Western creditors to search frantically for higher returns on ever-riskier investments. In all the episodes he examines, ample warning signs of these increasing risks appeared for anyone who cared to look. Few investors did.

The author's pessimistic attitude carries over into his recommendations. Lamfalussy appreciates the importance of the conventional prescriptions for the emerging market countries (sound macropolicy, sensible exchange rate policy, well-managed liberalization of capital flows, etc.), but he also warns that

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these are not always sufficient to prevent a crisis and that in some cases they may not even be of much help. For instance, providing more information to investors will either be useless (because it will be disregarded) or dangerous (if the IMF tries to add a qualitative interpretation). The most original contribution he makes in this section is to focus attention on the developed countries. It is not just that investors from the rich world share the responsibility for the unsustainable buildup of debt. The author's analysis of the Russian crisis leads him to warn that financial fragility in the developed world, interacting with an emerging market crisis, poses the gravest threat to the global financial system.

The book, though short, is densely packed with information and analysis. Lamfalussy's background (he has headed both the Bank for International Settlements and the European Monetary Institute) has given him a deep understanding of how these crises occur and what can (or, more often, cannot) be done to address them. Surprisingly, the author downplays the political aspects of these episodes. Strengthening the domestic legal, institutional, and financial infrastructure, which Lamfalussy says must be done before liberalization and deregulation, will involve intense distributional struggles and wrenching political changes. More attention to politics might have made Lamfalussy even more pessimistic about the future stability of the international financial system.

JONATHAN CRYSTAL
Fordham University

Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics *by Roland Bleiker. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 304 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $22.95.*

Is there a role for human agency in an era of increased globalization? Roland Bleiker poses and tackles this question in a provocative, philosophical way. Two main points are defended: there is a meaningful way to understand the role of human agency in global politics; and a positive concept of human agency can rest on fluid, as opposed to fixed epistemological foundations. According to Bleiker, human agency can best be approached through a close examination of "transversal" practices of dissent. By "transversal" Bleiker means "a political practice that not only transgresses national boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations" (p. 2).

In particular, potentially subversive linguistic practices—including, poetry, novels, aphorisms, essays, and the like—have played an important part in transforming global politics. Bleiker points to the influence of poetic underground magazines in Eastern Germany that he holds partially responsible for transforming societal values and common sense, helping eventually to trigger the sudden collapse of the Berlin Wall. Yet, as spectacular as the fall of the wall

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surely was, Bleiker cautions us not to focus too sharply on such great events. First, great events are usually preceded by slower and less dramatic challenges to dominant forms of discourse. Second, even great explosions of popular dissent are not capable of entirely toppling entrenched power relations. In Eastern Germany, for example, the Communist party was removed from power, but practices of gender discrimination and domination may actually have become further embedded.

Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics is refreshing in the sense that it challenges the Etienne de la Boetie's theory of dissent that rests on an ahistoric understanding of the relationship between ruler and ruled and tends to accept, work within, and reproduce a state-centric view of the global politics. Bleiker urges instead a methodology that analyzes dissent at a more mundane level of daily life and discourse. The theoretical promise of this approach rests on moving the agent-structure debate in international relations theory to an entirely new plane that recognizes that global politics is not dominated exclusively by the principle of state sovereignty. Localized practices of dissent (that paradoxically operate across territories and are transversal) also exercise a significant influence within international politics.

Bleiker argues, moreover, that to understand transversal dissent requires a deessentialized concept of human agency, that is, a concept that treats agency as contingent and rooted in fluid discursive practices. More grounded notions of human agency, Bleiker seems to fear, represent simply another grab for power that only further restricts human agency. Ironically, in the process of making this argument, Bleiker tends to render a dichotomous understanding of agency in which it can only be exercised in opposition to domination. This strikes me as an overly restrictive view of human agency. There may be no escape from power, but I see every reason to believe that agency is also involved in the creative production of novel forms of social order and meaning (whether we regard these formations as sometimes benign or otherwise).

Ultimately, Bleiker's effort to theorize human agency distracts him from either a systematic theoretical or empirical exploration of transversal forms of dissent in concrete-historical perspective. And, in the end, I am left to wonder whether one needs an abstract, philosophical theory of agency—as Bleiker implies—in order actually to dissent, to make decisions, and to act as a human agent. I prefer to think not.

KENNETH G. LAWSON
University of Utah

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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